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Increasing the expressiveness of information flow labels can improve the per-
missiveness of an enforcement mechanism. This thesis studies two formula-
tions of expressive information flow labels: RIF labels and label chains. Restric-
tions that a reactive information flow (RIF) label imposes on a value depend on the
sequence of operations used to derive that value. This allows declassication, en-
dorsement, and other forms of reclassication to be supported in a uniform way.
Piecewise noninterference (PWNI) is introduced as the appropriate security policy.
A type system is given for static enforcement of PWNI in programs that asso-
ciate checkable classes of RIF labels with variables. Two checkable classes of RIF
labels are described: general-purpose RIF automata and κ-labels for programs
that use cryptographic operations. But labels themselves can encode informa-
tion, and thus, certain restrictions should be imposed on their use, too. A new
family of dynamic enforcement mechanisms is derived to leverage arbitrarily
long label chains, where each label in the chain defines restrictions for its prede-
cessor. These enforcers satisfy Block-safe Noninterference (BNI), which proscribes
leaks from observing variables, label chains, and blocked executions. Theorems
characterize where longer label chains improve permissiveness of dynamic en-
forcement mechanisms that satisfy BNI. These theorems depend on semantic
attributes of such mechanisms as well as on initialization, threat model, and
size of lattice of labels.
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
Elisavet Kozyri received a Diploma in Electrical and Computer Engineering
from the National Technical University of Athens in 2010. She also received
the M.S. in Computer Science from Cornell University in 2015. As part of her
doctoral studies at Cornell, she completed a graduate minor in Mathematics.
iii
To Pagona.
iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I thank my advisor Fred B. Schneider for believing in me, for teaching me to
think, write, and present like a scientist, and for never stopping improving the
clarity of this thesis. He was the catalyst for my academic and personal evo-
lution. I thank Emin Gu¨n Sirer for giving me the opportunity to teach my first
class in Operating Systems, Richard A. Shore for teaching me logic, and Andrew
C. Myers for sharing his expertise in the field of information flow control.
I am thankful to my collaborators in research and teaching. To Jose´e De-
sharnais, Nadia Tawbi, Owen Arden, and Andrew Bedford for their patience,
constructive criticism, and personal support. To Michael R. Clarkson for giv-
ing me the opportunity to design and give lectures on information flow control
and for setting the best possible example as a lecturer and as an older academic
brother.
My doctoral studies would have been colorless without my extremely tal-
ented fellow students. I am fortunate to have you as my friends: Deniz Al-
tinbu¨ken, Konstantinos Mamouras, Bishan Ding, Stavros Nikolaou, Thodoris
Lykouris, Efe Gencer, and Moontae Lee.
I am always grateful to my family. To my parents, Zoi and Georgios, who
let me free to follow my dream and who are always by my side. To my sister,
Alexandra, who makes the ocean that separates us seem like a small pond. To
my uncle, Giannis, who has always been a third parent to me. I thank my hus-
band, Thodoris, for building together a dream team whose main player is our
sweet daughter Zoe—my life.
The research in this dissertation was supported in part by AFOSR grant
F9550-16-0250, NSF grant 1642120, and grants from Microsoft. The views and
conclusions contained herein are those of the authors and should not be inter-
v
preted as necessarily representing the official policies or endorsements, either
expressed or implied, of these organizations or the U.S. Government.
vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Biographical Sketch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
Dedication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
Table of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
1 Introduction 1
1.1 From Access Control to Information Flow Control . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 Information Flow Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2.1 Labels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2.2 Enforcement Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3 RIF Labels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.4 Label Chains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2 RIF Labels 16
2.1 Formalization of RIF labels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.2 A Security Policy for RIF Labels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.3 Static Enforcement of PWNI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.4 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.4.1 Defining flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.4.2 Reclassifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.5 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3 RIF Automata 49
3.1 Formalization of RIF Automata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.2 JRIF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.2.1 Syntax of JRIF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.2.2 Example applications using JRIF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.2.3 Building a JRIF Compiler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.3 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4 κ-labels 72
4.1 Formalization of κ-labels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.2 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
5 Label Chains 86
5.1 Formalization of Label Chains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
5.2 Enforcers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
5.3 Threat Models and BNI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
5.4 Enforcer∞-Enf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
5.4.1 Updating Label Chains of Flexible Variables . . . . . . . . 97
vii
5.4.2 Preventing Leaks through Anchor Variables . . . . . . . . 98
5.4.3 Operational Semantics for∞-Enf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
5.5 Enforcer k-Enf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
5.6 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
5.6.1 Inference from Label Chains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
5.6.2 Reclassification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
5.7 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
5.8 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
6 Permissiveness versus Chain Length 112
6.1 Permissiveness of k-Enf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
6.2 Other Enforcers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
6.2.1 In the Strong Threat Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
6.2.2 In the Weakened Threat Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
6.3 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
6.3.1 Extending Finite to Infinite Label Chains . . . . . . . . . . 125
6.3.2 Number of Non-bottom Labels in Chains . . . . . . . . . . 126
6.4 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
6.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
7 Conclusion 130
A Proofs for RIF Labels 131
A.1 Type-correctness implies PWNI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
A.2 Completeness of vRA and unionsqRA for RIF automata . . . . . . . . . . 157
A.3 Completeness of vκ and unionsqκ for κ-labels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
A.4 Significance of Type-correctness with κ-labels . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
B Proofs for Label Chains 175
B.1 Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
B.2 Soundness of∞-Enf and k-Enf for k ≥ 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
B.3 Optimized Enforcer k-Eopt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
B.4 Soundness of k-Eopt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
B.5 Permissiveness of k-Enf versus Chain Length . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
B.6 Other Enforcers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
Bibliography 247
viii
LIST OF FIGURES
2.1 Terminology for reclassifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.2 Syntax of simple imperative language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.3 Operational Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.4 Definition of ∆(Ci) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
A security policy (henceforth “policy”) on data captures requirements about
how this data can be used. An enforcement mechanism ensures executions of a
system satisfy these policies. Any enforcement mechanism has some specifica-
tion language for formally specifying policies and uses an abstract model of a
given system. Based on the formal specifications of policies and the abstract sys-
tem model, the enforcement mechanism then decides which system executions
are allowed.
All system executions allowed by a sound enforcement mechanism will sat-
isfy policies associated with all data in that system. So, a sound enforcement
mechanism prevents unsafe executions. However, an enforcement mechanism
might prevent safe executions, too.
To combat unnecessary conservatism, a sound enforcement mechanism is
expected to be permissive, and thus not prevent too many safe executions. In
some cases, it is impossible to obtain a sound enforcement mechanism that also
allows all safe executions (we give an example later in this chapter). One way to
improve permissiveness of an enforcement mechanism is by incorporating more
information about the system into the abstract system model. For example, per-
missiveness of a sound enforcement mechanism can be improved by using in-
formation available at run time or by modeling smaller units (e.g., words versus
files) and smaller computational steps (e.g., commands versus procedures). The
resulting mechanism is then characterized as being more fine-grained.
An inexpressive specification language potentially could harm soundness
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and/or permissiveness. Consider a specification language that does not allow a
desired policy to be expressed. The available specification language thus might
be able to express either (i) stricter or (ii) weaker policies than the desired one.
Option (i) harms permissiveness (with respect to the desired policy). Option
(ii) harms soundness (with respect to the desired policy). Therefore, increased
expressiveness of a specification language ought to maintain soundness and im-
prove permissiveness. This thesis studies techniques for increasing the expres-
siveness of specification languages employed by information flow control (IFC)
mechanisms.
1.1 From Access Control to Information Flow Control
Access control is widely employed for enforcing security policies on data. Data
is stored in objects (e.g., files, variables). An access control policy associated with
an object prescribes allowed accesses: which principals (e.g., user, computer pro-
gram) are allowed to perform what operations on the object. For confidentiality,
an access control policy specifies which principals are allowed to read the con-
tent of an object; for integrity, it specifies which principals are allowed to write
the content of an object. The enforcement mechanism for an access control pol-
icy often is a reference monitor, which intercepts all accesses to the corresponding
object and allows only those prescribed by that policy.
With discretionary access control (DAC) [72], a policy on an object is selected by
the owner of that object. An operating system, for instance, will often support
DAC, so users can specify policies for files. DAC can be implemented using
access control lists [33] or capabilities [37].
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But deciding whether an access is allowed (i.e., whether a principal is al-
lowed to perform an operation on an object) might depend on whether another
access is allowed. For example, to prevent leaking confidential information, a
principal allowed to read confidential reports might not be allowed to write to
public reports. Also, to address conflicts of interest, a principal might not be al-
lowed to read a company’s documents if that principal can also read documents
of a competitor [21]. DAC cannot express and enforce such policies.
This lack of expressiveness led to a family of enforcement mechanisms
known as mandatory access control (MAC) [71]. In MAC, the policy on an ob-
ject is decided by the institution (i.e., company, government) that maintains the
object—not by the owner of the object. Chinese wall policies is an example of
MAC that address conflicts of interests. Another example of MAC is role-based
access control [82], which categorizes principals based on a hierarchy of roles and
associates access rights to principals with respect to that hierarchy.
Multi-level security (MLS) [15] was among the first instantiations of MAC; it
allows accesses based on information flow. MLS for confidentiality associates
objects with labels that represent a confidentiality level (e.g., top secret (TS ), secret
(S), confidential (C), unclassified (U )). Each principal also is assigned a label rep-
resenting the highest confidential level this principal is trusted to read. With
MLS, principals may not read objects associated with a higher label than their
own. MLS also ensures that principals do not write to objects associated with
a lower label than their own. This restriction on writes prevents information
from flowing to objects with lower confidentiality level through the actions (i.e.,
read and write) of principals. Dual requirements [17] can be placed by MLS to
prevent low integrity information from flowing to objects of high integrity. So,
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MLS restricts the flow of information between objects by restricting read and
write actions that principals can perform to these objects.
Restricting information flow based only on principals’ actions harms permis-
siveness. For example, MLS for confidentiality prohibits a principal assigned
label C from writing some data to an object labeled U , even if the origin of the
data is actually labeled U . So no confidential information would be leaked by
writing this data. A more fine-grained approach could model the computation
used to derive the data, deduce that there is no dependency on confidential
information, and thus, allow the write. Information flow control is such an ap-
proach.
1.2 Information Flow Control
An information flow policy specifies restrictions on the use of data and other in-
formation derived from that data. One way that an information flow policy is
different from a DAC policy is that DAC restricts how data can be accessed but
imposes no restriction on accesses to derived information. In fact, an informa-
tion flow policy can be considered as a synthesis of DAC policies for initial and
derived data. An information flow policy can be set either by the owner of the
associated data or the institution that maintains that data. Thus, an information
flow policy is not necessarily a MAC policy, either.
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1.2.1 Labels
Labels are employed to express information flow policies. Traditionally [36],
labels in a set L form a lattice 〈L,v〉 with join operation unionsq. Partial order v
on labels defines allowed flow of information between tagged pieces of data.
If label `′ is at least as restrictive as `, meaning ` v `′ holds, then information
is allowed to flow from data tagged with label ` to data tagged with `′. For
example, L v H defines that data tagged with low confidentiality L is allowed
to flow to data tagged with high confidentiality H. Join ` unionsq `′ is the label for the
combination of two pieces of data tagged with ` and `′, correspondingly.
A system satisfies noninterference (NI) [44] for a given lattice of labels, if exe-
cutions of that system cause only allowed flows of information (with respect to
that lattice). In particular, a system satisfies NI, if changing initial values tagged
with ` ∈ L does not cause changes in computed values tagged with `′ ∈ L when
` 6v `′ holds.
1.2.2 Enforcement Mechanisms
IFC has been applied on abstract system models of different granularities. It has
been applied to cyberphysical systems modeled as timed automata (e.g., [90]).
IFC has been applied to operating systems (OS) (e.g., [40], [99]) to control the
flow of information that processes cause between OS objects (e.g., files, sockets,
locks). It has also been applied to databases (e.g., [97]), where fields or tables
are tagged with labels and the enforcement mechanism controls the information
flow caused by queries. This thesis studies IFC at the level of programs.
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Enforcement of information flow policies within programs usually builds
on existing methods for program analysis (e.g., data and control flow analysis,
type checking). Previous research has applied IFC to low-level programming
languages (e.g., [10]) and high-level programming languages [78]: imperative,
object-oriented, and functional. This thesis mainly considers a simple while-
language (i.e., imperative). We build on an approach pioneered by Volpano
et al. [93], where labels are types associated with variables. Labels associated
with variables are either fixed during analysis or they may change, in which
case they are called flow-sensitive [52]. An enforcement mechanism that supports
flow-sensitive labels is itself called flow-sensitive.
Each command in a program is analyzed to ensure that its executions cause
only allowed flows with respect to a lattice of labels. An assignment “x := e”
causes an explicit flow from expression e to variable x, because changing the
value of e leads to changes in the value of x. For such a flow to be allowed, the
label of x should be at least as restrictive as the label on the value of e.
Command “if y > 0 then x := 1 else x := 2 end” causes an implicit flow
from y to x. This is because the value of x depends on the value of y, even though
there is no explicit assignment of y to x in that command. For this implicit flow
to be allowed, the label of x should be at least as restrictive as the label of y.
IFC is an undecidable problem [78]—it is impossible to build an enforce-
ment mechanism that accepts exactly those program executions that cause only
allowed flows. This is because the halting problem, which is undecidable, can
be reduced to IFC. Consider the following command:
l := 0; if h > 0 then C; l := 2 else skip end
where variable l is tagged with L, variable h is tagged with H and L @ H holds
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(i.e., L v H and H 6v L). If an enforcement mechanism could precisely decide
whether this command satisfies NI, then this mechanism could decide whether
command C terminates (if the command satisfies NI, then C does not terminate,
but if the command does not satisfy NI, thenC terminates), which is impossible.
Static Enforcement
An enforcement mechanism for IFC is called static when its actions (e.g., check-
ing fixed labels, deducing flow-sensitive labels) do not depend on run-time in-
formation (e.g., values that variables store during program execution). So the
program can be analyzed before execution. If the program successfully passes
the analysis, then all executions of this program are guaranteed to cause only
allowed flows (with respect to a given lattice of labels).
A static enforcement mechanism does not add run-time overhead but it
might reject programs whose executions cause only allowed flows. Consider
the following command:
if f (l) 6= g(l) then l := h else l := 0 end (1.1)
where f and g are procedures implementing the exact same function, constant
0 is tagged with L, variable l is tagged with L, variable h is tagged with H and
L @ H holds. Command (1.1) causes only allowed flows, because f (l) 6= g(l) is
always false and assignment l := 0 causes an allowed flow. However, a static en-
forcement mechanism cannot in general decide whether f and g are equivalent.
So, it will analyze both branches of (1.1), as if both branches could be executed.
Because assignment l := h causes an illicit flow, the entire command (1.1) will
be rejected by the analysis.
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A static enforcement mechanism also might reject an entire program, even
though only a subset of program executions cause illicit flows. Consider com-
mand
if l ≤ 2 then l := h else l := 0 end. (1.2)
Executions where l ≤ 2 holds do cause illicit flows, due to assignment l := h.
But executions where l > 2 holds cause only allowed flows. Similar to (1.1),
command (1.2) will be rejected. Thus, no execution of (1.2) will be allowed,
including those where l > 2 holds.
Dynamic Enforcement
Dynamic enforcement improves permissiveness over static enforcement through
the use of run-time information. Actions (e.g., check labels, deduce flow-
sensitive labels) of a dynamic enforcement mechanism are performed (at least
partially) during program execution, introducing run-time overhead.
We give examples of how a dynamic mechanism could enhance permissive-
ness. For command (1.1), a dynamic mechanism would deduce that there is no
illicit flow, since l := h is never reached (because f (l) 6= g(l) is always false). So,
all executions will be allowed, because the only assignment that actually occurs
is l := 0. For command (1.2), if execution reaches l := h, then a dynamic en-
forcement mechanism might block that execution before performing assignment
l := h but allow all other executions to complete. So, for examples (1.1) and (1.2)
a dynamic mechanism can be more permissive than a static mechanism.
Flow-sensitive dynamic mechanisms can enhance permissiveness even fur-
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ther. Consider command
x := h; x := 0; l := x (1.3)
whose executions cause only allowed flows. A dynamic mechanism that tags
x with fixed label H, allows the execution of the first two assignments in (1.3),
but blocks assignment l := x because H 6v L holds. Instead, a flow-sensitive dy-
namic mechanism would tag x with flow-sensitive label H after x := h, but then
tag x with flow-sensitive label L after x := 0. Now, assignment l := x could be
allowed to execute. Thus, using flow sensitive labels enhanced permissiveness.
A purely dynamic flow-sensitive mechanism analyzes only code that is ac-
tually executed. Russo and Sabelfeld [77] showed that if a purely dynamic
flow-sensitive mechanism is at least as permissive as the Hunt and Sands clas-
sical flow-sensitive static mechanism [52], then that dynamic mechanism is not
sound.1 Here is an example where a purely dynamic flow-sensitive mechanism
D is not sound.
x := 0; if h > 0 then x := 2 else skip end (1.4)
where constants 0 and 2 are tagged with L, variable h is tagged with label H
and x with a flow-sensitive label. When x := 0 executes, D tags x with flow-
sensitive label L. If h > 0 holds, then x := 2 executes and D tags x with flow-
sensitive label H, thereby capturing the implicit flow from h to x. If h 6> 0 holds,
no assignment to x is executed, and thus neither the value nor the label of x
changes. So, x stores 0 and is tagged with L at termination if h 6> 0 holds.
However, the value of h has flowed to the final value of x, because knowing
1This result does not apply to secure multi-execution (SME) [38] , which is a purely dynamic
flow-sensitive enforcement mechanism that enforces information flow labels by simultaneously
executing the same program as many times as the number of labels.
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that x = 0 at terminations implies that h 6> 0 holds. So, x should always have
been tagged with H at termination.
Purely dynamic mechanisms (e.g., [7, 98]) proposed in the past maintain
soundness at the expense of permissiveness. For example, such a mechanism
would decide to block assignment x := 2 in (1.4) when h > 0 holds. In this way,
the final value of x will always be 0 (independent of h) and its final label will
always be L, which is sound.
Allowing a dynamic mechanism to analyze unexecuted code can maintain
soundness and permissiveness. Consider, again, (1.4). If h 6> 0 holds, then such
a mechanism could analyze untaken branch x := 2 and tag xwith flow-sensitive
label H (to capture implicit flow from h to x). If h > 0 holds, then x would
again be tagged with flow-sensitive label H after assignment x := 2 executes.
So, such a mechanism always tags x with H, which would not block any of
the executions. However, compared to purely dynamic mechanisms, such a
mechanism cannot handle programs involving dynamically loaded code, and it
introduces additional run-time overhead.
In this thesis, we explore both static and dynamic enforcement mechanisms
that use fixed and flow-sensitive expressive labels. The enforcement mecha-
nisms we propose are extensions of mechanisms proposed in the past.
1.3 RIF Labels
Specifying allowed flows of information based only on restrictiveness relation
v on labels and ignoring the semantics of operations that cause these flows can
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be inadequate. A flow from ` to `′ (i.e., from data tagged with ` to data tagged
with `′) caused by an operation may be acceptable, even if ` v `′ does not hold;
a flow from ` to `′ caused by an operation may not be acceptable, even if ` v `′
holds. Some examples illustrate.
Consider first an information flow policy on salaries h1, . . . , hn: salaries are
highly confidential, but the result of taking their average has low confidentiality.
Given lattice 〈{L,H},v〉with L @ H, salaries should be tagged with H, otherwise
the policy is violated. Consider now command
l := avg(h1, . . . , hn) (1.5)
that computes the average of salaries h1, . . . , hn. According to the above policy
on salaries, the average result l can be tagged with L. But now the flow of in-
formation caused by (1.5) is not allowed by restrictiveness relation v, because
H v L does not hold. So, a flow allowed by the policy on salaries is not allowed
by v, and thus permissiveness is harmed. In this example, operation avg is said
to trigger a declassification [81], because it causes a desired flow towards lower
confidentiality.
Soundness might also be harmed when flows are allowed based only on v.
As an example, consider an information flow policy on the guest list guests of
a hotel: guests has low confidentiality, but due to privacy concerns, the final
assignment of guests to rooms is deemed highly confidential. Also, the room
list rooms of that hotel has low confidentiality. Given again lattice 〈{L,H},v〉,
guests and rooms can then be tagged with L, otherwise the labels would be less
permissive than the policy. Consider command
agn := assign(guests , rooms) (1.6)
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that assigns guests to rooms. If agn is tagged with L, then the flow caused by
(1.6) is allowed by v, but violates the desired policy on guests . In this example,
operation assign is said to trigger a classification because it forces a flow towards
strictly higher confidentiality.
The difficulties illustrated by the above two examples can be addressed by
increasing the expressiveness of labels to more completely describe a desired
information flow policies. Such expressive labels would be able to specify how
restrictions on derived values depend on operations. So, such labels could spec-
ify arbitrary reclassifications, since restrictions on derived values may be more,
fewer, or incomparable to restrictions on inputs. Labels proposed by previous
approaches [23, 22, 69, 68, 57, 76, 88, 50, 63, 29, 74, 75, 81] do not explicitly specify
arbitrary reclassifications caused by operations.
In Chapter 2, we propose reactive information flow (RIF) labels that can spec-
ify how restrictions on derived values depend on the applied operations.2 We
also propose piecewise noninterference (PWNI) as an extension to NI to prescribe
allowed flows under arbitrary reclassifications. A type system is given for static
enforcement of PWNI in programs that associate checkable classes of RIF labels
with variables. Two checkable classes of RIF labels are described. RIF automata
(Chapter 3) are general-purpose and based on finite-state automata; κ-labels
(Chapter 4) concern confidentiality in programs that use cryptographic opera-
tions and assume the Dolev-Yao model of attacks. We actually implemented an
enforcement mechanism for RIF automata in Java.3
2This is joint work with Fred B. Schneider.
3This is joint work with Owen Arden, Andrew C. Myers, and Fred B. Schneider.
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1.4 Label Chains
Labels themselves are values that could encode sensitive information.4 Con-
sider a dynamic enforcement mechanism that tags variables with flow-sensitive
labels. Sensitive input information might influence which assignments are exe-
cuted and, consequently, determine how and when the flow-sensitive label that
is tagging a variable changes.
That means flow-sensitive labels can depend on sensitive information. In-
specting or directly observing flow-sensitive labels then might leak sensitive
information [51]. Consider a program that mixes flow-sensitive labels and fixed
labels:
if m > 0 then w := h else w := l end (1.7)
Suppose w is tagged with a flow-sensitive label, but the other variables are
tagged with fixed labels: l is tagged with fixed label L (i.e., low), m with M
(i.e., medium), and h with H (i.e., high), where L @ M @ H holds.
(i) If m > 0 holds, then when (1.7) terminates, w should be tagged with flow-
sensitive label H, because H is at least as restrictive as the label H that tags
h and the label M that tags m.
(ii) If m 6> 0 holds, then when (1.7) terminates w should be tagged with flow-
sensitive label M, because M is at least as restrictive as the labels that tag l
and m.
So, when (1.7) terminates, the flow-sensitive label tagging w depends on
whether m > 0 holds. That sensitive information about m leaks to observers
4Here, sensitivity refers to confidentiality level.
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that can learn that label.
Blocking (e.g., [2, 31, 67, 83]) an execution based on flow-sensitive labels
might leak sensitive information, too. Consider (1.7) extended with two assign-
ments:
if m > 0 then w := h else w := l end; m := w; l := 1 (1.8)
(i) If m > 0 holds, then m := w should be blocked to prevent information
tagged H and stored in w from flowing to m; assignment l := 1 is not
reached.
(ii) If m 6> 0 holds, then m := w does not need to be blocked (because w stores
information tagged M). Assignment l := 1 could execute.
Depending on whether m := w is blocked, principals monitoring variable l
(which is tagged L) either do or do not observe value 1 being assigned to l.
The decision to block m := w depends on the flow-sensitive label of w, which
depends on sensitive information m > 0. So m > 0 is leaked5 to principals
monitoring variable l.
In order to prevent such leaks, metalabels (e.g., [12]) can be introduced to rep-
resent the sensitivity of information encoded in labels. For example, the meta-
label for w in (1.8) would be M, corresponding to the sensitivity of information
m > 0 encoded in the flow-sensitive label taggingw. Only principals authorized
to read information allowed by the metalabel (i.e., M) would be allowed to ob-
serve the label of w. The metalabel that tags w would also capture the sensitivity
of the decision to execute m := w and reach l := 1. To prevent the implicit flow
5In fact, an arbitrary number of bits can be leaked through blocking executions [5].
14
of that information (which is tagged with M) to variable l (tagged L), assignment
l := 1 must never be executed.
Since metalabels are flow-sensitive, they too could encode sensitive informa-
tion that can be leaked to observers. It is tempting to employ meta-meta labels
to prevent those leaks. However, flow-sensitive meta-meta labels might then
leak. We seem to need a label chain associated with each variable: a label `1,
metalabel `2, meta-meta label `3, etc.
In Chapter 5, a new family of enforcers—k-Enf , for 2 ≤ k ≤ ∞—is derived to
leverage arbitrarily long label chains, where each label defines the sensitivity of
its predecessor.6 These enforcers satisfy Block-safe Noninterference (BNI), which
proscribes leaks from observing variables, label chains, and blocked executions.
In Chapter 6, theorems characterize where longer label chains improve permis-
siveness of dynamic enforcement mechanisms that satisfy BNI. These theorems
depend on semantic attributes—k-precise, k-varying, and k-dependent—of such
mechanisms as well as on initialization, threat model, and size of lattice. Previ-
ous approaches [100, 64, 27] can express label chains, but they have not studied
the relation of label-chain length with permissiveness. Finally, Chapter 7 con-
cludes this thesis.
6This is joint work with Fred B. Schneider, Jose´e Desharnais, Nadia Tawbi, and Andrew
Bedford.
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CHAPTER 2
RIF LABELS
The most general form of flow-derived restrictions would assign restrictions
to the output of an operation op(x1, x2, . . . , xn) according to operator op, its in-
puts x1, x2, . . . , xn, and the restrictions associated with those inputs. Information
flow control is a well known example of flow-derived restrictions. In Denning’s
initial work [36] and in much that has followed—both for confidentiality and
integrity—the set of restrictions assigned to the output of an operation is the
union of the restrictions associated with its inputs. But in ignoring the operator
and the values of its inputs, that approach can be too conservative.
The output of operation op(x1, x2, . . . , xn) might warrant fewer restrictions,
additional restrictions, or an incomparable set of restrictions than are being as-
sociated with its inputs.
• With an operation that computes the winner of an election, the inputs are
votes and the output is the majority. Each input is secret to the principal
casting that vote, whereas the output ought to be readable by any prin-
cipal. So the output is being associated with fewer restrictions than the
inputs.
• A conference-management system identifies reviewers for each submis-
sion. The inputs—a list of reviewers and a list submissions—can be read
by the entire program committee. Conflicts of interest, however, dictate
that only a subset of the program committee learn which reviewers are as-
signed to any given paper. So outputs are associated with more stringent
restrictions than inputs.
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• A value produced by symmetric-key encryption Enc(E , K) involving key
K may be read by any principal except one that both can read K and is
restricted from reading E . So Enc(E , K) would typically have fewer re-
strictions than inputs E and K. Decryption Dec(Enc(E , K), K) produces a
value that has the same restrictions as E and, thus, could have increased
restrictions over those assigned to its inputs Enc(E , K) and K. The re-
strictions assigned to Dec(Enc(E , K), K ′) when K 6= K ′ holds depend on
whether Enc(·, K) and Dec(·, K) are inverses of each other and on whether
any principal knows both K and K ′.
Previous work on information flow control—information flow locks [23, 22],
expressions for declassification (for confidentiality) and endorsement (for in-
tegrity) [69, 68], and capability-based mechanisms for downgrading security
policies [57, 76, 88]—has not provided means for arbitrary changes in restric-
tions to be linked with specific operations. Other approaches (e.g., [50, 63, 29,
74, 75, 81]) allow changes but only between two kinds of restrictions.
Reactive information flow (RIF) labels, which we introduce in §2.1, seek to ad-
dress these limitations. Piecewise noninterference (PWNI) in §2.2 then extends
classical noninterference in a way that handles changes to restrictions that RIF
labels support. A type system is given in §2.3 to support static enforcement of
PWNI for certain classes of RIF labels.
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2.1 Formalization of RIF labels
Restrictions. Restrictions specified by the RIF label for a value are taken from a
partially ordered set 〈R,vR〉. For confidentiality, an element ofR might identify
which principals are allowed to read some value, either by enumerating that
set of principals or giving the name (e.g., public, secret, etc.) for such a set;
for integrity, it might identify the set of principals allowed to write that value.
Other kinds of restrictions might be specified using elements in R that are a set
of programs, the name for a task, or the name of a set of tasks.
Partial order r vR r′ characterizes whether satisfying restrictions r′ ∈ R
implies that restrictions r ∈ R are satisfied too, so r′ is at least as strong as r
or, equivalently, r is at least as weak as r′. When elements of R denote sets of
principals, then for confidentiality of some value v, we would define r vR r′ to
hold if and only if r ⊇ r′ holds—if r′ allows a principal to read v then so does
r, but r might also allow other principals to read v, too. And, for integrity, we
would define r vR r′ to hold if and only if r ⊆ r′ holds, because r′ requires
putting trust in writes by more principals than r does, and trust can be justified
only when behavior is restricted.
Reclassifiers and RIF Labels. A set F of reclassifiers is used to abstract how
operations change restrictions on inputs.1 Each element of F might correspond
to a single operation or to a set of operations. A RIF label maps sequences of
reclassifiers (which abstractly describe the provenence of a value) to elements
of some given partially ordered set 〈R,vR〉 of restrictions. This is formalized
for a set Λ of RIF labels by giving a set F of reclassifiers and two functions R
1The term reclassify was used in Denning’s thesis [36] to name an operation that changes the
restrictions imposed on objects.
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R(λ) ⊂ R(T (λ, f)) R(λ) ⊃ R(T (λ, f))
Confidentiality declassification classification
Integrity deprecation endorsement
Figure 2.1: Terminology for reclassifications
and T .
– Rmaps λ ∈ Λ to the restriction r ∈ R that λ imposes:
R: Λ→ R (2.1)
– T maps λ ∈ Λ and any reclassifier f ∈ F to a RIF label that should be
associated with the value produced by an operation abstracted by f:
T : Λ×F → Λ (2.2)
T is extended to a sequence F of reclassifiers in the usual way, with empty se-
quence  of reclassifiers assumed to be an element of every set F of reclassifiers
(where it serves as an identity reclassifier).
T (λ, ) , λ
T (λ,F f) , T (T (λ,F ), f)
If λ 6= T (λ, f) holds, then f triggers a reclassification. Figure 2.1 gives some
specialized terminology whenR(λ) gives a set of principals that must be trusted
not to divulge the value (for confidentiality) or not to have corrupted the value
(for integrity).
Reclassifying Expressions. In order to associate RIF label transitions with
operations, we extend the set of ordinary expressions: variables and terms
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op(E1, . . . , En), where op is an operator and Ei is an ordinary expression. For
ordinary expressions E1, ..., En,
[op(E1, . . . , En)]f1,f2,...,fn (2.3)
defines a reclassifying expression. It specifies that reclassifier fi identifies how
the restrictions associated with the value of ordinary expression Ei should be
changed in order to obtain restrictions associated with the value produced
by op(E1, . . . , En). The change in restrictions is effected by transition T (λi, fi)
to RIF label λi being associated with the value of expression Ei. Notation
[op(E1, . . . , En)]f is used as a shorthand for [op(E1, . . . , En)]f,f,...,f , and we some-
times abbreviate [op(E1, . . . , En)]f1,f2,...,fn by [op(E1, . . . , En)]¯f or simply [E ]¯f when
the elided specifics are irrelevant.
When reclassifying expressions are used to compute values, then a sequence
of reclassifiers offers an abstract description for the series of operations that have
been applied to some value as program execution proceeds. This sequence of re-
classifiers then provides a basis for determining the set of restrictions associated
with computed values. For example, consider the following program.
w1 := [div(x1, x2)]f1 ; y2 := [mod(w1, w2)]f2 ; z3 := [add(y1, y2, y3)]f3
The restrictions on the value stored in z3 are informed (in part) by sequence f1f2f3
of reclassifiers applied to the restrictions on the value in x1, because the value
in x1 flows to z3 through f1f2f3: x1 first flows to w1 through f1, then w1 flows to
y2 through f2, and finally y2 flows to z3 through f3. The restrictions on the value
stored in z3 also are informed by sequence f1f2f3 applied to the restrictions on the
value stored in x2, sequence f2f3 applied to the restrictions on the value stored
in w2, and sequence f3 applied to the values stored in y1 and y3.
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Classes of RIF Labels. We require that 〈Λ,unionsq,v〉 form a lattice (which might
be infinite), with join operator unionsq used for combining RIF labels; restrictiveness
relation v then specifies whether one RIF label is at least as restrictive as another.
Since, by definition, λ v λ unionsq λ′ and λ′ v λ unionsq λ′ holds in a lattice, a combination
of RIF labels is at least as restrictive as any of its constituents. We posit that Λ
includes elements ⊥ and > such that for all λ ∈ Λ: ⊥ v λ and λ v > hold.
The specific definition of unionsq depends on the elements of Λ. The definition
of restrictivenesss relation v uses F∗ to denote the set of finite sequences of
reclassifiers in F :
λ v λ′ , (∀F ∈ F∗: R(T (λ,F )) vR R(T (λ′,F ))) (2.4)
So if λ v λ′ holds, then
• current restrictionsR(λ′) specified by λ′ are at least as strong as what λ im-
poses because, by definition,  ∈ F∗, R(T (λ, )) = R(λ) and R(T (λ′, )) =
R(λ′) hold, so (2.4) impliesR(λ) vR R(λ′), and
• restrictions λ′ imposes for any derived value are at least as strong as what
λ imposes—if v flows to w then there is a sequence F ∈ F∗ that v flows
through, and (2.4) requires thatR(T (λ,F )) vR R(T (λ′,F )) hold.
The quantification over all sequences F ∈ F∗ in (2.4) means that this definition
for λ v λ′ is conservative, since it could be imposing conditions on sequences F
of reclassifiers that never arise in a program execution.
A class of RIF labels is formed by putting the pieces together:
〈〈R,vR〉, 〈Λ,unionsq,v〉,F ,R, T 〉
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The definition of such a class is silent about the existence of algorithms for com-
puting unionsq or for deciding v. We say that a class of RIF labels is checkable if and
only if:
(i) There exists an algorithm for computing λ unionsq λ′, for all λ, λ′ ∈ Λ.
(ii) There exists a sound (no false positives) if not complete (false negatives
possible) decision procedure for determining whether λ v λ′ holds, for all
λ, λ′ ∈ Λ.
Programs that use the type system we give in §2.3, which has RIF labels as types,
can be statically checked if the RIF labels are from a checkable class.
2.2 A Security Policy for RIF Labels
We assume that every command is deterministic and changes the values of vari-
ables in memory. Therefore, execution of a command C1 that is started in a
memory M1 and terminates in a memory MN can be described by giving a
finite trace
〈C1,M1〉 → 〈C2,M2〉 → · · · → 〈•,MN〉 (2.5)
where each state 〈Ci,Mi〉 gives a command Ci and a memory Mi. Although •
is not considered a command, we use • in the final state of a trace to signify
that further execution is not possible. Thus the trace for a command C that
terminates will include at least two states: one having C as the command and
one having •.
Memories are represented by functions that map all variables x appearing in
any command to valuesM(x). These functions are then extended as usual for
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mapping ordinary expressions and reclassifying expressions.
M(op(E1, . . . , En)) , op(M(E1), . . . ,M(En))
M([E ]f1,f2,...,fn) , M(E)
An operational semantics for command execution thus defines a partial
function Υ, where Υ(C,M) equals the finite trace corresponding to an execu-
tion of C that terminates when started in memoryM, and Υ(C,M) is undefined
if that execution does not terminate.
Observations as a Threat Model. Given is a fixed mapping Γ that associates a
label Γ(x) ∈ Λ with each variable x. Γ is extended to handle ordinary expres-
sions in the usual way
Γ(op(E1, . . . , En)) , Γ(E1) unionsq . . . unionsq Γ(En) (2.6)
so we have Γ(op(x1, . . . , xn)) = Γ(x1) unionsq . . . unionsq Γ(xn), as expected. The RIF la-
bel associated with a reclassifying expression is expected to combine RIF labels
obtained after the indicated transitions have been performed:
Γ([op(E1, . . . , En)]f1,...,fn) , T (Γ(E1), f1) unionsq . . . unionsq T (Γ(En), fn) (2.7)
Γ induces equivalence classes comprising memories that are indistinguish-
able to a principal assigned a label λ ∈ Λ:
M =λM′ , (∀x: Γ(x) v λ⇒M(x) =M′(x))
So when a transition 〈Ci,Mi〉 → 〈Ci+1,Mi+1〉 occurs during execution, only cer-
tain memory changes are visible to a principal assigned a label λ ∈ Λ. These
changes are described by an observation
Mi+1 	λMi , {〈x,Mi+1(x)〉 | Mi(x) 6=Mi+1(x) ∧ Γ(x) v λ}
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which is a set giving the new value for each variable that was (i) changed by the
transition and (ii) has a label at most λ. It is easy to show:
M =λM′ ⇒ (M′ 	λM = ∅)
λ v λ′ ⇒ (M′ 	λM) ⊆ (M′ 	λ′M)
For principals assigned label λ, program execution described by a trace τ
results in a sequence τ |λ
θ0 ⇁ θ1 ⇁ . . . ⇁ θn
of non-empty observations M′i+1 	λMi that are derived from the successive
transitions 〈Ci,Mi〉 → 〈Ci+1,Mi+1〉 in τ .2 Traces τ and τ ′ are indistinguishable
to principals with label λ if τ |λ = τ ′|λ holds, which induces an equivalence
relation on traces:
τ =λ τ
′ , τ |λ = τ ′|λ
Sequences τ |λ of observations are the basis for our3 threat model. It stipu-
lates that a principal p with label λ is notified of every change in the value of
any variable x satisfying Γ(x) v λ. Such a threat model is well suited for an-
alyzing systems in which principals are co-resident and able to detect changes
(subject to restrictions defined by labels) being made to shared memory or other
resources.
2A formal definition of τ |λ is thus given by the following.
τ |λ ,

 if τ =  or τ = 〈C,M〉
 if τ = 〈C,M〉 → 〈C′,M′〉 ∧ M′ 	λM = ∅
M′ 	λM if τ = 〈C,M〉 → 〈C′,M′〉 ∧ M′ 	λM 6= ∅
(〈C′,M′〉 → τ ′)|λ if τ = 〈C,M〉 → 〈C′,M′〉 → τ ′ ∧ M′ 	λM = ∅
M′ 	λM ⇁ (〈C′,M′〉 → τ ′)|λ otherwise
3A similar threat model is found in Askarov and Sabelfeld [3].
24
Reclassification. Each transition 〈Ci,Mi〉 → 〈Ci+1,Mi+1〉 in a trace involves
evaluating some (possibly empty) set of expressions. The operational semantics
of commands determines what those expressions are and how their values are
computed. We therefore assume that the operational semantics for command
includes a function ∆(Ci) that gives the set of reclassifying expressions that a
command Ci evaluates in making its transition.
For example, with a simple imperative programming language and ordinary
expressions E and E ′ we might expect to have
∆(x := E) = ∅ (2.8)
∆(x := [E ]¯f) = {[E ]¯f} (2.9)
∆(if [E ]¯f then x := [E ′ ]¯f) = {[E ]¯f} (2.10)
if we are assuming that assignments are executed as a single transition but that
an if statement involves a first transition to evaluate its Boolean guard followed
by other transitions for the then (or else) parts.
Piecewise Noninterference. In the absence of reclassifications, an illicit λ-flow
is present if executing a command in states having different values of a variable
with label λ′ satisfying λ′ 6v λwill result in differences in updates to any variable
with label λ or less restrictive. Noninterference [44] is a widely studied security
policy that prohibits illicit λ-flows for all labels λ. It is the basis for piecewise
noninterference.
To formalize an extension to noninterference that accommodates reclassifica-
tion under our threat model, we introduce some notation. Given τ a non-empty
finite trace or subtrace,
〈C1,M1〉 → 〈C2,M2〉 → · · · → 〈CN ,MN〉
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and indices i and j satisfying 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ N , define
τ [i..] , 〈Ci,Mi〉 → · · ·
τ [i..j] , 〈Ci,Mi〉 → · · · → 〈Cj,Mj〉
τ [i] , 〈Ci,Mi〉
τ [i].C , Ci
τ [i].M , Mi
|τ | , N
although we write τ.C as an abbreviation for τ [1].C and write τ.M for τ [1].M.
If 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ N does not hold then it is convenient to define τ [i..], τ [i..j], τ [i],
τ [i].C, and τ [i].M as being be equivalent to .
We start by formalizing prohibition of illicit λ-flows for commands that
do not contain reclassifying expressions. By definition, an illicit λ-flow is not
present if executing such a command Ĉ in statesM andM′ satisfyingM =λM′
does not result in differences in updates to a variable that has a label λ or less
restrictive.
(∀M,M′, τ, τ ′: τ = Υ(Ĉ,M) ∧ τ ′ = Υ(Ĉ,M′) ⇒ NI (λ, τ, τ ′))
where
NI (λ, τ, τ ′) , τ.M =λ τ ′.M ⇒ τ =λ τ ′
So we characterize the absence of illicit λ-flows for all labels λ by:
(∀λ,M,M′, τ, τ ′: τ = Υ(Ĉ,M) ∧ τ ′ = Υ(Ĉ,M′) ⇒ NI (λ, τ, τ ′)) (2.11)
Notice, if NI (λ, τ, τ ′) is false then τ and τ ′ are evidence of an illicit λ-flow.
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Handling Downgrades. A reclassifying expression [E ]¯f is considered to per-
form a λ-downgrade if Γ([E ]¯f) v λ and Γ(E) 6v λ hold. By definition, assigning
the value of [E ]¯f to a variable having label λ does not constitute an illicit λ-flow
(whereas assigning E would). So λ-downgrades eliminate certain illicit λ-flows
by fiat.
A programming language that supports RIF labels will provide syntax that
allows programmers to specify λ-downgrades by using reclassifying expres-
sions. To define our security policy for such programs, we stiplulate that the
language semantics include a function4 ∆−Ĉ(λ, Ci) that satisfies:
∆−Ĉ(λ, Ci) ⊆ {E | [E ]¯f ∈ ∆(Ci) ∧ Γ([E ]¯f) v λ ∧ Γ(E) 6v λ}
So ∆−Ĉ(λ, Ci) contains some of the expressions that are evaluated when Ci exe-
cutes and that satisfy the definition of a λ-downgrade.
A simple generalization of (2.11) accomodates λ-downgrades in ∆−Ĉ(λ, Ci).
NI (λ, τ, τ ′) was defined in terms of the indistinguishability of updates to any
variable x satisfying Γ(x) v λ. But differences in updates to x that arise when ex-
pressions in ∆−Ĉ(λ, Ci) have different values are, by definition, not illict λ-flows.
Therefore, initial memory pairs M and M′ that cause expressions in ∆−Ĉ(λ, Ĉ)
to have different values should be ignored in checking for indistinguishable ob-
servations.
(∀λ,M,M′, τ, τ ′: τ = Υ(Ĉ,M) ∧ τ ′ = Υ(Ĉ,M′) ⇒ dNI (λ, τ, τ ′)) (2.12)
where
dNI (λ, τ, τ ′) , (∀E ∈ ∆−Ĉ(λ, τ.C): τ.M(E) = τ
′.M(E)) ⇒ NI (λ, τ, τ ′)
4The Ĉ subscript in ∆−Ĉ(λ, Ci) enables this function to depend on enclosing program Ĉ and/or
the position of Ci within Ĉ. For example, a language designer might elect to omit E from
∆−Ĉ(λ, x := [E ]¯f) if that assignment appears in the scope of an if having a Boolean guard E ′,
where Γ(E ′) 6v Γ(x ) holds.
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By construction τ.C = Ĉ and τ ′.C = Ĉ hold, therefore τ.C = τ ′.C and
∆−Ĉ(λ, τ.C) = ∆
−
Ĉ(λ, τ
′.C) (2.13)
hold too. Thus, in ignoring downgraded expressions in the first transition of
trace τ (i.e., elements of ∆−Ĉ(λ, τ.C)), dNI (λ, τ, τ ′) is also ignoring downgraded
expressions in the first transition of trace τ ′ (i.e., elements of ∆−Ĉ(λ, τ
′.C)).
To handle traces that perform downgrades after the first transition in Ĉ, it
suffices to note that every illicit λ-flow is evidenced in a pair of λ-pieces, where
a λ-piece of a trace τ is a maximal length subtrace of τ that contains either no
downgrades or all of its λ-downgrades in its first transition. The problematic
pair of λ-pieces describe executing the same command in different memories
M and M′, where that execution leads to (i) different commands in the last
states of the pair of λ-pieces and/or (ii) different updates to a variable x in the
pair of λ-pieces, where Γ(x ) v λ holds.
Given a trace τ and a label λ, we introduce operators
→λ
τ and
λ→
τ to identify
the subtace
→λ
τ that is the initial λ-piece of τ and the subtrace
λ→
τ that is the rest
of τ . Since the defining characteristic of a λ-piece is having a λ-downgrade as
its starting transition, the the last state of
→λ
τ is also first state of
λ→
τ (if
λ→
τ is
non-empty). Thus,
→λ
τ and
λ→
τ satisfy the following, for traces and subtraces τ
satisfying |τ | ≥ 2:
(
→λ
τ = τ ∧ λ→τ = )
∨ (∃1 < i < |τ |: →λτ = τ [1..i] ∧ λ→τ = τ [i..] ∧ ∆−Ĉ(λ, τ [i].C) 6= ∅)
(2.14)
(∀1 < i < |→λτ |: ∆−Ĉ(λ,
→λ
τ [i].C) = ∅) (2.15)
And two λ-pieces
→λ
τ and
→λ
τ ′ are evidence of an illicit λ-flow if the following is
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false.
→λ
τ .C =
→λ
τ ′ .C ⇒ (τ [ |→λτ | ].C = τ [ |
→λ
τ ′ | ].C ∧ dNI (λ,→λτ ,
→λ
τ ′ )). (2.16)
By iterating (recursively) through corresponding λ-pieces in τ and τ ′, the ap-
proach embodied by (2.16) gives a way to identify traces τ and τ ′ that evidence
an illicit λ-flow.
dpNI (λ, τ, τ ′) , τ 6=  ∧ τ ′ 6=  ∧ →λτ .C =
→λ
τ ′ .C
∧ (∀E ∈ ∆−Ĉ(λ, τ.C): τ.M(E) = τ
′.M(E))
∧ τ.M =λ τ ′.M
⇒ τ [ |→λτ | ].C = τ [ |
→λ
τ ′ | ].C ∧ →λτ =λ
→λ
τ ′
∧ dpNI (λ, λ→τ ,
λ→
τ ′ )
Notice, for traces τ and τ ′ that each are a single λ-piece (i.e., τ =
→λ
τ and τ ′ =
→λ
τ ′
for all λ) then dpNI (λ, τ, τ ′) is equivalent to (2.16), since the the final state of both
τ and τ ′ will have • and, therefore, τ [ |→λτ | ].C = τ [ |
→λ
τ ′ | ].C is satisfied.
A characterization like (2.12) now handles downgrades that appear through-
out a trace.
(∀λ,M,M′, τ, τ ′: τ = Υ(C,M) ∧ τ ′ = Υ(C,M′) ⇒ dpNI (λ, τ, τ ′)) (2.17)
Some example programs illustrate nuances of (2.17). These programs use
RIF labels ΛLH , {L,H} with L @ H and reclassifiers F , {↓, ↑} satisfying the
following: T (H, ↓) , L and T (L, ↑) , H. Assume that Γ(low) = Γ(low ′) = L and
Γ(high) = Γ(high ′) = H.
The first program assigns (in C3) a value with label H to a variable with label
L without use of a reclassifying expression and, thus, would seem to exhibit an
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illicit L-flow.
C1: low := [high]↓;
C2: low ′ := [high ′]↓;
C3: low := high;
(2.18)
Traces for program (2.18) comprise two L-pieces. One L-piece starts with com-
mand C1 and the other L-piece starts with command C2 (and includes C3), due to
the following.
∆−(2.18)(L, C1) = {high} ∆−(2.18)(L, C2) = {high ′} ∆−(2.18)(L, C3) = ∅.
Checking, we find (2.17) is satisfied despite our earlier premonition about C3.
A close look shows why the flow to low in assignment C3 actually ought to be
allowed, as characterization (2.17) does: C3 is assigning an L-downgraded value,
since the value of high in the right hand side of C3 was an L-downgraded value
in C1 and has not been changed since.
A second program changes (in C2) the value in high after the L-downgrade in
C1.
C1: low := [high]↓
C2: high := high ′
C3: low := high
(2.19)
Traces for (2.19) comprise a single L-piece that starts with command C1 because:
∆−(2.19)(L, C1) = {high} ∆−(2.19)(L, C2) = ∅ ∆−(2.19)(L, C3) = ∅
Program (2.19) does not satisfy (2.17) since traces τ and τ ′ exist that generate ob-
servations that are not (but should be) indistinguishable. This is because there
exist memories M and M′ satisfying M =L M′ and M(high ′) 6= M′(high ′).
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When alternative executions of C1 are started in these two memories, C3 gener-
ates different updates to low . But having (2.17) not satisfied for this program is
what we should desire—the value in high when C3 executes is not the value that
was L-downgraded, so in program (2.19) a value with label H that has not been
L-downgraded is being used to update a variable with label L.
A final program illustrates the role of conjunct τ [ |→λτ | ].C = τ [ |
→λ
τ ′ | ].C in the
consequent of dpNI (λ, τ, τ ′).
C1: if high > 0 then C2: low := [high ′]↓
else C3: low := [high ′′]↓
(2.20)
Consider traces τ = Υ(C1,M) and τ ′ = Υ(C1,M′), where the following hold:
M =L M′, M(high > 0) = true, butM′(high > 0) = false. τ comprises a first
L-piece that starts with C1 and a second L-piece starts with C2; τ ′ has the same
first L-piece but a second L-piece that starts with C3.
Program (2.20) does not satisfy (2.17) since τ [ |→λτ | ].C = C2 and τ [ |
→λ
τ ′ | ].C = C3,
so conjunct τ [|→λτ |].C = τ [|
→λ
τ ′ |].C in the consequent of dpNI (L, τ, τ ′) does not hold.
Having (2.17) not be satisfied is what we should desire, though. C1 is leaking
information about the value of high to the program counter, which determines
whether C2 or C3 executes next. C2 and C3 cause different updates to low .
The test we are using for illicit λ-flows involving the program counter, how-
ever, can be too conservative. Consider the program obtained when C3 in (2.20)
is replaced by assignment low := [high ′ + 0]↓, which, by design, causes the same
sequence of observations to be produced whether the program executes C2 or
C3. Conjunct τ [ |→λτ | ].C = τ [ |
→λ
τ ′ | ].C in the consequent of dpNI (L, τ, τ ′) still does
not hold because C2 and C3 are different statements in the program. Yet the up-
dates produced with the replaced C3 are now are the same as C2 produces, so
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there is not actually an illicit L-flow. The way to obtain a less conservative test
would be to replace conjunct τ [|→λτ |].C = τ [|
→λ
τ ′ |].C by a predicate for equivalence
of the subsequent executions—but doing that requires a predicate to determine
whether two programs are equivalent.
Handling Upgrades. A reclassifying expression [E ]¯f is considered to perform
a λ-upgrade if Γ(E) v λ and Γ([E ]¯f) 6v λ hold. Characterization (2.17) is blind
to illicit λ-flows caused by λ-upgrades. Consider, for example, a program com-
prising assignment
low := [low ′]↑ (2.21)
that uses RIF labels from ΛLH. Since we have assumed Γ(low) = L and Γ(low ′) =
L hold then this program satisfies (2.17). Yet the program exhibits an illicit L-
flow: differences in the initial value of an L-upgraded expression ([low ′]↑) with
label H result in differences in updates to a variable (low ) with label L where
Γ([low ′]↑) 6v Γ(low) holds.
In checking for evidence of illicit λ-flows, (2.17) compares traces τ and τ ′
that differ in initial values of variables whose labels λ′ satisfy λ′ 6v λ. That set
of comparisons, however, ignores some of the other expressions whose labels λ′
satisfy λ′ 6v λ—those expressions that perform λ-upgrades.
A programming language that supports RIF labels will provide syntax that
allows programmers to specify λ-upgrades by using reclassifying expressions.
We therefore stiplulate that the language semantics include a function ∆+Ĉ(λ, Ci)
that satisfies:
∆+Ĉ(λ, Ci) ⊇ {E | [E ]¯f ∈ ∆(Ci) ∧ Γ([E ]¯f) 6v λ ∧ Γ(E) v λ}
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So ∆+Ĉ(λ, Ci) contains all expressions that are evaluated when Ci executes and
that satisfy the definition of a λ-upgrade.
Since (2.17) correctly handles variables whose labels are not less restrictive
than λ, we consider a transformation from λ-upgraded expressions to such vari-
ables. Define translated command T(λ, Ĉ) to be the command that results from
substituting hE for every expression E ∈ ∆+Ĉ(λ, Ci), where Ci is a subcommand
of Ĉ. If a program Ĉ exhibits an illict λ-leak from a λ-upgraded expression E
then, by construction, T(λ, Ĉ) exhibits an illicit λ-leak from hE . Moreover, be-
cause T(λ, Ĉ) contains no λ-upgraded expressions, it exhibits no illicit λ-flows
from upgraded λ-expressions per se. That means we can use (2.17) to check for
illicit λ-leaks in Ĉ by checking translated program T(λ, Ĉ) for illicit λ-leaks.
The result is the following characterization of piecewise noninterference for a
program Ĉ; it holds if there are no illicit λ-flows in Ĉ.
PWNI (Ĉ) ,
(∀λ,M,M′, τ, τ ′: τ = Υ(T(λ, Ĉ),M) ∧ τ ′ = Υ(T(λ, Ĉ),M′)
⇒ dpNI (λ, τ, τ ′))
(2.22)
Note, though, that (2.22) can be unnecessarily conservative. PWNI (Ĉ) might
not be satisfied even though Ĉ does not exhibit illicit λ-leaks. Here is an exam-
ple, where labels are from ΛLH, and Γ(low) = L holds.
C1: if [low = low ]↑ then C2: low := 1 else C3: low := 2 (2.23)
To evaluate PWNI involves constructing and checking translated program
T(λ, C1),
C1: if h[low=low ]↑ then C2: low := 1 else C3: low := 2 (2.24)
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where Γ(h[low=low ]↑) = H holds. Boolean guard [low = low ]↑ in (2.23) is always
true, so execution of this program produces no traces in which C3 executes. In
translated program (2.24), Boolean guard h[low=low ]↑ ranges over all values, so
there are traces involving C3 as well as traces involving C2. Thus, PWNI (C1)
is not satisfied for (2.24) due to the illicit H-flow from upgraded expression
h[low=low ]↑ to low ; in program (2.23) the corresponding illicit H-flow from up-
graded expression [low = low ]↑ does not actually exist.
The above specious detection of an illicit H-flow could be avoided if we re-
alized that [low = low ]↑ in (2.23) is a constant, despite occurences of variables
in this expression. In the general case, however, the required semantic analysis
quickly becomes intractable for determining new variables and expressions to
mirror the relationships among the upgraded expressions being replaced. Con-
sider:
C1: if [low > 0]↑ then high := 1 else high := 2
C2: if [low + 1 > 1]↑ then high ′ := 1 else high ′ := 2
C3: if high 6= high ′ then low ′ := 1 else low ′ := 2
(2.25)
The Boolean guards on C1 and C2 are equivalent, so command C3 always executes
low ′ := 2. Thus, there is no illicit H-flow in C3 to low ′ from [low > 0]↑ in C1 or from
[low + 1 > 1]↑ in C2. But to reach that conclusion requires knowledge about the
equivalence of these expressions so they are not replaced by different variables
to form the translated program.
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E ::= ν | x | op(E1, . . . , En)
C ::= skip
| x := [E ]¯f
| if [E ]¯f then Ct else Ce end
| while [E ]¯f do Ct end
| C1; C2
Figure 2.2: Syntax of simple imperative language
2.3 Static Enforcement of PWNI
Type-checking allows static enforcement of PWNI when a chackable class of RIF
labels are the basis of the type system. A simple imperative language provides
a vehicle for demonstration.
Language and Semantics. Figure 2.2 gives a syntax of expressions and a simple
programming language for defining commands. There, ν ranges over constants,
x ranges over program variables, E , E1, E2, . . . range over ordinary expressions,
and Ct, Ce, C1, C2, . . . range over commands. Note, allowing only reclassifyng
expressions (rather than ordinary expressions) in the language syntax for com-
mands is not a limitation—identity reclassifier  must be handled by every RIF
label, and reclassifying expression [E ] has the same value and label as ordinary
expression E .
Figure 2.3 gives an operational semantics for the programming language of
Figure 2.2. We writeM[x 7→ν] there to denote a mapping that is identical toM
exceptM(x) = ν. The rules in Figures 2.3 define partial function Υ(C,M).
The final part of the semantics for this programming langage are definitions
for sets ∆(Ci), ∆−Ĉ(λ, Ci), and ∆
+
Ĉ(λ, Ci). These definitions are given in Figure 2.4
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SKIP: 〈skip,M〉 → 〈•,M〉
ASGN:
M([E ]¯f) = ν
〈x := [E ]¯f ,M〉 → 〈•,M[x 7→ ν]〉
BRCH1:
M([E ]¯f) = true
〈if [E ]¯f then Ct else Ce end,M〉 → 〈Ct,M〉
BRCH2:
M([E ]¯f) = false
〈if [E ]¯f then Ct else Ce end,M〉 → 〈Ce,M〉
LOOP1:
M([E ]¯f) = true
〈while [E ]¯f do Ct end,M〉 → 〈Ct;while [E ]¯f do Ct end,M〉
LOOP2:
M([E ]¯f) = false
〈while [E ]¯f do Ct end,M〉 → 〈•,M〉
SEQ1:
〈C1,M〉 → 〈•,M1〉
〈C1; C2,M〉 → 〈C2,M1〉
SEQ2:
〈C1,M〉 → 〈C,M1〉 C 6= •
〈C1; C2,M〉 → 〈C; C2,M1〉
Figure 2.3: Operational Semantics
through Figure 2.6. In defining ∆−Ĉ(λ, Ci), we write lhs(Ci) to denote the set of
target variables in assignments appearing in a command Ci. This allows us to
limit ∆−Ĉ(λ, Ci) so that it does not include λ-downgrades that cannot influence
the value being assigned to a variable x where Γ(x ) v λ′ holds. No illicit λ-flow
is possible absent such an assignment.
Typing Rules. Figure 2.7 gives rules to associate a type with each expression.
The rules for ordinary expressions are standard. EXPR-T intantiates (2.6); ANNEXPR-T
is based on (2.7).
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∆(skip) , ∅
∆(x := [E ]¯f) , {[E ]¯f}
∆(if [E ]¯f then Ct else Ce) , {[E ]¯f}
∆(while [E ]¯f do Cw ) , {[E ]¯f}
∆(C1; C2) , ∆(C1)
Figure 2.4: Definition of ∆(Ci)
∆−Ĉ(λ, skip) , ∅
∆−Ĉ(λ, x := [E ]¯f) ,
{{E} if Γ(E) 6v λ ∧ Γ([E ]¯f) v λ ∧ Γ(x) v λ
∅ otherwise
∆−Ĉ(λ, if [E ]¯f then Ct else Ce) ,

{E} if Γ(E) 6v λ ∧ Γ([E ]¯f) v λ
∧ (∃x ∈ lhs(Ct) ∪ lhs(Ce): Γ(x ) v λ)
∅ otherwise
∆−Ĉ(λ,while [E ]¯f do Cw) ,

{E} if Γ(E) 6v λ ∧ Γ([E ]¯f) v λ
∧ (∃x ∈ lhs(Cw): Γ(x ) v λ)
∅ otherwise
∆−Ĉ(λ, C1; C2) , ∆
−
Ĉ(λ, C1)
Figure 2.5: Definition of ∆−Ĉ(λ, C)
∆+Ĉ(λ, skip) , ∅
∆+Ĉ(λ, x := [E ]¯f) ,
{{E} if Γ(E) v λ ∧ Γ([E ]¯f) 6v λ
∅ otherwise
∆+Ĉ(λ, if [E ]¯f then Ct else Ce) ,
{{E} if Γ(E) v λ ∧ Γ([E ]¯f) 6v λ
∅ otherwise
∆+Ĉ(λ,while [E ]¯f do Cw) ,
{{E} if Γ(E) v λ ∧ Γ([E ]¯f) 6v λ
∅ otherwise
∆+Ĉ(λ, C1; C2) , ∆
+
Ĉ(λ, C1)
Figure 2.6: Definition of ∆+Ĉ(λ, C)
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VAL-T:
Γ ` ν:⊥ VAR-T:
Γ(x) = λ
Γ ` x:λ
EXPR-T:
Γ ` E1:λ1 . . . Γ ` En:λn
Γ ` op(E1, . . . , En) : λ1 unionsq · · · unionsq λn
ANNEXPR-T:
Γ ` E1:λ1 . . . Γ ` En:λn
Γ ` [op(E1, . . . , En)]f1,...,fn : T (λ1, f1) unionsq · · · unionsq T (λn, fn)
Figure 2.7: Typing rules for expressions
SKIP-T:
Γ, λκ ` skip
ASGN-T:
Γ ` [E ]¯f :λg Γ ` x:λx λκ unionsq λg v λx
Γ, λκ ` x := [E ]¯f
BRCH-T:
Γ ` [E ]¯f :λg Γ, λκ unionsq λg ` Ct Γ, λκ unionsq λg ` Ce
Γ, λκ ` if [E ]¯f then Ct else Ce end
LOOP-T:
Γ ` [E ]¯f :λg Γ, λκ unionsq λg ` Ct
Γ, λκ ` while [E ]¯f do Ct end
SEQ-T:
Γ, λκ ` C1 Γ, λκ ` C2
Γ, λκ ` C1; C2
Figure 2.8: Typing rules for commands
Figure 2.8 shows the familiar rules to deduce whether a command is type-
correct. Judgment Γ, λκ ` C signifies that a command C is type correct. Param-
eter λκ in these rules is called context-type. It is used in checking for implicit
flows. Commands in the body of a conditional command (“if [E ]¯f then . . .” or
“while [E ]¯f do . . .”) are considered to be in the context of the corresponding
guard, Boolean expresssion [E ]¯f ; for nested conditional commands, the context is
defined to be the conjunction of the guards for all of the enclosing conditional
commands. Context-type λκ associates a type with the context, and λκ is com-
bined with the type of the right hand side of an assignment statement.
The following theorem states that if a program is type correct, then this pro-
38
gram satisfies PWNI.
Theorem 1. If Γ, λκ ` C, then PWNI (C) holds.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
2.4 Discussion
2.4.1 Defining flow
Semantically defining flow from initial values of variables to subsequently com-
puted values (i.e. not just final values of variables) is challenging. The literature
of information flow has not provided such definitions, and this thesis has not,
either. The difficulty to give a semantic definition for flow between values arises
from the use of conditional commands. The following intuitive semantic defi-
nition of flow does not apply for values computed during execution of a con-
ditional command: changing the initial value in variable x, causes computed
value in variable y to change. For example, changing the initial value in vari-
able x, may cause another branch of an if command to be executed, where y
is not even a target variable. Is this considered a change of y’s value? And if
yes, when exactly did this change take place? As another example, changing
the initial value in variable x, may just delay the assignment of the same value
to y (e.g., the assignment to y may follow an if command whose branches have
different number of commands). Is this phenomenon considered a flow from x
to y? These questions could be answered if we had a semantic definition of flow
from initial values of variables to subsequently computed values. Such a defini-
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tion would lead to more precise information flow specifications and properties
to be enforced.
2.4.2 Reclassifications
In this thesis, we assumed that the authors of RIF labels have already examined
the reclassifiers that annotate operations in programs and decided which oper-
ations may cause what kind of reclassifications to values. In fact, the decision
about which operations cause what reclassifications is relative to the decision
of what restrictions are initially associated with input values (e.g., which value
is initially considered secret and which public), which depends on assumptions
about the environment.
An obvious next step is to create a logic for reasoning about when reclas-
sification is allowed. For instance, for confidentiality, we might consider the
following approach:
– Consider a particular initial value ν.
– Create a mapping K from amounts of information conveyed about ν (this
amount may be expressed using information theory) to sets of principals,
– UseK to create RIF labels for ν and all other initial values. If applying F to
an initial value ν ′ conveys X amount of information about ν, and K maps
X to set S of principals, then the RIF label associated with ν ′ should map
F to S.
With this approach, a reclassification that an operation may cause is attributed
to mapping K.
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The existence of such a logic would help understand when it is sensible for
an operation to cause a reclassification. For example, when is it reasonable to
increase the confidentiality level of the output of an operation that gets public
inputs, from public to secret? Perhaps when the operation is nondeterministic?
Of course, the decision to change the confidentiality of a value may not be
always based on a mathematical logic. For example, a user may decide that she
no longer wants her age to be publicly available, and thus, she decides, at some
point in her life, to increase the confidentiality level of her age. An enforcement
mechanism should be flexible enough to incorporate such arbitrary information
flow policies as axioms.
2.5 Related Work
RIF labels specify restrictions based on the history of applied operations, which
can be enforced using a static type system. This, then, extends an approach
starting with Volpano et al. [93], which gives a type system based on Denning’s
lattice model [36, 34, 35] and enforces noninterference [44]. PWNI extends non-
interference for handling arbitrary reclassifications.
History-based Policies We are not the first to use history of applied operations
in types. Typestates [89] describe types with structures similar to automata that
record how execution history affects a value. Hartson and Hsiao [47] seem to
be the first to use access history in access control policies. Stack inspection [96]
and history-based access control [1] are more recent access control polices that use
history for defining authorization.
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Specifications and Enforcement The work of Chong et al. [29] is perhaps clos-
est to our RIF labels. Information flow policies for confidentiality in [29] use
predicates on the execution state as a basis for deciding when a variable may be
declassified or should be erased, which is a form of classification. In [29], when
a reclassification (i.e., declassification or erasure) is specified by the policy of a
variable, the value of that variable and all other values derived from that vari-
able are reclassified. Instead, when a reclassification is specified by the RIF label
of a variable, only the result of applying the corresponding operation to that
variable is reclassified. So, RIF labels specify changes of restrictions on values
at a more fine-grained level comparing to policies in [29]. ClickRelease [66] ad-
vances the expressiveness of declassification policies presented in [29] by using
linear-time temporal logic (instead of propositional logic) to express formulae
over events.
Paralocks [24] are execution state predicates used to specify reclassifications.
These predicates involve boolean variables that can be manipulated during pro-
gram execution. A security policy is written as Σ⇒ α, where Σ is a set of pred-
icates and α is a principal. A value associated with such a policy may flow to α
only if all predicates in Σ are true. Both Paralocks and policies presented in [29]
are enforced using a static type system.
In SHAI [41], policies associated with data containers specify confidentiality
and integrity restrictions, giving (i) the set of principals allowed to read data in a
container, (ii) a superset of principals allowed to read derived data (i.e., causing
a declassification) depending on the execution state, (iii) the set of principals
allowed to write in the container, and (iv) the type of data allowed to be written
in the container. SHAI uses static and dynamic analysis to enforce these policies.
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Jeeves [9] employs faceted values [8] to specify declassification between two
levels of confidentiality (i.e., high and low). A faceted value of a variable is a pair
of a real and a dummy value guarded by a state predicate. If that state predicate
(which can be a faceted value) holds, then the real, possibly confidential, value
is allowed to flow to low outputs. Otherwise, the dummy value will flow to low
outputs.
The policies mentioned above (i.e., [29, 24, 41, 9]) tie reclassifications to state
predicates. RIF labels tie reclassifications to sequences of operations applied
to individual values. Execution state could be used to track the sequences of
operations applied to individual values. So, RIF labels and the above policies
all can be viewed as policies that specify functions from sequences of predicates
to restrictions.
The specification language used for writing policies defines the set of func-
tions (from sequences of predicates to restrictions) that can be specified. The
larger the set of functions that can be specified, the more expressive these poli-
cies are. Our theory of RIF labels is agnostic to the expressive power of the
specification language—any function from sequences of reclassifiers to restric-
tions can be defined using primitive functionsR and T . It is not until chapter 3
and 4 that we give two families of RIF labels with particular expressive power
(i.e., RIF automata and κ-labels). In fact, these RIF labels are expressive enough
to accommodate the examples under consideration, and at the same time, not
too expressive to make the decision of restrictiveness relation v overly conser-
vative.
Each of the approaches mentioned above (i.e., [29, 24, 41, 9]) proposes one
particular specification language for expressing policies. So, they explore poli-
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cies with particular expressive power. Possible future work could propose a
general theory that handles any function from sequences of predicates to re-
strictions (including RIF labels). Such a work could then compare the expressive
power of previously proposed specification languages, give semantics to the re-
strictiveness relation between these policies, and show whether previously pro-
posed decision algorithms (employed by the corresponding enforcing mecha-
nisms) are sound and complete with respect to this semantics.
We are not the first to annotate operations with identifiers that specify de-
classification. FJifP[50] enables a principal to declare trusted methods to declas-
sify input values. These trusted methods are similar to trusted subjects, first in-
troduced by Bell and LaPadula [14] to handle declassifications. But a trusted
method declared by p must always perform a declassification of inputs pro-
vided by p. RIF labels are thus more expressive, because an annotated oper-
ation might trigger different kinds of reclassifications, depending on the RIF
labels that tag these input values.
Rocha et al. [74] employ policy graphs to specify declassifications between
two security levels. In a policy graph, nodes represent variables and edges rep-
resent operation identifiers (similar to our reclassifiers). The tail node of an edge
is an input of the corresponding operation and the head node of that edge is an
output of that operation. Some of the nodes in a policy graph are defined to be
final, and they represent values in variables that can be declassified: values in
variables of non-final nodes are considered secret, while values in variables that
correspond to final nodes are considered public. Policy graphs thus can express
only declassifications from secret to public (as compared to RIF labels, which
can specify arbitrary reclassifications). Data and control flow analysis is used to
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check whether a program satisfies the policy graph. Later, Rocha et al. [75] in-
troduced a specification language for defining policies that might also depend
on number of times a function is applied to a given value. This specification
language seems more expressive than Rocha et al. [74], although the classes of
properties being enforced has not been formally characterized. Similar tech-
niques to those presented in [74] for expressing and enforcing declassification
were later employed by Hammer et al. [46] and Johnson et al. [53]. The restric-
tions of a policy graph can be described using a set of RIF automata.
Li and Zdancewic [62] use lambda terms (i.e. functions) to specify down-
grading (i.e. declassification and endorsement) between two security levels.
When one of these lambda terms is applied to some value, the resulting value is
downgraded. So, an information flow label is a set of lambda terms. A type sys-
tem is given to enforce these policies. Whenever a lambda term is applied to a
value, the type system first checks if that lambda term equals one of the lambda
terms in the label of that value, before allowing the resulting value to be down-
graded. In general, using functions (e.g., lambda terms) to specify downgrades
leads to labels that precisely characterize what function of the input values is
allowed to be downgraded. Also, this characterization is independent from the
program code. Of course, at the same time, enforcement is more challenging,
because it involves deciding equivalence of functions, which is in general un-
decidable. Also, functions alone may not be intuitive for understanding why
a specified reclassification is reasonable. The ultimate goal should be to spec-
ify reclassifications based on properties of functions. For example, a declassi-
fication could be specified based on the number of bits that the output of the
corresponding function may reveal about the inputs.
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Variants of Noninterference PWNI is the first to handle reclassification due to
applied operations in full generality, but not the first to handle declassification.
Classical noninterference [44] is violated when a declassification occurs. This
led researchers to propose more expressive formulations. For example, condi-
tional noninterference [44, 43] proscribes secret information from flowing to pub-
lic information, unless the sequence of operations involved in this flow (includ-
ing the principals that invoke these operations) satisfy some given predicate.
So, conditional noninterference defines a function from sequences of operations
applied to some secret values, and principals that invoke these operations, to
whether the resulting value may be considered public. By also considering the
principals that invoke operations, conditional noninterference is more expres-
sive than PWNI, when focusing only on declassifications. However, conditional
noninterference cannot express classifications.
Gradual release (GR) [3] dictates that designated declassifications (down-
grades for confidentiality) should be the only points of execution where at-
tacker’s knowledge about initial high variables may increase. Other work (de-
limited release [79] and relaxed noninterference [62]) specifies what expressions of
high values in the initial state could be declassified, but it does not restrict where
in the program such an expression is allowed to be declassified. Conditional grad-
ual release [11], similar to our approach, can specify which particular expression
in the program is allowed to be declassified, but then it is not always possible
to characterize what initial high information becomes available to an observer
at every declassification (if it is important to do so, then we could adopt the re-
striction on programs employed by [11] and [79], namely declassified variables
may not be updated prior to declassification). However, conditional gradual
release [11] handles only a two-level lattice and it allows declassifications to de-
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pend on high context, implying that a declassification may disclose more infor-
mation than intended (our approach does not allow declassifications to depend
on high context by requiring λ-pieces to end at the same command).
Categorization of Policies Sabelfeld et al. [81] surveys papers that specify and
enforce expressive declassification policies. They introduce a four-dimension
categorization: what information is declassified, who declassifies information,
where in the system information is declassified, and when information can be de-
classified. RIF label focus on what, where, and when. An annotated expression
that causes a reclassification indicates what will be reclassified, where in the pro-
gram code, and when during the program execution. RIF labels do not specify
who is allowed to trigger a reclassification, but they could be extended to specify
this.
The decentralized label model (DLM) [70, 69] can express who is allowed to de-
classify information. According to DLM, a value may be declassified only if the
declassification command is executed on behalf of the value’s owner or on be-
half of a principal that acts-for that owner. We could adopt the approach of DLM
and have RIF labels specify principals trusted to execute specific operations. T
would map a RIF label, a reclassifier, and a principal trusted to execute an opera-
tion that corresponds to that reclassifier to the desired RIF label. So, a transition
would be triggered only if the specified principal executes the corresponding
operation.
Another way to characterize information flow policies is based on the three-
level hierarchy of control proposed by Broberg et al. [25]. Level 0 control is a set
of possible flow relations between information sources (e.g., input variables) and
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sinks (e.g., output channels). A flow relation indicates that information from the
source is allowed to flow to the sink. Level 1 control is a determining function that
selects which flow relation is allowed. Level 2 control is a meta policy controlling
the way in which the current flow relation may be changed. Our function T is
an instantiation of Level 1 and Level 2 controls, which specify how and when flow
relations between the information sources and sinks may change.
2.6 Summary
This chapter defined RIF labels, which couple arbitrary changes in restrictions
to specified operations. A simple programming language served as a vehicle
for exploring the use RIF labels. For these programs, PWNI extends classical
noninterference to handle arbitrary changes in restrictions, and a type system
implements static enforcement of PWNI for checkable RIF labels.
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CHAPTER 3
RIF AUTOMATA
Finite state automata provide the basis for a checkable class of RIF labels
called RIF automata. This class of labels is supported in the JRIF programming
language [55], which we built to gain practical experience with using RIF au-
tomata for specifying security policies and to understand the compiler modifi-
cations needed for replacing traditional security label types by RIF automata.
The privacy automata used in the Avanance language [20] for specifying use-
based privacy also are instances of RIF automata.
3.1 Formalization of RIF Automata
A finite state automaton can serve as a RIF label λα by (i) having the set of
reclassifiers be the automaton’s input alphabet, and (ii) associating restrictions
with each automaton state. Restrictions imposed by λα are those associated
with the current state of the automaton. Reclassifiers, which by construction
can change current state, thus cause a (potentially) different set of restrictions to
be imposed.
Formally, a set ΛRA comprising RIF automata is defined relative to some
given lattice of restrictions 〈R, vR, unionsqR〉. Each RIF automaton λα ∈ ΛRA is
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described by a 5-tuple 〈Qα,F , δα, qα, rα〉where1
Qα is a finite set of automaton states,
F is a finite set of reclassifiers,
δα: Qα ×F → Qα is a (deterministic) next-state transition function,
qα ∈ Qα is the current state of the RIF automaton, and
rα: Qα → R gives the restrictions associated with each state.
By requiring transition function δ to be total, any sequence of reclassifiers from
F causes a sequence of transitions.
RRA and TRA are defined as expected for RIF automata λα ∈ ΛRA and reclas-
sifiers f ∈ F :
RRA(λα) , rα(qα)
TRA(λα, f) , 〈Qα,F , δα, δα(qα, f), rα〉
Instantiating definition (2.4) of v using these definitions, we get
λα vRA λα′ , (∀F ∈ F∗: rα(δ∗α(qα,F )) vR rα′(δ∗α′(qα′ ,F ))) (3.1)
A sound and complete algorithm to compute this relation is given in Figure 3.1;
the proof appears in Appendix A.2.
The properties of unionsq for RIF automata are satisfied2 by a product automaton
defined in the usual way:
λα unionsqRA λα′ , 〈Qα ×Qα′ , F , δα×α′ , 〈qα, qα′〉, rα×α′〉
where δα×α′( 〈qα, qα′〉, f) , 〈δα(qα, f), δα′(qα′ , f)〉
rα×α′( 〈qα, qα′〉 ) , rα′(qα) unionsqR rα′(qα′)
1Closure δ∗α: Qα ×F∗ → Qα is derived from δα in the usual way: δ∗α(q, ) , q and δ∗α(q,Ff) ,
δα(δ
∗
α(q,F), f).
2See Appendix A.3 for a proof.
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rstr(λ1, λ2, visited) ,
Let λ1 = 〈Q1,F , δ1, q1, r1〉
Let λ2 = 〈Q2,F , δ2, q2, r2〉
if 〈q1, q2〉 ∈ visited then return(true)
if r1(q1) 6vR r2(q2) then return(false)
return(∀f ∈ F : rstr( TRA(λ1, f), TRA(λ2, f), visited ∪ 〈q1, q2〉 ))
Figure 3.1: rstr(λ1, λ2, ∅) computes λ1 vRA λ2
A Prins
tally
¬tally ∗
Figure 3.2: RIF automaton αvoter(A) for secret ballots
〈〈R,vR〉, 〈ΛRA,unionsqRA,vRA〉,F ,Rα, Tα〉 now forms a class of RIF labels provided
that λα unionsqRA λα′ ∈ ΛRA holds for all λα, λα′ ∈ ΛRA. And we will write λα(q) to
specify a RIF automaton λα whose current state is q and thus imposes restric-
tions rα(q).
Examples of RIF Automata. Though the value of an individual ballot cast in
an election might be secret, the value of the majority is not. This is a security pol-
icy associated with the ballot that each participant A casts: (i) only A may read
the ballot’s value and (ii) anyone may read the majority value derived from
all of the ballots cast. We can formalize this security policy as a RIF automa-
tion λvoter(A), where Prins is the set of all principals eligible to learn the election
outcome and set F of reclassifiers includes tally, which will be associated with
calculating the election outcome.
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Figure 3.2 gives a graphic depiction3 of λvoter(A); the formal definition is:
λvoter(A) , 〈{q1, q2},F , δvoter , qvoter(A), rvoter(A)〉
where
δvoter(q, f) ,
q2 if q = q1 ∧ f = tallyq othewise
rvoter(A)(q) ,
 {A} if q = q1Prins if q = q2
Restriction rvoter(A) is the set of principals who can read the value being labeled
by λvoter(A):
• the value is secret to A if qvoter(A) = q1 holds because rvoter(A)(q1) = {A},
and
• any value derived by using a tally operation becomes public because
qvoter(A) = q2 and rvoter(A)(q2) = Prins hold.
Thus, according to the terminology of Figure 2.1, tally causes declassification.
A programmer writes reclassifying expression [maj(vA, vB, . . . , vZ)]tally to as-
sert that computing the majority of votes vA, vB, ..., vZ implements the intended
effect of a tally operation. That derived value can be stored in a variable whose
RIF label imposes no restriction on readers. And assignment
winner := [maj(vA, vB, . . . , vZ)]tally (3.2)
3A conventional graphical representation for finite-state automata is used. Circles denote
states of the automaton. Arrows between states are labeled with sets of reclassifiers and define
allowed transitions, where * abbreviates the list of all reclassifiers. The label inside each state q
indicates associated restrictions rα(q), and the grey-filled state indicates the current automaton
state.
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all limited
ext
¬ext ∗
Figure 3.3: RIF automaton of document excerpting.
has exactly that effect if the RIF automaton associated with each variable vA is
λvoter(A)(q1) and the RIF automaton associated with variable winner is at least as
restrictive as
λvoter(A)(q2) unionsqRA λvoter(B)(q2) unionsqRA · · · unionsqRA λvoter(Z)(q2)
which happens to be equivalent to λvoter(x)(q2) for any x ∈ {A, . . . , Z}. So for
any choice of x, assignment (3.2) typechecks according to the rules of §2.3.
A second example sketches RIF automata that enforce integrity policies for a
document management system.4 Given is a set of original documents; these are
trusted by all principals for all purposes. Operation ext(D, parms) derives a new
document by excerpting from document D according to parms . Because cre-
ative excerpting can be used to generate a document that has different meaning
from the original, conservative principals will not use such derived documents
for certain purposes. Using the terminology of Figure 2.1, excerpting causes
deprecation.
One RIF automaton αD for supporting such a policy might be constructed
as follows. It would have a set FDocs of reclassifiers that includes ext, which
will correspond to excerpting operations. And it would have two automaton
states; restrictions indicate whether the associated document D is trusted for all
4This example is inspired by TruDocs [84].
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purposes or for limited purposes:
rDocs(q) ,
 all if q = q1limited if q = q2
Figure 3.3 gives a graphic depiction for a RIF automaton λD(q1) associated with
an original document D; λD(q2) would be associated with a derived document.
The formal definition of λD is:
λD , 〈{q1, q2},FDocs, δDocs, qD, rDocs〉
where
δDocs(q, f) ,
q2 if q = q1 ∧ f = extq othewise
For some applications, we might seek a more refined basis to decide whether
a document should be trusted for a specific purpose. The obvious basis for such
trust assesments is the set of principals participating in the document’s deriva-
tion. RIF automata can specify such policies, too. There would be an automaton
state qS for each set S of principals corresponding to a subset of Prins . And re-
strictions being associated with an automaton state qS would depend on mem-
bers of S. Transitions are facilitated by having a set FDoc of reclassifiers contain
an element extP for each principal P that invokes an excerpting operation. The
formal definition of an automaton λD now becomes:
λD , 〈QPrins ,FDoc, δDoc, qD, rDoc〉
where
QPrins , {qS | S ∈ 2Prins}
δDoc(qS, excP ) , qS∪{P}
rDoc(qS) , {S}
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λ ::= {λc;λi}
λc ::= c [ListOfTerms ]
λi ::= i [ListOfTerms ]
ListOfTerms ::= T | T,ListOfTerms
T ::= State | InitialState | Transition
State ::= ID : {ListOfPrincipals}
InitialState ::= ID∗ : {ListOfPrincipals}
Transition ::= ID : ID → ID
Figure 3.4: Syntax for JRIF labels, where ID represents an alphanumeric string.
3.2 JRIF
JRIF (Java with Reactive Information Flow) extends Java’s types to incorporate
RIF automata. Programmers can tag fields, variables, and method signatures
with RIF automata, and the JRIF compiler checks whether a program satisfies
these RIF automata.
3.2.1 Syntax of JRIF
In JRIF, a JRIF label is a pair comprising a c-automaton, which is a RIF automaton
for confidentiality, and an i-automaton, which is a RIF automaton for integrity.
The JRIF syntax5 of a JRIF label is given in Figure 3.4. The set of all principals is
represented by { }, and the empty set is represented by {}. Reclassifications that
are not given explicitly in a JRIF label are taken to be transitions whose starting
and ending states are identical.
Figure 3.5 illustrates how the c-automaton in Figure 3.2 is coded using JRIF
5For clarity, the syntax presented in this section simplifies the syntax used in our JRIF imple-
mentation.
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c[s*:{A}, t:{_}, tally:s→t]
Figure 3.5: Syntactic representation of a c-automaton
Figure 3.6: PIN check
syntax. The initial state s is distinguished by an asterisk * and maps to principal
A. State t maps to the set of all principals Prins (denoted by { }). Reclassifier
tally triggers a transition from s to t.
In JRIF, an expression E is annotated with reclassifier f by simply writing
reclassify(E , f).
Annotated expressions can appear wherever ordinary Java expression can be
used (e.g., in right-hand side expressions of assignments or in guard expres-
sions of conditional commands). Expressions not explicitly annotated trigger
no transition on JRIF labels.
A simple method for PIN (personal identification number) checking written
in JRIF is shown in Figure 3.6. Here, method check takes as arguments an in-
teger input in and an integer PIN; it checks if these two arguments are equal.
The arguments are tagged with different c-automata.6 Input in is, for simplic-
ity, considered public (all principals can read it). PIN can initially be read only
by principal p (the principal that picked this PIN), but the result of applying the
equality check (annotated with reclassifier C) on PIN is public. Method check
6We focus only on confidentiality for this example.
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returns the boolean value that results from this equality check, which is con-
sidered public. JRIF’s compiler decides whether this method is safe, based on
typing rules we discuss next.
Label checking
For c-automata, we define λ′c to be at least as restrictive as λc, denoted λc vc λ′c, if
for all possible sequences of reclassifiers, principals allowed to read the resulting
value according to λ′c are also allowed by λc. Relationvc is thus formally defined
as follows:
λc vc λ′c , (∀F : R(T (λc,F )) ⊇ R(T (λ′c,F ))). (3.3)
For i-automata, λ′i is at least as restrictive as λi, denoted λi vi λ′i, if for all
possible sequences of reclassifiers, principals that must be trusted according to
λ′i include those that must be trusted according to λi. So, relation vi is defined
as follows:
λi vi λ′i , (∀F : R(T (λi,F )) ⊆ R(T (λ′i,F ))). (3.4)
We extend these restrictiveness relations to JRIF labels by comparing RIF
automata pointwise:
{λc;λi} v {λ′c;λ′i} , (λc vc λ′c) ∧ (λi vi λ′i).
The least restrictive JRIF label is denoted with {}; it allows all principals to read
values, and it requires no principal to be trusted. JRIF label {λc} imposes re-
strictions on confidentiality (according to λc), but it imposes no restriction on
integrity (no principal is required to be trusted). Similarly, JRIF label {λi} im-
poses restrictions on integrity, but it imposes no restriction on confidentiality.
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The JRIF label inferred by the JRIF compiler for an expression is at least as
restrictive as the JRIF labels of all variables in this expression. In particular, the
c-automaton of an expression is the join unionsq of all c-automata of variables in that
expression. JRIF constructs the join of two c-automata by taking their product,
assigning the intersection of the allowed principals at each state. For integrity,
the join of two i-automata is their product, assigning the union of the required
principals at each state.
The JRIF label of an annotated expression reclassify(E , f) is the JRIF la-
bel of expression E after performing an f transition. Specifically, if λ = {λc;λi}
is the JRIF label of E , then T (λ, f) , {T (λc, f); T (λi, f)} is the JRIF label of
reclassify(E , f).
JRIF extends label checking rules in Figure 2.8 to support all basic Java fea-
tures, including method overloading, class inheritance, and exceptions.7 The
formal description for all rules employed by JRIF is out of scope for this thesis.
We illustrate label checking by returning to method check from Figure 3.6.
This method compiles successfully in JRIF, because:
– the c-automaton of res is at least as restrictive as the c-automata of in and
PIN, after their taking a C transition, and
– the c-automaton of the return value is at least as restrictive as the c-
automaton of res.
More JRIF examples can be found on the JRIF web page [54].
7Label checking rules for Java features already exist in Jif. Their core component is a call to
a decision algorithm for the restrictiveness relation. So, we support JRIF labels by substituting
Jif’s decision algorithm with JRIF’s decision algorithm for JRIF label restrictiveness.
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Dynamic labels
Sometimes an information flow label becomes known only at execution time. To
accommodate this, JRIF adopted Jif’s support for dynamic labels. JRIF labels in
JRIF may be instantiated as runtime values: they may be constructed program-
matically, stored in variables, used in static type declarations, and compared
dynamically.
Since the actual JRIF label that a dynamic label denotes is not known at com-
pile time, JRIF requires the programmer to provide code that checks for unsafe
flows at runtime. For example, consider
y = reclassify(x mod 4, f) (3.5)
where x is tagged with dynamic label L1, and y is tagged with dynamic label
L2. This assignment statement is secure only when T (L1, f) v L2 holds. In JRIF,
programmers can write T(L1,f) to represent a dynamic label whose value is
T (L1, f). So, to ensure that T (L1, f) v L2 holds when (3.5) executes, the pro-
grammer must code
if (T(L1,f) v L2) y = reclassify(x mod 4, f) (3.6)
At compile time, constraint T(L1,f) v L2 informs the type system about the
necessary relationship between L1 and L2, because the type system may as-
sume T(L1,f) v L2 holds when the ”then” clause starts executing. At runtime
the system constructs the JRIF label that results from an f transition on L1 and
checks whether L2 is at least as restrictive. This example also illustrates an in-
teresting property of JRIF labels: the same reclassifier may have different effects
on different labels. For some instantiations of L1, transitioning according to f
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may satisfy relation T(L1,f) v L2, and for some other instantiations of L1,
transitioning according to the same reclassifier f may not satisfy this relation.
Programming with RIF versus classic labels
We use the term classic label to refer to an information flow label that specifies
the same restrictions on all values derived from the value with which this label
is associated (e.g., [36]).8 For example, if a user’s PIN is associated with a classic
label specifying that only this user is allowed to read PIN, then even the result
of a PIN check involving PIN is allowed to be read only by that user, instead by
everyone. Classic labels often impose more restrictions than needed.
Information flow control systems employing classic labels (e.g., [69, 68]) are
forced to use explicit declassification (for confidentiality) and endorsement (for
integrity) commands to attach appropriate labels to derived values (i.e., labels
that impose weaker restrictions). Reclassifications in JRIF have a concise de-
scription in terms of an identifier (i.e., the reclassifier); declassifications and en-
dorsements for classic labels are more verbose, since they glue a target label (i.e.,
the label that will be attached to the output) and, sometimes, must include the
source label (i.e., the label attached to the input) as well.
JRIF labels are more verbose than classic labels, but there is a pay-off—
changes to confidentiality and integrity specified in JRIF labels are not express-
ible by classic labels. Systems using classic labels need additional program code
to emulate JRIF labels. This additional code is not automatically checkable for
security, and thus, the programmer bears the full responsibility to implement
the intended policy correctly.
8Classic labels can be simulated by one state RIF automata.
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Compared to systems using classic labels, JRIF better separates program
logic from information flow policies. This makes programs easier to write and
easier to maintain. Suppose, for example, that a programmer decides that some
input value—a game player’s name—should not be declassified when formerly
it was.
– In JRIF, this change to the program involves modifying the JRIF label dec-
laration on any field storing the player’s name. The c-automaton of the
label would be inspected and edited so that it contains no transitions to
automaton states that map to additional principals.
– To accommodate this change in systems that use classic labels, the pro-
grammer must not only find and remove all declassification commands
that involve the name field explicitly, but she also must remove all de-
classification commands that involve any expressions to which the game
player’s name flows. Getting these deletions right is error prone, since
the programmer must reason about the flow of information in the code—
something the type system was supposed to do.
3.2.2 Example applications using JRIF
Battleship
The Battleship game is a good example, because both confidentiality and in-
tegrity are important to prevent cheating. Over the course of the game, con-
fidential information is declassified. Ship coordinates are initially fixed and
secret, but revealed when opponents guess their coordinates correctly. Also,
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p1 P
Q
¬Q ∗
(a) A c-automaton for ship-
coordinates.
p1 ∅
A
¬A ∗
(b) An i-automaton for ship-
coordinates.
Figure 3.7: RIF automata for ship-coordinates
players must not be able to change the position of their ships after initial place-
ments.
A simple c-automaton suffices to specify the confidentiality policy for the
ship-coordinates of each player. Values derived from ship-coordinates selected
by player p1 should be read only by p1, because opponent player p2 is not al-
lowed to learn the position of p1’s ships. The result of whether a ship of p1 has
been hit by the opponent player p2 may be read by everyone, including p2. A
c-automaton that expresses this policy appears in Figure 3.7a, where Q is the re-
classifier for the operation that checks whether an opponent’s attack succeeded,
and P is the set of all principals.
The integrity policy of ship-coordinates can be expressed using a simple i-
automaton. Once p1 selects the coordinates of her ships, they are as trusted as p1.
After ship-coordinates are chosen, they may not be changed during the game.
So, before the game actually starts, there is a game operation whose reclassifier
raises the integrity of all ship-coordinates, thereby ensuring that neither player
can make changes. An i-automaton that expresses this policy is presented in
Figure 3.7b, where A is the reclassifier annotating the operation that accepts the
initial coordinates.
We borrowed Jif’s implementation of Battleship [68] to show that Jif pro-
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Figure 3.8: Method processQuery from JRIF implementation. It checks the
success of opponent’s hit.
grams can easily be ported to JRIF. We replaced Jif labels with JRIF labels, and
we replaced various Jif declassification or endorsement commands with JRIF
reclassifications. Methods in the Jif implementation that involved only label
parameters and dynamic labels could be used without any modification in the
JRIF implementation. Figure 3.8 contains a method of the Battleship implemen-
tation in JRIF. This method demonstrates the use of the c-automaton in Figure
3.7a and the application of reclassifier Q. The full JRIF source for the Battleship
implementation is found on JRIF’s web page [54], along with the original Jif
source (for comparison).
A Shared Calendar
To explore the expressive power of JRIF labels, we developed a shared calen-
dar application from scratch.9 The application allows users to create and share
events in calendars. Each event consists of fields: time, date, duration, and de-
scription. Declassification, classification, endorsement, and deprecation all are
employed in this application. Also, users may choose dynamic JRIF labels to
9Source code for this shared calendar implementation in JRIF can be found on JRIFs web
page [54].
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associate with values, so the same reclassifier could have different effects on
values with different labels.
Operations supported by our shared calendar include:
– Create a personal event or a shared event.
– Invite a user to participate in a shared event.
– Accept an invitation to participate in a shared event. Reclassifier: Accept
– Cancel a shared event. Reclassifier: Cancel
– Check and announce a conflict between personal events (not shared or
canceled events) and an invitation for a new shared event. Reclassifier:
CheckConflict
– Publish an event date and time (but not the event description). Reclassi-
fier: PubSlot
– Hide an event date and time. Reclassifier: HideSlot
The reclassifiers that annotate these operations change the confidentiality
and integrity of events. Once an event is accepted (Accept is applied), the result-
ing shared event is given the highest integrity, since all of the attendees endorse
it. Having the highest integrity implies that no attendee is able to modify this
shared event, thereafter. If an event is cancelled (Cancel is applied), then this
event is given the lowest integrity, as are all values that subsequently may be de-
rived from it by applying supported operations. With lowest integrity, cancelled
events and all values derived from them can be distinguished. If CheckConflict
is applied to a personal event and an invitation for a new shared event, then the
result gets the lowest confidentiality and the highest integrity. This is because
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p1 P
P
PubSlotHideSlot
CheckConflict
(a) A c-automaton that permits de-
classification for conflict checking.
p1
P
PubSlotHideSlot
(b) A c-automaton that does not
permit declassification for conflict-
checking.
Figure 3.9: RIF automata for event confidentiality. Self-loops are omitted for
clarity.
the result is readable and trusted by all principals that learn about the conflict.
If PubSlot is applied to an event, then the events date and time can flow to all
principals, until a HideSlot is subsequently applied to that event.
Figure 3.9 illustrates c-automata for events created by a principal p1. The c-
automaton in Figure 3.9a permits a full declassification triggered by reclassifier
CheckConflict ; the c-automaton in Figure 3.9b does not. Both c-automata spec-
ify a declassification under PubSlot , and a classification under HideSlot . Figure
3.10 gives corresponding i-automata for the events of p1. The i-automaton in
Figure 3.10a permits a full endorsement triggered by reclassifier CheckConflict ;
the i-automaton in Figure 3.10b does not. Both i-automata specify an endorse-
ment under Accept , and a deprecation under Cancel . Notice that CheckConflict
triggers transitions in both a c-automaton and an i-automaton, contrary to, say,
PubSlot .
Dynamic labels are used extensively in the shared calendar application. Fig-
ure 3.11 excerpts from the conflict-checking method. Here, the label of the event
is checked dynamically to see whether it permits the result from the conflict
check to be declassified and endorsed before performing the corresponding op-
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p1 ∅ P
∅
Accept
CheckConflict
Cancel
(a) An i-automaton that permits
endorsement for conflict checking.
p1 ∅ P
Accept Cancel
(b) An i-automaton that does not
permit endorsement for conflict-
checking.
Figure 3.10: RIF automata for event integrity. Self-loops are omitted; for in-
stance, the result of applying CheckConflict to a canceled event has low integrity.
eration. In Figure 3.11, lEvt is the dynamic label of the requested shared event
e, lCal is the dynamic label of events in the calendar cal, against which the
conflict will be checked, and method hasConflict returns true if a conflict is
detected. If lEvt and lCal after having taken a C transition impose no restric-
tions to the resulting value, and if hasConflict is true, then a conflict will be
announced.
Different users may tag events with different dynamic labels. For example,
a user might pick the c-automaton in Figure 3.9a for some events but pick the
c-automaton in Figure 3.9b for others. Events can have different i-automata,
too. An unshared event has one of the i-automata in Figure 3.10, but an ac-
cepted event can be treated with higher integrity and thus tagged with the i-
automaton denoted by taking the Accept transition. In addition, the time slot of
some events could be either hidden or public. To accommodate these heteroge-
neously labeled events, we store events in a data structure that makes it easier
to aggregate events with different labels. The data structure has two fields: an
event and a label. Before processing an event, its label is checked to prevent
unspecified flows. Such data structures are common in Jif programs, and they
are studied formally in [100].
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Figure 3.11: Checking if the conflict is allowed to be declassified and endorsed,
where C corresponds to reclassifier CheckConflict .
3.2.3 Building a JRIF Compiler
We built a JRIF compiler by modifying the existing Jif compiler in relatively
straightforward ways.10 Extending compilers for other information flow lan-
guages ought to be similar. This should not be so surprising: JRIF labels expose
the same interface to a type system as native information flow labels.
Our strategy for building JRIF involved three steps:
1. Add syntax for JRIF labels and for annotating expressions with reclassi-
fiers.
2. Add typing rules for annotated expressions (according to §3.2.1).
3. Modify the type checker to handle this more expressive class of labels:
(a) implement the restrictiveness relation on JRIF labels,
(b) add an axiom stipulating that this relation is monotone with respect
to transition function T .
Item (3b) is essential for supporting our richer language of label comparisons.
For example, if relation l2 v l1 holds for two dynamic JRIF labels, then the
10The source code for JRIF can be found on JRIF’s web page [54].
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type checker must be able to deduce that T (l2, f) v T (l1, f) holds for every f.
We decided to build JRIF by extending the Jif compiler because Jif is a widely
studied language for information flow control and the Jif compiler is readily
available. JRIF adds 6k lines of code to Jif (which contains 230k LOC). Out
of the 494 Java classes comprising Jif, we modified only 31 and added 48 new
classes for JRIF. Of these new classes, 37 are extensions of Jif classes—primarily
abstract syntax tree nodes for labels, confidentiality and integrity policies, and
code generation classes. Thus, most of the effort in building JRIF focused on
extending Jif’s functionality rather than on building new infrastructure. More-
over, extending Jif enabled us to harness Jif features, such as dynamic labels,
label parameters, and label inference, which reduce the annotation burden on
the programmer.
Some features of Jif are orthogonal to enforcing JRIF labels, and JRIF ignores
them, for the time being. For instance, Jif uses authority and policy ownership to
constrain how labels may be downgraded. Since JRIF labels are concerned with
what operation is applied to what value, authority and ownership are ignored
for the enforcement of JRIF labels.
3.3 Related Work
Expressive structures, like automata, have previously been used to represent
information flow specifications. Program dependence graphs [46, 53], which
represent data and flow dependencies between values, specify allowable declas-
sifications. And Rocha et al. [74, 75] employ policy graphs to specify sequences
of functions that cause declassifications. However, this work does not handle
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arbitrary reclassifications; it only handles declassifications.
Many recent systems for information flow control are based on capabilities,
including Flume [57], HiStar [99], Asbestos [40], Aeolus [28], Laminar [76], and
LIO [88]. We focus our discussion on Flume, but similar arguments apply to
other systems.
Flume extends standard operating system abstractions with information
flow control. Confidentiality and integrity policies are represented in Flume
with unforgeable tokens, called tags. System resources are annotated with la-
bels, which are collections of tags. Each process has an associated process label,
which conservatively tracks the confidentiality and integrity policy on the pro-
cess’s memory. When a process performs input operations on sensitive data, the
restrictiveness of the process label is raised by adding that resource’s tags to the
label. Output operations are constrained to affect resources with labels that are
at least as restrictive as the current process label. For instance, if a process reads
a secret file, then any subsequent attempt to write to a public file will receive an
error.
This mechanism alone is usually too restrictive; certain outputs of a program
might not actually depend on any secret data, or the purpose of the program
may actually be to release secret data in a controlled way. Thus, Flume also
assigns to each process a set of capabilities that specify which tags it is permitted
to add or remove from its process label. For instance, to add or remove a tag t,
a process must have capability t+ or t−, respectively. Removing a tag from the
process label is equivalent to declassification or endorsement.
Consider the following scenario. Alice has two files: “diary.txt”, where she
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keeps a personal journal, and “pwds.db”, where she stores passwords. Both
files contain sensitive information, so she adds a tag, secret, to their labels. She
gives her editor the secret+ capability, but not secret−. This capability enables
the editor to read “diary.txt”, but prevents it from outputting its contents to
the network or to a file lacking the secret tag. In order to read the password
file, she gives her password manager the secret+ capability, but also the secret−
capability so that the passwords can be used to log in to remote hosts.
Unfortunately, this scheme gives the password manager more power than
Alice might have intended, since it may both read file “diary.txt” and export it
to the network. In Flume, Alice’s only option is to create separate tags for each
file to distinguish secrets that should never be exported and to carefully assign
capabilities to processes accordingly.
Extending Flume with RIF automata would provide a better option. As in
Jif, we can replace Flume labels with RIF automata, but where the states of these
automata are mapped to sets of tags. Thus, each system resource is associated
with a RIF automaton, and the process label is a RIF automaton that is at least as
restrictive as the current process’s memory. Instead of permitting processes to
directly add or remove tags, processes receive capabilities for performing tran-
sitions on the process label’s RIF automaton. Output operations are constrained
to resources whose RIF automata are at least as restrictive as the process label.
RIF automata for Flume would allow Alice to express her policies more di-
rectly. For “diary.txt”, she assigns a RIF automaton with a single state: secret.
For “pwds.db”, she assigns an automaton with two states, secret and public, and
a transition between them called login. Then granting the login capability to her
password manager does not allow it leak “diary.txt”, because that file’s automa-
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ton remains in the secret state after the login transition.
3.4 Summary
We defined RIF automata, a checkable class of RIF labels, and introduced JRIF.
JRIF compiler was implemented by extending the Jif compiler and runtime,
thereby demonstrating that RIF automata are easily incorporated into languages
that already support information flow types.
JRIF’s type system is more expressive than classic information flow type sys-
tems. For instance, JRIF allows programmers to specify rich policies based on
the sequence of operations used to derive a value. Existing programming lan-
guages allow such policies to be emulated in the state and control flow of a
program, but doing so invariably makes code more complex and provides few
security guarantees.
We illustrated JRIF with an implementation of Battleship and a shared cal-
endar application. Our implementation of Battleship demonstrates that appli-
cations developed with Jif may be ported easily to JRIF; the shared calendar
demonstrates the separation between policies and program logic that JRIF en-
ables.
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CHAPTER 4
κ-LABELS
Encryption causes declassification; decryption causes classification. This
chapter presents a checkable class of RIF labels, called κ-labels, for specifying
and enforcing confidentiality policies in programs that employ such crypto-
graphic operations. Functions Rκ and Tκ on κ-labels capture how confidentiality
restrictions change with (possibly nested) applications of cryptographic opera-
tions.1 We also give algorithms for deciding a restrictiveness relation vκ and
join unionsqκ over κ-labels, so that the type system of §2.3 can be used with κ-labels
as types. We assume that non-cryptographic operations have no effect on confi-
dentiality restrictions associated with values, and thus, can be ignored.
4.1 Formalization of κ-labels
Our κ-labels are based on Dolev-Yao [39], and they exhibit the limitations of that
model. A cryptosystem is characterized in terms of an encryption operation
Enc and a decryption operation Dec. Herein, Θ(E , K) will range over these
operations, where E is an expression (viz. plaintext or ciphertext) and K is a
key. Assignments to keys are not permitted. A function KN maps each key K
to the set of principals allowed to know the value of K and maps each variable
x to the set of principals allowed to know the initial value of x.
E and K both flow to the result of a cryptographic operation Θ(E , K). So,
both arguments might be reclassified when Θ(E , K) is computed. For exam-
1For example, if successive encryptions are followed by the same number of successive de-
cryptions (assuming appropriate keys are used), then the result can be read only by principals
knowing the initial value, because the result equals that initial value. Otherwise, the result can
be read by everyone.
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ple, both E and K are being declassified from secret to public when ciphertext
Enc(E , K) is considered public. Cryptographic reclassifiers from a set Fκ abstract
the effect of Θ(E , K) on confidentiality restrictions associated with E and K.
In Θ(E , K), the reclassifier for E is denoted Θ(·, K) and the reclassifier for K
is denoted Θ(E , ·). For the rest of this section, Θ(E , K) abbreviates annotated
expression [Θ(E , K)]Θ(·,K),Θ(E,·).
The restrictions associated with outputs of cryptographic operations depend
on the restrictions associated with inputs and the cryptographic reclassifiers ap-
plied to those inputs. Take the program in Figure 4.1, where Enc and Dec im-
plement symmetric cryptography. Each arrow depicts a value flowing from the
expression at the tail of the arrow to the variable at the head; the label on the
arrow is the cryptographic reclassifier that corresponds to the flow. From Figure
4.1, we deduce that the value being stored by the first assignment into w might
be described as applications of:
Enc(·, K) to x, (4.1)
Enc(x, ·) to K. (4.2)
Restrictions on w are derived from these and on any restrictions associated with
x and K. In particular, restrictions on w depend on (i) Enc(·, K) and KN (x) due
to x as well as (ii) Enc(x, ·) and KN (K) due to K. This can be depicted as set of
pairs:
{〈Enc(·, K),KN (x)〉, 〈Enc(x, ·),KN (K)〉} (4.3)
In general, restrictions on computed values depend on sequences of cryp-
tographic operations applied to initial values. Considering again Figure 4.1,
restrictions on the computed value in y are represented by extending with
Dec(·, K ′) the reclassifiers in each pair in (4.3), for the flow to y from w, and
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Figure 4.1: A program that implements part of a cascade protocol [39].
adding 〈Dec(w, ·),KN (K ′)〉, for the flow to y from key K ′ to form the following
set:
{〈Enc(·, K)Dec(·, K ′),KN (x)〉,
〈Enc(x, ·)Dec(·, K ′),KN (K)〉,
〈Dec(w, ·),KN (K ′)〉}.
(4.4)
So, (4.4) records the sequences of reclassifiers applied to the initial values of x,
K, and K ′ in computing the final value of y.
Cryptosystems typically define complement cryptographic operations. For
a symmetric cryptosystem, Dec is the complement of Enc when the following
holds:
∀ν: ∀K: Dec(Enc(ν,K), K) = ν. (4.5)
Complements are specified using rewriting rules on cryptographic reclassifiers.
For a symmetric cryptosystem where (4.5) holds, rewriting rule
Enc(·, K)Dec(·, K)  (4.6)
signifies that if the computation of a value involves sequence of reclassifiers
Enc(·, K)Dec(·, K), then that sequence can be deleted. Deletion is justifiable be-
cause whether Enc(·, K)Dec(·, K) or  is applied to a given value, the result will
be the same. We assume that we are given set of rewriting rules that completely
characterizes all complements. Also, we assume that the complement of cryp-
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tographic reclassifier is the only way to efficiently retrieve arguments to which
these reclassifiers have been applied.
We write fc to denote the complement of reclassifier f when that complement
exists. So, fc is defined iff
ffc  (4.7)
is a rewriting rule of the given cryptosystem. For example, (4.6) implies that
Dec(·, K) is the complement of Enc(·, K): Enc(·, K)c = Dec(·, K). If (fc)c exists,
then we require (fc)c = f to hold. This requirement is satisfied by cryptosystems
where, for example, Dec(·, K)c is Enc(·, K). We limit attention to rewriting rules
that involve cryptographic reclassifiers of the form Θ(·, K), and not of the form
Θ(E , ·). Thus, no cryptographic operation is available to recover keys used in
computing ciphertexts.2
Using rewriting (4.7), a sequence F ffcF ′ of reclassifiers can be rewritten as
FF ′. A sequence of reclassifiers is considered reduced iff no reclassifier is fol-
lowed by its complement. Empty sequence  is, by definition, reduced. In Figure
4.1, ifK were replaced byK ′ (so y would equal xwhen the program terminates)
then Enc(·, K)Dec(·, K ′) in the first pair of (4.4) would be replaced by .
We use LF M to denote the reduced sequence to which F can be rewritten.
2 The limitation rules out cryptographic systems that are vulnerable to plaintext attacks. In
such cryptosystems, the following equation would hold: Θ′(E ,Θ(E ,K)) = K. The rewriting
rule that describes this equation is Θ(E , ·)Θ′(E , ·)  , because Θ′(E , ·) is the complement of
Θ(E , ·), since applying Θ(E , ·) to K and then applying Θ′(E , ·) to that result, yields K.
75
Specifically, we have:
LM ,  (4.8)
LfM , f (4.9)
Lf1f2 . . . fnM ,

Lf1 . . . fj−1fj+2 . . . fnM ∃j: 1 ≤ j < n:
(∀i: 1 ≤ i < j: fci 6= fi+1)
∧ (fcj = fj+1)
f1f2 . . . fn otherwise
(4.10)
We prove in Appendix A.3 that reduction is associative, which gives:
LFaFFbM = LFaLF MFbM (4.11)
Efficient retriever function X maps each cryptographic reclassifier f to the set
of principals that can perform the operation corresponding to cryptographic
reclassifier fc. Those principals can retrieve the value of an argument to which f
is being applied. So, p ∈ X(f) holds iff (i) fc exists and (ii) principal p is allowed
to know the values of all arguments appearing in fc:
X (f) ,

∅ if fc does not exist
{p | fc = Θ(·, K) ∧ p ∈ KN (K)} otherwise
(4.12)
If p ∈ X(f) holds and ν ′ is characterized by reclassifier f applied to ν then (4.12)
implies that principal p can apply fc to ν ′ and retrieve ν. We define X () , P.
We write X (f) to denote set complement of X (f) with respect to set P of all
principals. So, X (f) contains those principals that cannot complement f.
For example, in a symmetric cryptosystem where (4.6) is the only rewriting
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rule, X is:
X(Enc(·, K)) , KN (K) (4.13)
X(Enc(E , ·)) , ∅ (4.14)
X(Dec(·, K)) , ∅ (4.15)
X(Dec(E , ·)) , ∅ (4.16)
These equations assert that only those principals allowed to know K can com-
plement reclassifier Enc(·, K) (i.e., decrypt with K); also no principal can com-
plement Enc(E , ·), Dec(·, K), or Dec(E , ·).
A value ν ′ produced by applying a reduced sequence LF M to some value ν
may safely be read by two sets of principals:
P1: Principals allowed to know ν.
P2: Principals unable to perform the operations to complement all reclassifiers
in LF M. They learn nothing about ν by reading ν ′.
A κ-atom 〈LF M, B〉 comprises a reduced sequence LF M and a set B of principals
that know ν; the κ-atom characterizes which principals can safely read value ν ′:
P1 is B, and P2 is
⋃
f∈LF MX (f), since for any f ∈ LF M, if p 6∈ X (f) then p cannot
perform an operation that corresponds to fc, so p cannot retrieve ν from ν ′ by
complementing all the reclassifiers recorded in LF M.
In general, a set of κ-atoms might be needed to characterize which principals
can safely read some value. So, we define a κ-label λ to be a set of κ-atoms.
Define Λκ to be the powerset of {〈LF M,B〉 | F ∈ F ∗κ ,B ⊆ P}.
– An initial value in x is tagged with κ-label {〈,KN (x)〉}.
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– An initial value in K is tagged with κ-label {〈,KN (K)〉}.
To define a RIF system for κ-labels, we need to give functionsRκ and Tκ.
Rκ(λ) specifies the set of principals that can safely read a value tagged with
λ ∈ Λκ. A value ν tagged with λ can be safely read only by principals allowed
by all κ-atoms in λ
Rκ(λ) ,
⋂
〈F ,B〉∈λ
R̂κ(〈F ,B〉) (4.17)
where R̂κ is defined by:
R̂κ(〈,B〉) , B,
R̂κ(〈F f,B〉) , R̂κ(〈F ,B〉) ∪ X (f)
(4.18)
For example, if a value ν ′ is tagged with {〈f1f2 . . . fn,B〉} then (4.17) asserts that
the set of principals that can read ν ′ is:
Rκ({〈f1f2 . . . fn,B〉}) =R̂κ(〈f1f2 . . . fn,B〉)
=R̂κ(〈f1f2 . . . fn−1,B〉) ∪ X (fn)
. . .
=R̂κ(〈,B〉) ∪ X (f1) ∪ X (f2) ∪ · · · ∪ X (fn)
= B︸︷︷︸
P1
∪X (f1) ∪ X (f2) ∪ · · · ∪ X (fn)︸ ︷︷ ︸
P2
.
As another example, consider the value stored in w (Figure 4.1), which is tagged
with κ-label (4.3). The set of principals that can read w is:
Rκ({〈Enc(·, K),KN (x)〉, 〈Enc(x, ·),KN (K)〉})
=R̂κ(〈Enc(·, K),KN (x)〉) ∩ R̂κ(〈Enc(x, ·),KN (K)〉) due to (4.17)
=(KN (x) ∪ X (Enc(·, K))) ∩ (KN (K) ∪ X (Enc(x, ·))) due to (4.18)
=(KN (x) ∪KN (K)) ∩ (KN (K) ∪ ∅) due to (4.13) and (4.14)
=KN (x) ∪KN (K) by set theory
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So, w can be safely read by those principals that know x as well as those that do
not know K. Principals that do not know x but know K (and thus they could
execute Dec(w,K) to retrieve x) are not authorized to read w according to the
κ-label in (4.3).
Tκ(λ, f) appends f to the reduced sequences of all κ-atoms in λ, when a re-
classifier f is applied to a value tagged with λ ∈ Λκ. Thus, Tκ is defined as
follows:
Tκ(λ, f) , {〈LF fM,B〉 | 〈F ,B〉 ∈ λ}.
Finally, restrictiveness relation vκ instantiates (2.4) using ⊇ for order vR:
λ vκ λ′ , (∀F ∈ F ∗κ : Rκ(Tκ(λ,F )) ⊇ Rκ(Tκ(λ′,F ))). (4.19)
Bottom element ⊥ is the singleton set {,P}.
There is an algorithm that computes conservative approximation for vκ.
This algorithm extends the notion of a complement sequence [39] to maximum com-
plement F c of a reduced sequence F . F c is constructed by taking the complement
of each element of F , starting from the last element of F :
c , 
F c ,
 f
cF c1 if F = F 1f and f
c exists,
 otherwise.
F is fully complementable iff for every f in F , fc exists. Notice that if F 1 and F 2 are
fully complementable, then the following holds:
(F 1F 2)c = F c2F
c
1 (4.20)
Decision Algorithm for λ2 vκ λ1. Return true iff
∀〈F 1,B1〉∈λ1, 〈F 2,B2〉∈λ2: Rκ(Tκ({〈F 2,B2〉},F c2)) ⊇ Rκ(Tκ({〈F 1,B1〉},F c2))
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holds.
The proof in the Appendix A.3 establishes that this algorithm is sound with
respect to (4.19) and, therefore, if the algorithm returns true, then λ2 vκ λ1 holds
according to (4.19).
The above algorithm is complete if λ1 is a singleton set (i.e., the algorithm
returns true iff λ2 vκ λ1 holds according to (4.19)). So, type checking an as-
signment (the only place where the type system in §2.3 invokes this algorithm)
whose target variable is tagged with a singleton set λ1 fails if and only if (4.19)
is not satisfied. Consequently, in this case, using the above decision algorithm
for deciding λ2 vκ λ1 does not exacerbate the conservatism of the type system.
Join unionsqκ of two κ-labels is defined to be their union3:
λ unionsqκ λ′ , λ ∪ λ′.
This definition of unionsqκ is sound and complete because, for a κ-label to satisfy the
restrictions specified by both λ and λ′, it should satisfy the restrictions specified
by all κ-atoms in λ and all κ-atoms in λ′, so it should satisfy the restrictions
specified by all κ-atoms in union λ ∪ λ′. We prove in the Appendix A.3 that
3The reason to tag values with sets of κ-atoms, instead of one κ-atom 〈F ,B〉 now can be
explained. It is not always possible to construct one single κ-atom that is the join of two other
κ-atoms. Assume two sets of principals H, P (i.e., the set of all principals) with H ⊂ P and
KN (K) = H. Consider symmetric cryptographic operations Enc and Dec, which use only one
key K. Consider also definitions (4.13) and (4.14). No κ-atom is equivalent to
〈Enc(·,K)Enc(·,K),H〉 unionsqκ 〈Enc(·,K),H〉.
Assume for contradiction that there is such a κ-atom 〈F ′,B〉. By the definition of vκ and
unionsqκ, Rκ(Tκ(〈Enc(·,K)Enc(·,K),H〉,F )) ⊇ Rκ(Tκ(〈F ′,B〉,F )) and Rκ(Tκ(〈Enc(·,K),H〉,F )) ⊇
Rκ(Tκ(〈F ′,B〉,F )) for all F . So, these relations should hold for F = Dec(·,K)Dec(·,K) and
F = Dec(·,K). So, B = H and F ′ should have both exactly one and exactly two Enc(·,K)
elements, which is a contradiction.
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λ unionsqκ λ′ is the least upper bound of λ and λ′. So, tuple
〈〈2P,⊇〉, 〈Λκ, unionsqκ, vκ〉,Fκ,Rκ, Tκ〉
forms a checkable class of RIF labels.
Given these decidable procedures for computingvκ and unionsqκ, the type system
of §2.3 enforces κ-labels. To illustrate, return to the program in Figure 4.1.
We start with the first assignment. Assume principals in Px are allowed to
know the initial value stored in x and principals in PK are allowed to know key
K: KN (x) = Px and KN (K) = PK . So, for mapping Γ from variables to κ-labels,
we have Γ(x) = {〈,Px〉} and Γ(K) = {〈,PK〉}. Using rule ANNEXPR-T, the κ-label
of expression Enc(x,K) is
Tκ(Γ(x),Enc(·, K)) unionsqκ Tκ(Γ(K),Enc(x, ·))
which equals
{〈Enc(·, K),Px〉, 〈Enc(x, ·),PK〉} (4.21)
which is equivalent to (4.3). ASGN-T requires the κ-label of w to be at least as
restrictive as the κ-label (4.21) of right-hand side expression Enc(x,K). That
requirement is satisfied because κ-atom 〈Enc(x, ·),PK〉 in (4.21) imposes no re-
strictions since (4.14) dictates that Enc(x, ·) cannot be complemented by any
principal, and thus:
∀F ∈ F∗κ : Rκ(Tκ(〈Enc(x, ·),PK〉,F )) = P.
So, the type Γ(w) of w can be the κ-label:
Γ(w) = {〈Enc(·, K),Px〉} (4.22)
By definition (4.17) ofRκ and (4.13), the principals that can safely read w are:
Rκ({〈Enc(·, K),Px〉}) = Px ∪ X (Enc(·, K)) = Px ∪KN (K) = Px ∪ PK .
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Thus, the type system correctly deduces that the value in w may be safely read
by principals that know x (i.e., Px) as well as by principals that cannot comple-
ment Enc(·, K) (i.e., principals that do not know K). Notice, in this example,
cryptographic reclassifier Enc(·, K) triggers a declassification, because:
Rκ(Γ(x)) ⊂ Rκ(Tκ(Γ(x),Enc(·, K))).
We now examine both assignments in Figure 4.1, assuming (4.22), Γ(y) =
{〈,P〉}, and Px ⊂ P hold. If K = K ′, then by reading y, principals in P − Px
could learn the value in x, which they are not supposed to know. We show that
in this case the program in Figure 4.1 is not type-correct. We also show that
if K 6= K ′, then the program in Figure 4.1 is type-correct, which is reasonable
because principals in P − Px learn nothing about value in x by reading y, since
they cannot efficiently retrieve x from y.
– Assume K = K ′ holds. In this case, the κ-label of expression Dec(w,K ′)
is {〈,Px〉, 〈Dec(w, ·),KN (K ′)〉}, which is retrieved using rule ANNEXPR-T and
(4.22). By rule ASGN-T, y should be tagged with a κ-label at least are re-
strictive as 〈,Px〉. This assignment is not type correct, because 〈,P〉,
the κ-label of y, is not at least are restrictive as 〈,Px〉. Notice, in this
case, cryptographic reclassifier Dec(·, K ′) triggers a classification, because
Rκ(Γ(w)) ⊃ Rκ(Tκ(Γ(w),Dec(·, K ′))) holds.
– Assume K 6= K ′ holds. Using rule ANNEXPR-T, the κ-label of expres-
sion Dec(w,K ′) is {〈Enc(·, K)Dec(·, K ′),Px〉, 〈Dec(w, ·),KN (K ′)〉}. Due to
definitions (4.15) and (4.16), no principal can complement Dec(·, K ′) or
Dec(w, ·), and thus, the κ-label of Dec(w,K ′) imposes no restriction. So, y
can be tagged with 〈,P〉. Thus, the assignment is type correct.
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Significance of Type-correctness with κ-labels
To explore the connection between type correct programs involving κ-labels and
flows, assume some principal p is not allowed to know a value ν. We argue that,
when executing a type-correct program C, if ν flows to a value ν ′ that can be
read by p, then p cannot efficiently retrieve ν from ν ′. So p does not learn ν by
reading ν ′.
Consider a κ-label λp:
λp , {〈F ,B〉 | 〈F ,B〉 is a κ-atom ∧ p ∈ R̂κ(〈F ,B〉)}.
Any value that can be read by p must be tagged with a label λ ∈ Λκ where
λ vκ λp holds. For purpose of illustration, we will call values tagged with such
labels λ low. Values that p is not supposed to know (and thus not supposed to
read) are tagged with λ′ ∈ Λκ, such that λ′ 6vκ λp; these values will be called high.
We now argue that if a high value flows to a low value during execution, then p
cannot efficiently retrieve the high value from that low value, which means that
in executing type-correct programs, principals do not learn values they are not
supposed to know.
Because C is type-correct, then C satisfies PWNI, due to Theorem 1. Accord-
ing to PWNI, the only way for a high value to flow to a low value is through a
λp-downgrade. In C, an expression that performs a λp-downgrade is an anno-
tated expression of the form [Θ(E , K)]Θ(·,K),Θ(E,·), abbreviated as Θ(E , K), where
at least one of E and K is high but Θ(E , K) is low. For example, a downgrading
expression could be Enc(x,K), where p is not allowed to know x and K but p
is allowed to read Enc(x,K). Theorem 2 below implies that for every expres-
sion Θ(E , K) that performs a λp-downgrade in C, principal p cannot efficiently
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retrieve either E (i.e., p ∈ X (Θ(·, K))) or K (i.e., p ∈ X (Θ(E , ·))) by reading
Θ(E , K).
Theorem 2. Consider a principal p ∈ P and κ-label λp. Assume Γ, λκ ` C for a
context-type λκ ∈ Λκ and a mapping Γ that maps variables in a command C to κ-
labels in Λκ. Let Θ(E , K) perform a λp-downgrade in C. Then, p ∈ X (Θ(·, K)) and
p ∈ X (Θ(E , ·)).
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
Consequently, when executing a type-correct program, a high value (i.e., cannot
be read by p) flows to a low value (i.e., can be read by p) only when p cannot
efficiently retrieve that high value from the low value.
4.2 Related Work
Variants of noninterference exist to support declassification caused by special
commands, such as match queries4 [94] and one-way functions [91]. Encryption
can be viewed as a special command, too. Two approaches have been explored
for cryptographic operations: computational and symbolic [32]. The permitted
disclosure of secret values only when they are encrypted is formalized as com-
putational noninterference (CNI) [58]. CNI handles only encryption (not decryp-
tion), and it is enforced by type systems introduced in Laud et al. [60] for passive
and Fournet et al. [42] for active adversaries. Smith et al. [86] propose a variant of
noninterference that handles both encryption and decryption, and it is enforced
4A match query checks whether two objects are equal. For example, a match query is use to
check whether a certain string is the password of a given user.
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using a type system. All approaches discussed above are computational. In this
chapter, we employed a symbolic approach to model cryptographic operations.
Models based on the symbolic analysis first were introduced by Dolev and
Yao [39]. Cryptographically masked flows [4] uses a symbolic analysis of crypto-
graphic systems, and this is then enforced by a type system. The formalism of
cryptographically masked flows is based on a two-level lattice (i.e., secret and
public), while our theory handles richer lattices (formed by sets of principals).
Also, types in [4] record only sequences of applied encryptions (not decryp-
tions), because a decryption is allowed to be applied only to a value previously
encrypted with a proper key. We impose no restriction on the application of
cryptographic operations, and thus our κ-labels need to record sequences of
any cryptographic operation (encryption and decryption). Laud [59] shows that
type correctness according to [4], together with some additional conditions, im-
ply CNI, thereby establishing a connection between cryptographically masked
flows (which is based on symbolic analysis) and CNI (which is based on com-
putational analysis). Cortier et al. [32] generalizes this connection by showing
that programs secure according to a symbolic analysis are also secure according
to a computational analysis.
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CHAPTER 5
LABEL CHAINS
This chapter introduces and analyzes dynamic enforcement mechanisms
that employ label chains of arbitrary length. We start by formalizing label chains
(§5.1) and defining enforcers (§5.2). We next (§5.3) extend block-safe noninter-
ference (BNI) [56] to stipulate that sensitive information must not leak to ob-
servers of variables and label chains, whether execution terminates normally or
is blocked by an enforcer. Enforcer∞-Enf is derived (§5.4); it uses label chains
of infinite length to enforce BNI. A family k-Enf of enforcers for finite label
chains approximate∞-Enf , and these too are shown (§5.5) to satisfy BNI.
5.1 Formalization of Label Chains
We posit that each variable x in a program is associated with a possibly infi-
nite label chain 〈`1, `2, . . . , `i, `i+1, . . .〉, where label `1 specifies sensitivity for the
value stored in x and, for i ≥ 1, label `i+1 specifies sensitivity for `i. Labels come
from a possibly infinite underlying lattice L = 〈L,v〉, with join operation unionsq and
bottom element ⊥. For1 `, `′ ∈ L, if ` v `′ holds, then `′ is at least as restrictive
as `, signifying that information is allowed to flow from data tagged with ` (i.e.,
data whose sensitivity is `) to data tagged with `′.
Every principal p is assigned a fixed label ` that allows p to read variables
and labels whose sensitivity is at most `. Thus, if a variable x is tagged with `′,
then p assigned label ` is allowed to read x iff `′ v ` holds.
1When L = 〈L,v〉, we write ` ∈ L to assert that ` ∈ L holds.
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Unless a label chain 〈. . . , `i, `i+1, . . .〉 is monotonically decreasing
`i+1 v `i for i ≥ 1,
sensitive information can be leaked. Here is why. Consider a variable x associ-
ated with a non-monotonically decreasing label chain 〈L,H, . . .〉, where L @ H.
Principals assigned label L are authorized to read the value in x. When the read
access to x succeeds, these principals conclude that the label of x is L. Thus,
success in reading x leaks to a principal assigned L information about the label
of x—even though label chain 〈L,H, . . .〉 defines the sensitivity of that label to be
H. Such leaks cannot occur in monotonically decreasing label chains.
Label chains will be implemented by sequencing individual labels that are
stored in a memory M . Domain dom(M) of a memory M includes:
– Variables that store (say) integers (ν ∈ Z). We use lower case letters (e.g.,
a, w, x, h,m, l) for variables. So, M(x) denotes the integer stored in a vari-
able x by memory M . Let Var denote the set of variables. Constants (e.g.,
1, 2, 3) are a subset of Var whose values are fixed.
– Tags that store labels (` ∈ L) representing sensitivity. The label for x is
stored at tag T (x) in M ; its value is M(T (x)). Some tags store labels rep-
resenting the sensitivity of other tags. The label for T i(x) is stored in tag
T i+1(x), for i ≥ 1. We use the term value v when referring to either a label
or an integer.
– Auxiliaries that store additional information needed by an enforcement
mechanism (e.g., a stack to track implicit flows in nested if commands).
The names of auxiliaries are µ1, µ2, etc.
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Tags and auxiliaries are called metadata. A possibly infinite label chain
〈T (q), T 2(q), . . . , T i(q), . . .〉 will be associated with each identifier q that is either
a variable or a tag (but not an auxiliary). For convenience, we adopt the no-
tation T 0(q) , q and T i+1(q) , T (T i(q)). We also may write T i(q) instead
of M(T i(q)) for that value in memory M if there will be no ambiguity (e.g.,
T i(q) v `, T i(q) unionsq T j(q′)). We require the following:
∀i ≥ 1: T i(q) ∈ dom(M)⇒ T i−1(q) ∈ dom(M).
The mappings defined by M and T i extend from identifiers to expressions
in the usual way, where ⊕ represents an operator:
M(e⊕ e′) ,M(e)⊕M(e′) (5.1)
T i(e⊕ e′) , T i(e) unionsq T i(e′), for i ≥ 1. (5.2)
Variables are categorized according to whether their label chains may change
during execution. For a flexible variable w, the entire associated label chain
might be updated when an assignment to w is executed. For an anchor vari-
able a, the label stored in T (a) remains fixed throughout execution, and the
remaining elements of the label chain satisfy:
M(T i(a)) = ⊥ for any T i(a) ∈ dom(M) with i > 1. (5.3)
Associating this form of chain with an anchor variable is sensible because T (a)
is declared in the program text and thus that label can be considered public (i.e.,
T 2(a) is ⊥) when execution starts. No other information can be encoded in T (a)
during execution because T (a) remains fixed. So, T (a) ought to be considered
public during execution, too. The requirement that label chains be monotoni-
cally decreasing then leads to (5.3). A constant ν is a special case of an anchor
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variable, so we have
M(T i(ν)) = ⊥, for any T i(ν) ∈ dom(M) with i ≥ 1. (5.4)
5.2 Enforcers
Execution of a command C on a memory M can be represented by a trace τ ,
which is a potentially infinite sequence
〈C1,M1〉 → 〈C2,M2〉 → . . .→ 〈Cn,Mn〉 → . . .
where a state 〈Ci,Mi〉 gives the commandCi that will next be executed and gives
a memory Mi to be used in that execution. A sequence τ ′ of states is considered
a subtrace of τ iff τ = . . . → τ ′ → . . .. We write |τ | to denote the length of τ and
τ [i] to denote the ith state in τ for 1 ≤ i ≤ |τ |. We also write 〈C,M〉 =0 〈C ′,M ′〉
to denote that two states agree on the command and the values in variables:
– C = C ′,
– dom(M)∩Var = dom(M ′)∩Var , and
– ∀x∈dom(M)∩Var : M(x) = M ′(x).
A set of operational semantics rules is usually employed to formally define
traces. This chapter uses a simple while-language (Figure 5.1) and operational
semantics rulesR (Figure 5.2) for this language. Notice thatR does not reference
metadata. Notation M [x 7→ν] in (ASGNA) and (ASGNF) defines a memory that equals
M except x is mapped to ν. Conditional delimiter exit in rules for conditional
commands (IF1), (IF2), (WL1), and (WL2) signifies the end of these commands ([77,
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(Constants) ν ∈ Z
(Anchor variables) a, x ∈ VarA
(Flexible variables) w, x ∈ VarF
(Expressions) e ::= ν | x | e1 ⊕ e2
(Commands) C ::= skip | x := e | C1;C2 |
if e then C1 else C2 end |
while e do C end
Figure 5.1: Syntax
(SKIP) 〈skip,M〉 → 〈stop,M〉 (ASGNA)
ν = M(e)
〈a := e,M〉 → 〈stop,M [a 7→ ν]〉
(ASGNF)
ν = M(e)
〈w := e,M〉 → 〈stop,M [w 7→ ν]〉
(IF1)
M(e) 6= 0
〈if e then C1 else C2 end,M〉 → 〈C1; exit,M〉
(IF2)
M(e) = 0
〈if e then C1 else C2 end,M〉 → 〈C2; exit,M〉
(WL1)
M(e) 6= 0
〈while e do C end,M〉 → 〈C;while e do C end; exit,M〉
(WL2)
M(e) = 0
〈while e do C end,M〉 → 〈exit,M〉 (EXIT) 〈exit,M〉 → 〈stop,M〉
(SEQ1)
〈C1,M〉 → 〈stop,M ′〉
〈C1;C2,M〉 → 〈C2,M ′〉
(SEQ2)
〈C1,M〉 → 〈C ′1,M ′〉 C ′1 6= stop
〈C1;C2,M〉 → 〈C ′1;C2,M ′〉
Figure 5.2: Structural Operational Semantics R
80]). When execution of the corresponding taken branch completes, rule (EXIT)
is triggered.2 Notice that Ci in a state 〈Ci,Mi〉 can be a command C as defined
in Figure 5.1, a termination delimiter such as stop, or a command involving a
conditional delimiter exit.
Operational semantics rules R define a function traceR(C,M) that maps a
2For a while command, the number of times (EXIT) is triggered equals the number of times
rules (WL1) and (WL2) are invoked for this command.
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command C and a memory M to the trace that represents the entire execution
of C started with initial memory M . For traceR(C,M) to be well-defined, M
should be healthy for C denoted M |= H(C) and formalized below, where x∈C
indicates that x∈Var appears in C:
M |= H(C) , ∀x∈Var : (x ∈ C ⇒ x ∈ dom(M))
∧ (x ∈ dom(M)⇒M(x) ∈ Z).
If traceR(C,M) is finite, then by definition it ends with a normal termination
〈stop,M ′〉 state.
Executing command C on memory M under the auspices of an enforcer E
leads to a trace τ = traceE(C,M). We expect that all traces generated by an en-
forcer will satisfy some policy P of interest, and E blocks traces to ensure that P
is satisfied. So, a trace τ = traceE(C,M) may end with blocked state 〈block,M ′〉;
omitting the blocked state from τ and projecting only commands and variables
should yield a prefix of traceR(C,M).
We now formalize the definition of an enforcer. Define blk(τ) to hold iff τ
ends with a blocked state, and define prefix relation τ  τ ′:
τ  τ ′ , |τ | ≤ |τ ′| ∧ l = |τ |
∧ (∀1≤ i<l: τ [i] =0 τ ′[i]) ∧ (¬blk(τ)⇒ τ [l] =0 τ ′[l]))
E is an enforcer on R for P if
– (∀C,M : traceE(C,M)  traceR(C,M)) and
– the image of traceE satisfies P .
An enforcer E may employ metadata. For enforcers E that we consider, this
metadata includes label chains of size nE ≥ 1 and a set AuxE of auxiliaries.
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A memory M is healthy for E, L, and C denoted by M |= H(E,L, C) iff
– M |= H(C),
– for each variable x, the domain of M contains exactly nE tags comprising
a label chain, where all tags are mapped to L:
∀x ∈dom(M)∩Var :
(∀1 ≤ i ≤ nE: T i(x) ∈ dom(M) ∧M(T i(x)) ∈ L)
∧ (∀i > nE: T i(x) 6∈ dom(M))
– the domain of M contains auxiliaries AuxE :
∀µ ∈ AuxE: µ ∈ dom(M)
– flexible variables in M are associated with monotonically decreasing label
chains,
– anchor variables in M are associated with label chains satisfying (5.3), and
– constants in M are associated with label chains satisfying (5.4).
Notice that if M |= H(E,L, C) and x ∈ dom(M), then the sensitivity T nE+1(x) of
the last element T nE(x) of the label chain associated with x does not belong to
dom(M), and thus, T nE+1(x) is not defined.
For InitE a mapping from auxiliaries in AuxE to initial values, M is defined
to be initially healthy for E, L, and C denoted M |= H0(E,L, C) iff:
– M |= H(E,L, C), and
– auxiliaries AuxE are initialized according to InitE :
∀µ ∈ AuxE: M(µ) = InitE(µ).
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We only consider enforcers E satisfying certain restrictions, where L is a
lattice:
(E1) Trace traceE(C,M) is defined when M |= H0(E,L, C) holds.
(E2) For memory Mi in a state of τ , Mi |= H(E,L, C) holds.
(E3) E updates the label chain of a flexible variable w only in performing an
assignment to w, or at exit for a conditional command whose branches
(taken or untaken) contain an assignment to w.3
5.3 Threat Models and BNI
Observations. Our threat model is formulated in terms of principals observ-
ing updates to variables. When an assignment to a flexible variable w is exe-
cuted, each element in set A(w) , {w, T (w), . . . , T i(w), . . .} is updated. When
an assignment to an anchor variable a is executed, only A(a) , {a} is updated.
A principal p assigned label ` observes updates to variables and tags q, where
T (q) is in the domain of a memory M and M(T (q)) v ` holds. A similar threat
model is used in [10] (i.e., observations at the granularity of individual memory
locations, whose sensitivity may change during execution). Principals do not
observe updates to an identifier q when T (q) 6∈ dom(M) holds, indicating q is
3 More formally, we have:
∀C: ∀M : ∀C1 ∈ C:
∀τ = 〈C1;C2,M1〉 ∗→ 〈C ′1;C2,M2〉 a subtrace of traceE(C,M):
∀w a flexible variable:
“w := e” 6∈ C1 ⇒ (∀i ≥ 1: T i(w)∈dom(M1)⇒M1(T i(w)) = M2(T i(w)))
where C ′ ∈ C denotes that C ′ is a subcommand of C. A conditional delimiter (e.g., exit) is not
considered a subcommand of C.
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not covered by the security policy to be enforced. That implies principals do not
observe updates to the last element of a label chain. Also, a principal p assigned
` might be allowed to observe updates to an identifier T j(q) (i.e., T j+1(q) v `)
but p might not be allowed to observe updates to a preceding identifier T i(q)
(i.e., T i+1(q) 6v `) for 0 ≤ i < j, due to monotonically decreasing label chains.
We can now formalize the observation available to a principal p assigned label
` when an assignment executes. Define the projection of a memory M with
respect to label ` and a set S of identifiers:
M |S` , {〈q,M(q)〉 | q ∈ S ∧ T (q) ∈ dom(M) ∧M(T (q)) v `}.
If assignment to a variable x is performed and memoryM results, then observa-
tion M |A(x)` is generated to p. Notice that M |A(x)` can be empty (i.e., M |A(x)` = ∅).
Also, as desired, M |A(x)` does not contain any observation for the last element of
the label chain associated with x.
A sequence of observations are generated along with a trace. Given a trace τ ,
define τ |S` to be a sequence θ = Θ1 ⇀ . . . ⇀ Θn of those observations involving
identifiers in set S and having sensitivity at most `:
|S` , 
〈C,M〉|S` , 
(〈C,M〉 → 〈C ′,M ′〉 → τ)|S` ,
M ′|A(x)∩S` ⇀ (〈C ′,M ′〉 → τ)|S` , if C is “x := e;C ′”
(〈C ′,M ′〉 → τ)|S` , otherwise
We abbreviate τ |S` by τ |k` , when S = {T i(x) | 0 ≤ i ≤ k ∧ x ∈ Var}. We write
θ =obs θ
′ to denote equality of sequences of observations with empty observa-
tions omitted, since θ and θ′ are then equivalent for principals.
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We call this the strong threat model to distinguish it from threat models (e.g.,
section 6.1) that allow observations only on variables. Notice that the strong
threat model does not generate observations when identifiers are updated at
execution points other than assignments to variables (e.g., no observation is
generated when a conditional delimiter exit is executed).
Block-safe Noninterference. The goal of an enforcer is to prevent leaks from
observations. This can be formalized as Block-safe Noninterference (BNI),
which is a form of noninterference [44]. Formally, BNI stipulates that if two fi-
nite traces (terminated normally or blocked) of the same command agree on ini-
tial values whose sensitivity is at most `, then observations (involving variables
and tags) visible to a principal assigned label ` should be the same in the two
executions. We define for k ≥ 0 specialized k-BNI that restricts observations to
variables and up to kth tag (i.e., T 0, T 1, . . . , T k); and we write M |` to abbreviate
M |dom(M)` .
k-BNI(E,L, C) , (∀` ∈ L: ∀M,M ′:
M |= H0(E,L, C) ∧M ′ |= H0(E,L, C)
∧M |` = M ′|`
∧ τ = traceE(C,M) is finite
∧ τ ′ = traceE(C,M ′) is finite
⇒ τ |k` =obs τ ′|k` )
If k-BNI(E,L, C) holds for every C, then we say that E enforces k-BNI(L).4 We
study enforcers on semantics R for security policy k-BNI(L). If for all k ≥ 0 and
L, enforcer E satisfies k-BNI(L), then we say that E enforces BNI.
4Notice that if E satisfies (k + 1)-BNI(L), then E satisfies k-BNI(L).
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0-BNI is stronger than termination insensitive noninterference (TINI) [95],
which is the policy enforced by many dynamic enforcement mechanisms that
have been proposed in the past (e.g.[6, 18, 26, 30, 65]). TINI only concerns nor-
mally terminated executions but does not consider finite traces that correspond
to blocked executions. So TINI ignores flows that occur during a trace that be-
comes blocked by the enforcement mechanism and thus potentially allows sen-
sitive information to be leaked. 0-BNI considers all finite traces: both terminated
normally and blocked traces. So, an enforcement mechanism that satisfies 0-BNI
will satisfy TINI, too.
0-BNI is weaker than termination sensitive noninterference (TSNI) [92]. TSNI
considers all traces: infinite and finite (terminated normally as well as blocked).
Because 0-BNI ignores infinite traces, 0-BNI allows leakage through termination
channels that already exist in a program (due to non-terminating while-loops).
An enforcement mechanism enforcing 0-BNI can be extended into one that en-
forces TSNI by employing techniques similar to those presented in [12].
5.4 Enforcer∞-Enf
We use familiar insights for handling explicit and implicit information flow to
define enforcer ∞-Enf , which uses infinite label chains (i.e., n∞-Enf = ∞) to
enforce BNI for programs written in the programming language of Figure 5.1.
We later derive from ∞-Enf the k-Enf family of enforcers that use finite label
chains.
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5.4.1 Updating Label Chains of Flexible Variables
When w := e executes in isolation, the value of e flows explicitly to flexible
variable w. So, w should be at least as sensitive as e. Therefore, just prior to the
assignment∞-Enf updates tag T (w) with T (e). But with that update, the value
of T (e) flows explicitly to T (w), so ∞-Enf also must update tag T 2(w) with
T 2(e). Repeating the argument, we conclude that prior to executing w := e,
∞-Enf should update tag T i(w) with T i(e), for i ≥ 0.
Information can also flow implicitly from the context of an assignment to
the target variable of that assignment. Context ctx of a command C is a set of
boolean expressions that includes all guards involved in determining whether
C is reached. So if C appears in the body of a conditional command (if or while
commands) having guard e, then e belongs to the context of C. For example,
consider:
if x > 0 then w := w′ else w := w′′ end (5.5)
Here, context ctx of w := w′ and w := w′′ is x > 0. Notice, if prior to (5.5)
T i(w′) 6= T i(w′′) holds for some i ≥ 0, then the value in T i(w) after the if com-
mand depends on ctx . For T (ctx ) the sensitivity of context ctx , if we require that
T (ctx ) v T i+1(w) holds then ctx is prevented from leaking through T i(w).
In general, for q a flexible variable or a tag, if q is assigned the value of e (e
is an expression of variables or tags), then information can flow explicitly from
e to q and implicitly from ctx to q. Thus, the sensitivity T (q) of q should be
updated to T (e) unionsq T (ctx ). But, this update might also require that T i(q) have
been updated for i ≥ 1. Recursive function UT (q, e, ctx ) below describes tag
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updates triggered by q being updated with e in context ctx :
UT (q, e,ctx ) ,
T (q) := T (e) unionsq T (ctx );
UT (T (q), T (e) unionsq T (ctx ), ctx )
For w := e in context ctx , UT (w, e, ctx) expands to5
∀i ≥ 1: T i(w) := T i(e) unionsq T (ctx ). (5.6)
5.4.2 Preventing Leaks through Anchor Variables
Execution of assignments to flexible variables need not be blocked because they
cannot cause leaks. But executing an assignment to an anchor variable can cause
a leak. So, a prerequisite to executing a := e for an anchor variable a is for an
enforcer to check a block condition Ga:=e. Ga:=e is defined so that if it holds, then
the explicit and implicit flows to a in a := e do not constitute leaks. If Ga:=e does
not hold, then execution is blocked.
Blocking an execution might cause implicit flow of sensitive information,
as seen with (1.8). We address this by generalizing the definition of context
ctx for a command to include block conditions that could have been checked
before execution reached the current point. This generalization is consistent
with the role of ctx : execution of a := e and of any command that might follow
is conditioned on whetherGa:=e holds. If execution of C depends onGa:=e being
true, then Ga:=e belongs to the context ctx of C.
5This expansion uses the fact that the label chain associated with ctx is monotonically de-
creasing: T i+1(ctx ) v T i(ctx ).
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We now show how to construct Ga:=e for an assignment a := e in context
ctx . Ga:=e needs to protect against explicit and implicit flows to a. The value of
e explicitly flows to a. So, a should be at least as sensitive as e:
T (e) v T (a).
Because execution of a := e depends on Ga:=e, the context of a := e is ctx ∪
{Ga:=e}. Information flows implicitly from this context to a. Variable a should
thus be at least as sensitive as T (ctx ∪ {Ga:=e}) = T (ctx ) unionsq T (Ga:=e):
T (ctx ) unionsq T (Ga:=e) v T (a).
So, forGa:=e to hold, then T (e) v T (a) and T (ctx )unionsqT (Ga:=e) v T (a) should both
hold. We conclude
Ga:=e ⇒ (T (e) v T (a) ∧ T (ctx ) unionsq T (Ga:=e) v T (a))
or equivalently
Ga:=e ⇒ (T (e) unionsq T (ctx ) unionsq T (Ga:=e) v T (a)) . (5.7)
One possible solution for Ga:=e in (5.7) is:6
Ga:=e , (T (e) unionsq T (ctx ) v T (a)). (5.8)
To verify that it is a solution, first compute sensitivity T (Ga:=e):
T (Ga:=e) = T ( T (e) unionsq T (ctx ) v T (a) )
= T 2(e) unionsq T 2(ctx ) unionsq T 2(a) {due to (5.2)}
= T 2(e) unionsq T 2(ctx ) unionsq ⊥ {T 2(a) = ⊥}
= T 2(e) unionsq T 2(ctx ) {` unionsq ⊥ = `} (5.9)
6Ga:=e in (5.8) is used by all dynamic flow sensitive enforcement mechanisms we know. But,
we seem to be the first to give a derivation of this block condition from first principles (i.e.,
explicit and implicit flows) and monotonically decreasing label chains as a solution of (5.7).
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Substituting T 2(e) unionsq T 2(ctx ) for T (Ga:=e), substituting T (e) unionsq T (ctx ) v T (a) for
Ga:=e in (5.7), and noticing that T 2(e) unionsq T 2(ctx ) v T (e) unionsq T (ctx ) (due to mono-
tonically decreasing label chains), equation (5.7) becomes equivalent to a true
statement, which is what we needed to verify solution (5.8).
5.4.3 Operational Semantics for∞-Enf
Enforcer ∞-Enf uses (i) UT (see (5.6)) for deducing label chains and (ii) Ga:=e
(see (5.8)) for blocking possibly unsafe assignments. UT andGa:=e only mention
tags for variables and sensitivity T (ctx ) of the context (i.e., they do not need ctx ,
T 2(ctx ), T 3(ctx ), . . . ). T (ctx ) is the join of the sensitivity of each guard and each
block condition that determines the reachability of a command. ∞-Enf uses the
auxiliaries below to maintain T (ctx ):
– cc (conditional context) keeps track of the sensitivity of the guards in all if
and while commands that encapsulate the next command to be executed,
and
– bc (blocking context) keeps track of the sensitivity of the information re-
vealed by block conditions that might have influenced the reachability of
the next command to be executed.
So, Aux∞-Enf = {cc, bc}. We now show how T (ctx ) is defined in terms of cc and
bc.
Auxiliary bc is a tag that (conservatively) stores a label at least as restrictive
as the sensitivity of all block conditions that could have been evaluated so far
in the execution. Any observation after assignment a := e reveals information
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about Ga:=e and about context ctx in which Ga:=e is evaluated. So, whenever a
block condition Ga:=e is checked,∞-Enf updates bc with T (Ga:=e) and T (ctx ):
bc := T (Ga:=e) unionsq T (ctx ). (5.10)
From (5.9) and monotonicity of label chains (i.e., T 2(ctx ) v T (ctx )), we then get:
bc := T 2(e) unionsq T (ctx ). (5.11)
No block condition has been evaluated at the beginning of execution, so auxil-
iary bc is initialized to ⊥: Init∞-Enf (bc) = ⊥.
Auxiliary cc is implemented in ∞-Enf using a stack. Whenever execution
enters a conditional command (if or while command), the sensitivity of the cor-
responding guard is pushed onto cc; when execution exits a conditional com-
mand, the top element of cc is popped. We write bccc to denote the join of all
labels in cc
bccc ,
⊔
`∈cc
` (5.12)
where ` ∈ cc signifies that ` appears in some element in stack cc. At the begin-
ning of execution, no conditional command has been entered, and thus auxiliary
cc is initialized to the empty stack  with bc , ⊥. So, we have Init∞-Enf (cc) = .
Putting it all together, sensitivity T (ctx ) is bccc unionsq bc. Substituting bccc unionsq bc for
T (ctx ) in (5.8), block condition Ga:=e becomes:
T (e) unionsq bccc unionsq bc v T (a). (5.13)
Substituting bccc unionsq bc for T (ctx ) in (5.11), the update of bc becomes:
bc := T 2(e) unionsq bccc unionsq bc. (5.14)
So, Ga:=e and the update of bc have now been expressed in terms of tags and
auxiliaries that∞-Enf uses.
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(SKIP) 〈skip,M〉 → 〈stop,M〉
(ASGNA)
v = M(e) Ga:=e ` = M(T
2(e)) unionsqM(bccc) unionsqM(bc)
〈a := e,M〉 → 〈stop,M [a 7→ v, bc 7→ `]〉
(ASGNAFAIL)
v = M(e) ¬Ga:=e ` = M(T 2(e)) unionsqM(bccc) unionsqM(bc)
〈a := e,M〉 → 〈block,M [bc 7→ `]〉
(ASGNF)
v0 = M(e) ∀i ≥ 1: vi = M(T i(e)) unionsqM(bccc) unionsqM(bc)
〈w := e,M〉 → 〈stop,M [∀i ≥ 0:T i(w) 7→ vi]〉
Figure 5.3: Operational Semantics for skip and assignments, where Ga:=e is
M(T (e)) unionsqM(bccc) unionsqM(bc) vM(T (a))
Rule (ASGNA) in Figure 5.3 uses (5.13) and (5.14) to execute a := e. If Ga:=e
does not hold, then rule (ASGNAFAIL) is triggered. Notice that in (ASGNAFAIL), bc is
updated with a label representing the sensitivity of the context in which execu-
tion is blocked. That label in bc could then dictate which principals are allowed
to learn the reason why an execution ended (i.e., due to a block versus due to a
stop) without leaking sensitive information.
Rule (ASGNF) for assignment w := e to flexible variable w implements (5.6),
given T (ctx ) = bccc unionsq bc. So, the label chain of w is updated as follows:
∀i ≥ 1: T i(w) := T i(e) unionsq bccc unionsq bc.
Rules for conditional commands are given in Figure 5.4. They adopt tech-
niques employed by other dynamic enforcement mechanisms (e.g., [30]) to up-
date auxiliary cc and handle implicit flows to variables and metadata that could
have been updated in untaken branches. When execution reaches a conditional
command C, tuple 〈`,W,A〉 is pushed onto cc; when execution exits, C tuple
〈`,W,A〉 is popped.
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– Element ` is the sensitivity of the guard e of C. Including ` in cc while
taken branch Ct of C is executed signifies that the sensitivity of the context
of Ct is the result of augmenting the sensitivity of the context of C with the
sensitivity of guard e.
– Element W is the set targetFlex (Cu) of all target flexible variables in the
untaken branch Cu of C. If w ∈ W , then T i(w) for i ≥ 0 could have
been updated if untaken branch Cu were executed. To capture implicit
flow from the context of Cu to T i(w), when execution exits C, sensitivity
T i+1(w) is augmented with the sensitivity of the context of Cu, which is the
same as the context of Ct.
– Element A is the set targetAnchor(Cu) of all anchor variables in the un-
taken branch Cu. If A is not empty and if Cu would have been executed,
then a block condition could have been evaluated, possibly causing that
execution to be blocked. So, the reachability of a command following C
might be influenced by whether Cu has been executed, and thus, it might
be influenced by the context of Cu. So, in this case, when execution exits C
auxiliary bc is augmented with the sensitivity of the context of Cu (which
is the same as the context of Ct).
Figure 5.5 gives rules for executing sequences of commands. Rule (SEQF) as-
serts that the entire execution stops once an assignment is blocked (i.e., block
has been generated by (ASGNAFAIL)).
Given a lattice L, a command C, and a memory M initially healthy for
∞-Enf , L, and C, function trace∞-Enf (C,M) is defined by the operational se-
mantics presented in Figures 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5. We have the following theorem.
Theorem 3. ∞-Enf is an enforcer on R for BNI.
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(IF1)
M(e) 6= 0 W = targetFlex (C2)
A = targetAnchor(C2) cc
′ = M(cc).push(〈M(T (e)), W, A〉)
〈if e then C1 else C2 end,M〉 → 〈C1; exit,M [cc 7→ cc′]〉
(IF2)
M(e) = 0 W = targetFlex (C1)
A = targetAnchor(C1) cc
′ = M(cc).push(〈M(T (e)), W, A〉)
〈if e then C1 else C2 end,M〉 → 〈C2; exit,M [cc 7→ cc′]〉
(WL1)
M(e) 6= 0 cc′ = M(cc).push(〈M(T (e)), ∅, ∅〉)
〈while e do C end,M〉 → 〈C;while e do C end; exit,M [cc 7→ cc′]〉
(WL2)
M(e) = 0 W = targetFlex (C )
A = targetAnchor(C) cc′ = M(cc).push(〈M(T (e)), W, A〉)
〈while e do C end,M〉 → 〈exit,M [cc 7→ cc′]〉
(EXIT)
bc′ =
{
M(bc) unionsqM(bccc), if M(cc).top.A 6= ∅
M(bc), otherwise
M ′ = U(M,M(cc).top.W ) cc′ = cc.pop
〈exit,M〉 → 〈stop,M ′[cc 7→ cc′, bc 7→ bc′]〉
where U(M,W ) ,M [ ∀w∈W : ∀i ≥ 1: T i(w) 7→ T i(w) unionsqM(bccc) unionsqM(bc)]
Figure 5.4: Operational Semantics for conditional commands
(SEQ1)
〈C1,M〉 → 〈stop,M ′〉
〈C1;C2,M〉 → 〈C2,M ′〉
(SEQ2)
〈C1,M〉 → 〈C ′1,M ′〉 C ′1 6∈ {stop,block}
〈C1;C2,M〉 → 〈C ′1;C2,M ′〉
(SEQF)
〈C1,M〉 → 〈block,M ′〉
〈C1;C2,M〉 → 〈block,M ′〉
Figure 5.5: Operational Semantics for sequences
Proof. See Appendix B.2.
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5.5 Enforcer k-Enf
An enforcer that uses infinite label chains cannot be implemented with finite
physical memory. But an infinite label chain can be approximated by a finite
label chain. Infinite label chain Ω = 〈`1, . . . , `k, `k+1, `k+2, . . .〉 is conservatively
approximated by infinite label chain Ω′ = 〈`1, . . . , `k, `k, `k, . . .〉, where kth label `k
is infinitely repeated. It is a conservative approximation, because if Ω′ allows
a principal p assigned label ` to observe the ith element of Ω′, then Ω allows p
to observe the ith element of Ω, too (but not vice versa). This is because Ω and
Ω′ agree up to the kth element and, for i ≥ k, the ith element in Ω′ is at least as
restrictive as the corresponding element in Ω due to monotonically decreasing
label chains: `k+1 v `k, `k+2 v `k, . . .. Finite label chain with m ≥ 0:
Ω′′ = 〈`1, . . . , `k, `k, . . . , `k︸ ︷︷ ︸
m
〉
also is a conservative approximation for Ω′ (recall no observation is allowed
for identifiers whose sensitivity is not defined). Consequently, an infinite label
chain Ω can be approximated by finite label chain Ω′′.
We employ such finite approximations to derive from∞-Enf enforcer k-Enf .
Enforcer k-Enf is based on the operational semantics rules of∞-Enf to compute
up to the kth tag. Because rule (ASGNA) mentions T 2(x), we require k ≥ 2. In
∞-Enf , only (ASGNF) and function U actually refer to T i(x) for i > 2. So in k-Enf
rule (ASGNF) and function U are modified to compute labels only for the first k
tags. The new rules appear in Figure 5.6.
Enforcer k-Enf generates observations involving updates for up to the kth
tag. To generate an observation about an update to the kth tag, k-Enf con-
servatively approximates the sensitivity of element T k(x) to be itself—that is,
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(ASGNF)
v0 = M(e) ∀1 ≤ i ≤ k: vi = M(T i(e)) unionsqM(bccc) unionsqM(bc)
〈w := e,M〉 → 〈stop,M [∀i :0 ≤ i ≤ k :T i(w) 7→ vi]〉
U(M,W ) ,
M [ ∀w∈W : ∀i :1 ≤ i ≤ k: T i(w) 7→ T i(w) unionsqM(bccc) unionsqM(bc)].
Figure 5.6: Modified rules for k-Enf
T k+1(x) , T k(x) (i.e., tag T k(x) represents tag T k+1(x)). So, k-Enf actually is
using label chains of length nk-Enf = k + 1 and it conservatively approximates
an infinite label chain Ω = 〈`1, . . . , `k, `k+1, `k+2, . . .〉 that would have been com-
puted by∞-Enf with finite label chain Ω′′ = 〈`1, . . . , `k, `k〉.
Similar to ∞-Enf , enforcer k-Enf has Aux k-Enf = {cc, bc}, Initk-Enf (cc) = ,
and Initk-Enf (bc) = ⊥. We prove the following theorem.
Theorem 4. k-Enf is an enforcer on R for k-BNI(L), for any L and k ≥ 2.
Proof. See Appendix B.2.
5.6 Discussion
5.6.1 Inference from Label Chains
Knowledge that label chains must be monotonically decreasing might be used
by unauthorized principals to infer information about labels they are not sup-
posed to read. Assume, for example, T i+1(w) = M and T i+2(w) = L. Principals
associated with label L are allowed to read T i+1(w) and learn that T i+1(w) = M.
Because label chains are monotonically decreasing, these principals can then
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deduce T i+1(w) v T i(w), which is M v T i(w). So, they learned something
(i.e., M v T i(w)) about T i(w), which they are not supposed to read (because
T i+1(w) = M and M 6v L). But, knowing M v T i(w) does not leak anything about
initial sensitive values, because the fact that label chains are monotonically de-
creasing is independent from the actual choice of initial sensitive values.
This kind of inference becomes possible whenever any invariant involving
sensitive information is publicly known. In the example above, the invariant
was that label chain are monotonically decreasing. In the next example, the
publicly known invariant is the program code. Consider a program that in-
cludes assignment h′ := h ∗ 2, where h′ and h are tagged with H. Because the
program code is publicly known, all principals can infer that high variable h′
stores an even value, even if these principals are not allowed to read h′. Such a
program might still satisfy noninterference, which implies that these principals
learn nothing about initial sensitive values by making the above inference. Per-
haps a stronger property than noninterference, which would protect all sensi-
tive values—not only initial sensitive values—could proscribe these inferences.
5.6.2 Reclassification
As a future work, we are planning to extend our family of enforcers to sup-
port arbitrary reclassification (e.g., declassification and classification) of both
variables and tags. Reclassifying values in variables has been already stud-
ied and is well-understood. Reclassifying labels in tags has not been studied
yet. And arbitrary reclassifications of labels could produce non-monotonically
decreasing label chains. To remedy this, the semantics of label chains would
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have to be changed. Here is one solution: define the sensitivity of T i(x) to be
T i+1(x)unionsqT i+2(x)unionsq. . .. Now, elements in a label chain may change in an arbitrary
way, yet their sensitivity would still be monotonically decreasing.
5.7 Related Work
Dynamic Enforcement Mechanisms and Leaks. The formalization of dy-
namic information flow enforcement mechanisms dates back to Bell and La-
Padula [15]. The research community realized then that dynamic enforcement
mechanisms for information flow control might introduce leaks, which were not
present in the program itself. Denning [73], for instance, explains that blocking
an execution and reporting the underlying violation might leak sensitive in-
formation. Denning also gives examples where flow-sensitive labels generated
by dynamic enforcement mechanisms violate TINI. Our k-Enf enforcers do not
report the reason an execution terminates for exactly this reason. Also, they
ensure that information is not leaked by observing flow-sensitive labels during
normally terminated or blocked executions.
Label Chains of Length One. Most dynamic enforcement mechanisms use la-
bel chains of length one. Purely dynamic enforcement mechanisms that analyze
only code that is executed and employ no-sensitive-upgrade (NSU) or permissive-
upgrade (PU) (e.g., [18], [6],[31], [83], [7],[49]) satisfy TINI but not BNI, because
they leak sensitive information when blocking an execution. Previous hybrid
flow-sensitive enforcement mechanisms (e.g., [67], [30]), which employ pro-
gram analysis before and during execution, do not satisfy BNI, either. There are
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enforcement mechanisms (e.g., [2], [13]) that satisfy BNI, but they either han-
dle only L2 = 〈{L,H},v〉, or lose permissiveness by tagging variables with the
same labels at the end of conditional commands independent of which branch
is actually taken.
Label Chains of Length Two. Certain dynamic enforcement mechanisms em-
ploy label chains of length two. Buiras et al. [26] propose a purely dynamic
enforcement mechanism where fixed metalabels capture the implicit flow of in-
formation caused by conditional commands. The purely dynamic enforcement
mechanism in [26] causes insecure executions to diverge instead of blocking.
By enforcing only TINI, no security guarantee is given for executions that are
forced to diverge (because TINI considers only finite traces).
By employing hybrid enforcement, Bedford et al. [12] use label chains where
the second element is flow sensitive. The hybrid enforcement mechanism pre-
sented in [12] enforces TSNI on programs written in a while-language that sup-
ports references.
Unbounded Label Chains. Some enforcement mechanisms are expressive
enough to support label chains of unbounded length. Zheng et al. [100] em-
ploy dependent types to tag a label with another label, thus forming chains of
labels. Their approach can express a label recursively tagging itself, which can
be seen as infinitely repeating the last label of a chain. Examples presented in
[100] employ label chains of up to two elements (e.g., 〈`,⊥〉 and 〈`, `〉), but the
authors acknowledge [100, §3.3.2] that longer chains are sensible. We explain
in the next chapter why permissiveness can be lost with label chains of shorter
length.
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The enforcement mechanism presented in Zheng et al. [100] is mostly static,
and thus it does not exhibit the leaks we examine (i.e., through flow sensitive
labels and blocking executions). Specifically, label chains in [100] are given as
input; they are not deduced by the enforcement mechanism. Conditions on
these labels are inlined in the program by the programmer before execution.
The program is then statically analyzed. If the analysis succeeds, then the pro-
gram will satisfy TINI. So, a type-correct program can be safely executed until
normal termination. Techniques presented in [100] involving label chains have
been implemented in Jif [69, 68]. We believe that any framework that supports
dependent types, such as [64] and [27], is likely able to express unbounded label
chains.
Actions Other than Blocking. Dynamic enforcement mechanisms can take ac-
tions other than blocking when an unsafe command is about to be executed.
Enforcement mechanisms presented in [61] and [30], which handle lattices with
two elements (i.e., L and H), modify or skip the execution of an unsafe com-
mand. Similar to [26], the enforcement mechanism presented in [65] (which
handles lattices with two elements) diverges the execution when reaching an
unsafe command. Some enforcement mechanisms (e.g., [45],[48], [16],[85]) take
no action, because they only update labels on variables; they do not perform
any checks.
Certain purely dynamic enforcement mechanisms ([51], [87]) recover from
exceptions caused by unsafe commands. The authors acknowledge that ex-
ceptions depend on flow-sensitive labels that tag variables and on the control
flow of the program. These mechanisms avoid leaking sensitive information to
exceptions through flow-sensitive labels and control flow. They enforce error
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sensitive noninterference, which we believe is stronger that BNI. One of the tech-
niques they employ is assigning the same labels to variables after conditional
commands, independent of the branch that is taken. By doing so, some permis-
siveness might be lost against 2-Enf , which allows labels on variables to depend
on taken branches.
Other Dynamic Enforcement Mechanisms. Secure multi-execution [38] (SME)
is a flow-sensitive dynamic enforcement mechanism that enforces information
flow labels by simultaneously executing the same program as many times as
the number of labels. An execution that corresponds to a label ` sees the ac-
tual values, when these values are tagged with labels at most as restrictive as `,
and it sees dummy values, otherwise. Using faceted values [8], which is a tuple
of values, each one corresponding to a different label, one can use one execu-
tion to simulate the set of executions generated by SME. These two approaches
are permissive and do not introduce information leaks. However, the run-time
overhead they introduce increases in proportion to the number of different la-
bels that are used.
5.8 Summary
In this chapter we presented dynamic flow-sensitive enforcement mechanisms
k-Enf that associate variables with label chains of arbitrary length. We proved
that these mechanisms satisfy BNI, which stipulates that sensitive information is
not leaked to principals that observe values in variables and label chains, during
normally terminated and blocked executions.
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CHAPTER 6
PERMISSIVENESS VERSUS CHAIN LENGTH
An independent criterion for assessing the value of an enforcer is permis-
siveness. Theorems are proved in this chapter to relate label chain length and
permissiveness for k-Enf enforcers (§6.1) and for other enforcers (§6.2) that sat-
isfy BNI. The relationships depend on initialization, threat model, and size of
the lattice.
6.1 Permissiveness of k-Enf
An enforcer E ′ is at least as permissive as an enforcer E if, for all executions of
each command, E ′ emits observations involving at least as many identifiers (in
the same relative order) as E. This comparison involves deciding whether iden-
tifiers (i.e., variables and tags) that appear in a sequence θ of observations pro-
duced by E, also appear in a sequence θ′ produced by E ′ (in the same relative
order). We write θ E θ′ iff
|θ| ≤ |θ′| ∧ (∀i: 1 ≤ i ≤ |θ|: dom(θ[i]) ⊆ dom(θ′[i]))
where θ[i] is the ith observation in sequence θ. Notice, relation E does not de-
pend on values being stored in variables because, by definition, enforcers E and
E ′ are required to compute the same values while executing the same command.
We compare permissiveness of enforcers with respect to an underlying lat-
tice and some identifiers of interest; we start this comparison with pairs of mem-
ories that satisfy some desired initialization condition, such as equality on initial
values and label chains. Formally, an enforcer E ′ is at least as permissive as an
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enforcer E for initialization condition ρ, underlying lattice L, and identifiers up
to the kth tag (i.e., T k) with k ≥ 0, writing E ≤k,Lρ E ′, iff
∀C,M,M ′:
M |= H0(E,L, C) ∧M ′ |= H0(E ′,L, C) ∧ ρ(M,M ′)
⇒ (∀` ∈ L: traceE(C,M)|k` E traceE′(C,M ′)|k` )
(6.1)
Notice, the consequent of (6.1) holds iff labels deduced by E are at least as re-
strictive as labels deduced by E ′. Relation ≤k,Lρ is a preorder (i.e., reflexive and
transitive relation) on enforcers.
For convenience, we introduce abbreviations:
– E <k,Lρ E ′ , E ≤k,Lρ E ′ ∧ E ′ 6≤k,Lρ E
– E ∼=k,Lρ E ′ , E ≤k,Lρ E ′ ∧ E ′ ≤k,Lρ E
Notice that from (6.1) we can prove that if ρ ⇒ ρ′, then E ≤k,Lρ′ E ′ ⇒ E ≤k,Lρ E ′.
Also, if k ≤ k′, then E ≤k′,Lρ E ′ ⇒ E ≤k,Lρ E ′.
We now examine how lengths of label chains relate to the permissiveness of
enforcers by comparing the permissiveness of enforcers k-Enf and (k + 1)-Enf
for k ≥ 2. To perform this comparison, the initial memories considered by k-Enf
and (k + 1)-Enf for executing a command should agree on values in variables
and on labels in tags, up to the kth. Define
M |k , {〈T i(x),M(T i(x))〉 | 0 ≤ i ≤ k ∧ x ∈ Var ∧ T i(x) ∈ dom(M)}
The desired initialization condition then is:
ρk(M,M
′) , M |k = M ′|k
Initialization condition ρk allows a flexible variable w to be initially associated
with label chains:
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– Ω = 〈`1, `2, . . . , `k, `k+1, `k+1〉 by (k + 1)-Enf , where `k+1 @ `k, and
– Ω′ = 〈`1, `2, . . . , `k, `k〉 by k-Enf .
Here, Ω′ is a conservative approximation of Ω. We will say that Ω exhibits a
(k + 1)-decrease because T k+1(w) @ T k(w). Label chain Ω allows a principal p
having label `k+1 to observe T k(w) because T (T k(w)) = T k+1(w) = `k+1. But
Ω′ does not allow p to observe T k(w) because, by definition of k-Enf , we have
T (T k(w)) = T k(w) and `k+1 @ `k. Notice that for a label chain to exhibit a
(k + 1)-decrease, the labels in that chain should belong to a lattice with at least
one non-bottom element.
Whenever (k+1)-Enf initially associates flexible variablewwith a label chain
Ω that exhibits a (k + 1)-decrease, enforcer k-Enf is forced by initialization con-
dition ρk to use conservative approximation Ω′ for Ω. So, (k + 1)-Enf is strictly
more permissive than k-Enf .
Theorem 5. k-Enf <k,Lρk (k + 1)-Enf , for k ≥ 2 and any lattice L with at least one
non-bottom element.
Proof. See Appendix B.5.
So, longer label chains offer increased permissiveness for the k-Enf family of
enforcers. From Theorem 5, we conclude by transitivity that k-Enf <k,Lρk ∞-Enf ,
for any k ≥ 2.
There are cases where flexible variables initially store no information, and
thus, they are initially associated with bottom-label chains (i.e., 〈⊥, . . . ,⊥〉). We
say memory M is conventionally initialized when
αc(M) , ∀w∈VarF : ∀i ≥ 1: T i(w)∈dom(M)⇒M(T i(w)) = ⊥.
114
We also define initialization condition
c(M,M ′) , αc(M) ∧ ρ1(M,M ′)
which implies that two memories are conventionally initialized and agree on
values in anchor variables and on the first labels of these anchor variables.
A result analogous to Theorem 5 does not hold when <k,Lρk is replaced with
<k,Lc . With initialization condition c, label chains longer than two elements do
not enhance the permissiveness of k-Enf . This is because, for conventional ini-
tialization c, k-Enf produces label chains where the second element is always
repeated (e.g., 〈H,M,M, . . . ,M〉) (See Appendix B.2 for the proof) due to the con-
servative update of label chains of flexible variable induced by rules (ASGNF) in
Figure 5.3 and (EXIT) in Figure 5.4. There, all elements of label chains of the in-
volved flexible variables are updated with the same label (i.e., the sensitivity of
the context).
Theorem 6. k-Enf ∼=k,Lc (k + 1)-Enf for any lattice L and k ≥ 2.
Proof. See Appendix B.5.
Threat model specifics affect the permissiveness of longer label chains, too.
Consider a weakened threat model that allows observations of variables but disal-
lows observations of updates to tags. Enforcers here would be expected to sat-
isfy 0-BNI. Enforcer k-Enf satisfies k-BNI. So, k-Enf should also satisfy 0-BNI,
because 0-BNI is implied by k-BNI.
Under our weakened threat model, the permissiveness of our enforcers is
compared using relation ≤0,Lρk , where superscript 0 indicates that only observa-
tions involving variables are considered for the comparison. Theorem 5 does
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not apply because relation <k,Lρk considers observations up to the kth tag (due to
superscript k) where k ≥ 2. But we do have:
Theorem 7. k-Enf ∼=0,Lρk (k + 1)-Enf for any lattice L and k ≥ 2.
Proof. See Appendix B.5.
So, under our weakened threat model, the permissiveness of k-Enf does not
improve by using label chains of length greater than two. It is tempting to posit
a more general result stating that, under the weakened threat model, the per-
missiveness of all enforcers does not improve when using label chains of length
greater than two, but we leave that for future work.
6.2 Other Enforcers
We now turn to the relation between permissiveness and label chain length for
enforcers other than k-Enf . These other enforcers are categorized first based
on the threat model they assume and then, based on particular properties they
satisfy.
6.2.1 In the Strong Threat Model
Longer label chains help an enforcer E under the strong threat model provided
there are executions of commands for which E produces label chains whose
elements
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(i) are not redundant—they are not a function of other elements in the same
label chain, and
(ii) capture the real sensitivity of the elements they tag rather than conserva-
tively approximating it.
Label chains that can be used as evidence for properties (i) and (ii) are formal-
ized below as being k-varying and k-precise.
Two label chains 〈`1, `2, . . . , `k〉 and 〈`′1, `′2, . . . , `′k〉, whose elements belong to
a lattice L, are defined to be k-varying for k ≥ 2 iff
(∀i: 1 ≤ i < k: `i = `′i) ∧ `k 6= `′k.
Notice that k-varying label chains cannot exist when L has only one element.
We now formalize k-precise. Consider an enforcer E, lattice L, command C,
and conventionally initialized memory M such that M |= H0(E,L, C). Assume
trace τ = traceE(C,M) produces label chain prefix Ω = 〈`1, . . . , `n〉 at some state
τ [j] after an assignment to a flexible variable w:
∃1 < j ≤ |τ |: ∃w ∈ VarF :
τ [j − 1] = 〈w := e;Cr,Mw〉,
τ [j] = 〈Cr,Mr〉,
∀i: 1 ≤ i ≤ n: T i(w) ∈ dom(Mr) ∧ Mr(T i(w)) = `i.
Label chain Ω is k-precise (for 1≤k≤n) at τ [j] when for each enforcer E ′:
if
– E ′ satisfies (k − 1)-BNI(L), and
– E ≤k−1,Lc E ′,
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then
– trace τ ′ = traceE′(C,M ′) with M ′ |= H0(E ′,L, C) and c(M,M ′) produces
label chain 〈`1, . . . , `k〉 at τ ′[j].
So, if Ω is k-precise, then an enforcer E ′ that is sound (i.e., E ′ satisfies (k − 1)-
BNI(L)) and at least as permissive as E (i.e., E ≤k−1,Lc E ′) cannot produce (at
the same execution point) a label chain whose first k elements are less restric-
tive than those in Ω. Consequently, the first k elements of Ω captures the real
sensitivity of the elements they tag.
For brevity, we say that E produces some k-precise k-varying label chains with
elements in L iff there exist commands C,C ′ whose executions produce label
chains Ω,Ω′ such that:
– Ω is k-precise at the ith state of traceE(C,M), for some i and M with M |=
H0(E,L, C),
– Ω′ is k-precise at the jth state of traceE(C ′,M ′), for some j and M ′ with
M ′ |= H0(E,L, C ′),
– Ω and Ω′ are k-varying.
We show that longer label chains can offer increased permissiveness for an
enforcer E, under the strong threat model, provided E produces some k-precise
k-varying label chains. To do so, we compare such an enforcer E with an en-
forcer E ′ that approximates the kth element of each label chain as a function of
the previous elements, instead of performing, for example, an analysis of the
code. We say that E ′ produces (k− 1)-dependent label chains for k− 1 ≥ 1 iff E ′ is
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an enforcer and
∀x: ∀i > k − 1: T i(x) = fE′(T (x), . . . , T k−1(x))
for some function fE′ . For example, k-Enf produces k-dependent label chains,
because T k = T k+1. Notice that if an enforcer E ′ produces (k − 1)-dependent
label chains, then that mechanism cannot produce k-varying label chains.
An enforcer E ′ cannot both satisfy (k − 1)-BNI and be at least as permissive
as E. Assume for contradiction that E ′ satisfies (k−1)-BNI and is at least as per-
missive asE. Because the k-varying label chains produced byE are k-precise,E ′
should then produce the same k-varying label chains. But, we previously saw
that if an enforcer E ′ produces k-varying label chains, then E ′ does not produce
(k − 1)-dependent label chains, which is a contradiction.
Theorem 8. (i) For a lattice L, for an enforcer E that satisfies (k − 1)-BNI(L), with
k ≥ 2, and produces some k-precise k-varying label chains with elements in L, and for
an enforcer E ′ that produces (k − 1)-dependent label chains,
if E ≤k−1,Lc E ′, then E ′ does not satisfy (k − 1)-BNI(L).
(ii) Enforcer E and lattice L exist.
Proof. See Appendix B.6.
For an enforcer E ′ that uses label chains of length k−1 (i.e., produces (k−1)-
dependent label chains), Theorem 8 implies that E ′ cannot be at least as permis-
sive as an enforcer E that uses label chains of length k. So, in contrast to The-
orem 6, which stipulates that the family of k-Enf does not benefit from longer
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label chains under conventional initialization, enforcer E in Theorem 8 does
benefit. For example, given that the enforcement mechanism in [12] uses 2-
dependent label chains, Theorem 8 implies that this enforcement mechanism
loses permissiveness against an enforcer that produces 3-precise 3-varying label
chains (e.g., 3-Eopt).
Theorem 8 (ii) asserts that such an enforcer E and lattice L exist. So, it is
always possible to define, for each k > 1, an enforcer E that can produce k-
precise k-varying label chains when executing some command C. Notice, k-Enf
cannot produce k-precise k-varying label chains.
Witness E and L for Theorem 8 (ii). In the Appendix B.3, we describe k-Eopt ,
which is an enforcer that satisfies (k − 1)-BNI and produces some k-precise k-
varying label chains during the execution of a certain command C. C involves
sequences of assignments and if commands whose branches contain only one
assignment. Such if commands will be called simple. We construct k-Eopt by
optimizing k-Enf for deducing k-precise k-varying labels during the execution
of such C. The optimization is based on the following observation: ignoring
context, if T i(w) = ⊥ at the end of both branches of a simple if command, then,
at the end of that if command, T i+1(w) does not need to be updated with the
sensitivity T (e) of the guard of that if command. This optimization enables
k-Eopt to produce some k-precise k-varying label chains.
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6.2.2 In the Weakened Threat Model
In the weakened threat model, label chains of length two can offer enhanced
permissiveness compared to label chains of length one: the second label in a
label chain enables the decision to block assignment commands to be more per-
missive (previous theorems consider label chains with at least two elements). To
illustrate, it suffices to consider anchor-tailed commands, which are a sequence
C;C ′ of commands where C does not involve any assignment to anchor vari-
ables and C ′ is a sequence of assignments to anchor variables. The second label
in a label chain allows the decision to block an assignment in an anchor-tailed
command to be more permissive.
Let GEa:=e denote the condition used by an enforcer E for blocking an assign-
ment a := e to anchor variable a when execution reaches state 〈a := e;C ′,M ′〉
in a trace traceE(C,M). GEa:=e is a boolean expression on the domain of M ′ such
that
M ′(GEa:=e) ⇔ 〈a := e;C ′,M ′〉 → 〈C ′,M ′′〉 is a subtrace of traceE(C,M).
For assignment a := e in an anchor-tailed command, GEa:=e may depend on
label chains of variables in
• the assignment a := e itself (to capture explicit flows), and
• the context of that assignment (to capture implicit flows). By definition
of anchor-tailed commands, such an assignment is not encapsulated in
any conditional command, but it may follow other assignments to anchor
variables. So, the context of a := e only references variables mentioned in
assignments to anchor variables that precede a := e.
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Let Va:=e denote the above set of variables.
We say GEa:=e is a k-dependent condition for a := e in an anchor-tailed com-
mand iff GEa:=e depends at most on the first k elements of the label chains of
variables in Va:=e
GEa:=e = fE({T i(x) | x ∈ Va:=e ∧ 1 ≤ i ≤ k}),
for some function fE . For example, 2-Enf uses 2-dependent Ga:=e.
We can now return to our original goal, which is to show how the second
label in a label chain makes the decision to block assignment commands more
permissive. Theorem 9 states that if an enforcer E uses 1-dependent GEa:=e, then
this enforcer cannot both satisfy 0-BNI and be at least as permissive as 2-Enf .
Here is why. E does not compute the sensitivity of labels referenced by block
conditionGEa:=e, and thus, E does not compute the sensitivity of the information
conveyed by its decision to block a certain assignment a := e. In an effort to
satisfy 0-BNI and prevent leaking sensitive information, E must decide to al-
ways block a := e, even though in some executions that assignment is safe and
allowed by 2-Enf .
Theorem 9. For an enforcer E and lattice L3, if GEa:=e is 1-dependent and 2-Enf ≤0,L3c
E, then E does not satisfy 0-BNI(L3).
Proof. See Appendix B.6.
So, for the weakened threat model, there is improved permissiveness when us-
ing two (instead of one) labels for each variable.
Since most dynamic enforcement mechanisms proposed in the past satisfy
TINI, the reader might wonder whether Theorem 9 still holds when 0-BNI is
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replaced by TINI. Under the weakened threat model, there are enforcers (e.g.,
EH,L in the next section) that use 1-dependent GEa:=e, are at least as permissive
as 2-Enf and they do satisfy TINI. So, Theorem 9 does not hold when 0-BNI is
replaced by TINI.
Familiar Two-level Lattice
Some papers build a theory based on a two-level lattice L2 , 〈{L,H},v〉 with
L @ H, expecting results that will extend to arbitrary lattices. In this section,
we give a result expressed in terms of L2 that does not hold for more complex
lattices. Thus, generalizing from L2 to arbitrary lattices is not always a sound
presumption.
Consider L2 along with the weakened threat model. Previous work [56]
proposed a flow-sensitive enforcement mechanism that uses only one label per
variable. We denote that enforcement mechanism by EH,L, which is derived
from k-Enf by associating each variable with only one tag (i.e., EH,L does not
use T i(x) when i > 1). Figure 6.1 shows the modified rules for EH,L. We prove
that Ga:=e defined in Figure 6.1 is 1-dependent (Theorem 10).
EH,L ensures that the sensitivity of each tag T (w) is always L (so there is
no need to explicitly keep track of T 2(w)). The only way to encode sensitive
information (i.e., tagged with H) in T (w) is if T (w) is updated with different
labels in a conditional command that has a sensitive (tagged with H) guard.
But, if the sensitivity of the guard is H, then due to function U in Figure 6.1,
tag T (w) will always be updated to H at the end of that conditional command,
because M(bccc) = H. So, T (w) will reveal no information about the value of
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that sensitive guard. Thus, the sensitivity of T (w) is L.
Define function traceEH,L(C,M) to map command C and memory M with
M |= H0(EH,L,L, C) to the entire trace that starts with state 〈C,M〉. We have
nEH,L = 1, AuxEH,L = {cc, bc}, InitEH,L(cc) = , and InitEH,L(bc) = ⊥.
Theorem 9 does not hold when L3 is replaced with L2 and E is EH,L. Instead,
Theorem 10 below holds; it states that EH,L satisfies 0-BNI and is strictly more
permissive than 2-Enf only when L2 is used. We are also not aware of an en-
forcement mechanism that uses label chains of length one, enforces L2, satisfies
0-BNI, and is at least as permissive as EH,L.
Theorem 10. Enforcer EH,L uses 1-dependent Ga:=e, satisfies 0-BNI(L2), and satisfies
2-Enf <0,L2c EH,L.
Proof. See Appendix B.6.
So, Theorem 10 contradicts expectations that longer label chains offer increased
permissiveness. Moreover, this theorem is an example where a result expressed
in terms of L2 does not necessarily generalize for arbitrary lattices.
Notice, though, that EH,L does not satisfy 0-BNI for arbitrary lattices. For
example, consider (1.8), which employs L3. Based on rules in Figure 6.1 and
rules (IF),(SEQ) in §5.4.3, EH,L executes (1.8) as described in (i) and (ii) in §1.4. So,
executing (1.8) under EH,L leaks sensitive m > 0 to principals observing non-
sensitive variable l, and thus, 0-BNI is not satisfied. So, EH,L illustrates that an
enforcer designed to enforce two-level lattices cannot necessarily enforce arbi-
trary lattices.
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(ASGNA)
v = M(e) Ga:=e ` = M(bccc) unionsqM(bc)
〈a := e,M〉 → 〈stop,M [a 7→ v, bc 7→ `]〉
(ASGNAFAIL)
v = M(e) ¬Ga:=e ` = M(bccc) unionsqM(bc)
〈a := e,M〉 → 〈block,M [bc 7→ `]〉
(ASGNF)
v0 = M(e) v1 = M(T (e)) unionsqM(bccc) unionsqM(bc)
〈w := e,M〉 → 〈stop,M [w 7→ v0, T (w) 7→ v1]〉
U(M,W ) ,M [ ∀w∈W : T (w) 7→ T (w) unionsqM(bccc) unionsqM(bc)]
Ga:=e is M(T (e)) unionsqM(bccc) unionsqM(bc) vM(T (a))
Figure 6.1: Modified rules for EH,L
6.3 Discussion
6.3.1 Extending Finite to Infinite Label Chains
Infinitely repeating the last element of the finite label chain is one approach for
safely extending finite label chains into infinite label chains. But this approach is
not panacea; it might generate less permissive label chains than others satisfying
BNI. As a first example, consider an anchor variable being associated with one-
element label chain 〈`〉. Extending that one-element label chain by infinitely
repeating ` would be safe, but it would lead to a less permissive infinite label
chain that, say, 〈`,⊥,⊥, . . .〉 (used in §5.1). As a second example, recall §6.2.2,
where we established that if labels belong to a two-level lattice, then the one-
element label chain 〈`〉 of every variable can be extended into infinite label chain
〈`, L, L, . . .〉. Consequently, the rule for extending label chains may depend on
the enforcement mechanisms, assumptions on variables, and on the lattice of
labels.
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6.3.2 Number of Non-bottom Labels in Chains
Under the conventional initialization, flexible variables are initially associated
with label chains whose elements equal to bottom label ⊥. Also, anchor vari-
ables are always associated with label chains whose first element is not⊥, but all
other elements are⊥. So, one might wonder whether the number of non-bottom
labels increases as a program is executed under an enforcer.
First we consider a case where an enforcer should fill the entire label chain of
a variable with non-bottom elements in order to achieve soundness. Consider:
if m > 0 then w := 1; x := 3 else x := 0; w := 4 end
where T (m) = M. Because sensitive information m > 0 implicitly flows to
flexible variables w, x and their label chains, it is safe to associate w and x with
label chain 〈M,M, . . . 〉, as k-Enf actually does. Assume, for contradiction, that
an enforcer deduces label chains of length k for w and x, where the label chain
contains at least one ⊥. We show that k-BNI is not satisfied. That is, assume:
– T (w) = T 2(w) = . . . = T i(w) = M and T i+1(w) = T i+2(w) = . . . = ⊥,
– T (x) = T 2(x) = . . . = T j(x) = M and T j+1(x) = T j+2(x) = . . . = ⊥
for 1 ≤ i, j < k. Then principals assigned ⊥ make different observations de-
pending on the branch that is taken, and thus, sensitive m > 0 is leaked:
• If m > 0 holds, then principals assigned ⊥ first observe 〈T i(w),M〉 and
then 〈T j(x),M〉.
• If m > 0 does not hold, then principals assigned ⊥ first observe 〈T j(x),M〉
and then 〈T i(w),M〉.
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So, k-BNI is not satisfied. This leak is avoided if at least w or x is associated with
a label chain without ⊥. Assume:
– T i(w) = M, for all i > 0,
– T (x) = M, T 2(x) = . . . = ⊥.
Then, in all executions, principals assigned ⊥make the same observations (i.e.,
{〈T (x),M〉, 〈T 2(x),⊥〉, . . .}), and thus, m is not leaked.
In other cases, an enforcer gradually fills label chains of variables with dis-
tinct non-bottom elements. Consider enforcer k-Eopt (see Appendix B.3) and
the following program:
if a1 > 1 then w1 := 0 else w1 := 1 end;
if a2 > 1 then w2 := w1 else w2 := 2 end;
if a3 > 3 then w3 := w2 else w3 := 3 end;
. . .
if ai > i then wi := wi−1 else wi := i end;
. . .
Figure 6.2 gives the chains associated with each wi at the end of the ith if com-
mand, assuming an execution where each ai > i holds. Notice that the num-
ber of non-bottom labels increases as successive if commands are executed.
Notice, also, that all generated label chains are monotonically decreasing. If
⊥ @ . . . @ T (ai) @ . . . @ T (a2) @ T (a1), then these label chains become strictly
monotonically decreasing. So, any attempt to approximate these label chains
with shorter ones would lose precision and thus harm permissiveness.
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w1 〈T (a1),⊥,⊥,⊥, . . .〉
w2 〈T (a1) unionsq T (a2), T (a2),⊥,⊥, . . .〉
w3 〈T (a1) unionsq T (a2) unionsq T (a3), T (a2) unionsq T (a3), T (a3),⊥ . . .〉
. . . . . .
wi 〈T (a1) unionsq . . . unionsq T (ai), T (a2) unionsq . . . unionsq T (ai), . . . , T (ai),⊥, . . .〉
Figure 6.2: Label chains for wi
6.4 Related Work
Russo et al. [77] study trade-offs between static and dynamic security analysis.
They prove the impossibility of a purely dynamic information-flow monitor that
satisfies TINI and accepts programs certified by the Hunt and Sands classical
flow-sensitive static analysis [52]. They first define some basic semantics (Figure
4 in [77]) that purely dynamic information-flow monitor may extend. Then,
they introduce properties for the purely dynamic enforcement mechanisms they
consider (i.e., not look ahead, not look aside). Their main impossibility theorem has
the same style as our Theorem 9: an enforcement mechanism with the above
properties cannot both satisfy TINI and be at least as permissive as [52]. Our
Theorem 8 adopts a more general style, since it compares the permissiveness
of any two enforcement mechanisms that satisfy particular properties; it does
not assume that one of the two is a fixed known enforcement mechanism. And
our permissiveness relation ≤k,Lρ is more general than the one presented in [77],
because it is defined for any two enforcers and handles arbitrary lattices (not
only L2) and initialization conditions.
Bielova et al. [19] present a taxonomy of five representative flow-sensitive
information flow enforcement mechanisms (no-sensitive-upgrade, permissive-
upgrade, hybrid monitor, secure multi-execution, and multiple facets), in terms
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of soundness and transparency, which stipulates that enforcement mechanisms
do not alter the semantics of safe executions. The authors introduce Termination-
Aware Noninterference (TANI) as a soundness goal, and it is expressed in terms of
knowledge semantics. If an enforcement mechanism that decides to diverge the
execution of an unsafe command satisfies TANI, then this mechanism does not
leak sensitive information by making this decision. The theoretical framework
considered in [19] assumes labels are taken from L2. Also, it assumes that a
terminating execution produces one output, at the end, tagged with L (all prin-
cipals can read it); if an execution diverges, no output is produced. So, TANI
guarantees that dynamic enforcement mechanisms do not introduce leaks when
deciding to diverge executions in this particular framework. Because only L2 is
considered in [19], our section 6.2.2 explains that there is no danger for these
mechanisms to encode sensitive information in the flow-sensitive labels.
Bielova et al. [19] use several metrics for comparing information flow en-
forcement mechanisms: precision, permissiveness, and transparency. The com-
parison results proved in [19] use a style similar to our Theorems 5, 6, 7, and 10,
which compare specific enforcement mechanisms.
6.5 Summary
We formalized conditions under which permissiveness is harmed when an en-
forcer uses shorter label chains. We believe the results presented in this chapter
can explain choices made by past work in dynamic information flow control
and illustrate how these choices might affect permissiveness.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
This thesis studied two extensions of classical information flow labels: RIF
labels and label chains. We established that the resulting increased expressive-
ness of these formulations can maintain soundness and increase permissiveness.
RIF labels (chapters 2-4) specify arbitrary reclassifications triggered by oper-
ations. With RIF labels, restrictions on derived values can be fewer than those
imposed on initial values, and thus permissiveness is enhanced. Also, restric-
tions on derived values can be increased over those imposed on initial values,
and thus soundness is maintained. Of course, supporting labels with increased
expressiveness, such as RIF labels, could complicate enforcement. In this the-
sis, we managed to keep the enforcement mechanism of RIF labels simple and
we presented two checkable families of RIF labels where relation v can be de-
cidable. Our PWNI is a first extension of noninterference to handle arbitrary
reclassifications (specified by RIF labels). But as discussed in §2.2, PWNI is con-
servative.
Label chains (chapters 5-6) enable us to reason about the sensitivity of flow-
sensitive labels employed by dynamic enforcement mechanisms. We showed
that there are cases where longer label chains can increase permissiveness. As
a next step, we plan to support reclassification of any element in a label chain.
This step can be achieved by using RIF labels as elements of label chains. Em-
ploying RIF label chains would give us the opportunity to study RIF labels in
a dynamic flow-sensitive enforcement mechanism. It would also force us to
interpret label chains in terms of arbitrary restrictions—not only in terms of
confidentiality restrictions.
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APPENDIX A
PROOFS FOR RIF LABELS
A.1 Type-correctness implies PWNI
We first define T(λ, C). Consider a deterministic generator G of fresh variables.
G.init sets G to its initial state. G.fresh([E ]¯f) returns the next fresh variable h.
Variable h stores an arbitrary value (of the same type as [E ]¯f) and Γ(h) = Γ([E ]¯f).
T(λ, C) is deterministic (assuming each T is called in the order that it appears in
the definitions below).
T(λ, C) , T (λ, C, G.init)
T (λ, x := [E ]¯f , G) , x := S(λ, [E ]¯f , G)
T (λ, if [E ]¯f then Ct else Ce end, G) , if S(λ, [E ]¯f , G) then T (λ, Ct, G)
else T (λ, Ce, G)
T (λ,while [E ]¯f do Cw end, G) , while S(λ, [E ]¯f , G) do T (λ, Cw, G) end
T (λ, C1; C2, G) , T (λ, C1, G);T (λ, C2, G)
S(λ, [E ]¯f , G) ,

G.fresh([E ]¯f), if Γ(E) v λ ∧ Γ([E ]¯f) 6v λ
[E ]¯f , otherwise
We now proceed with the proofs.
Theorem 1. Γ, λκ ` C ⇒ PWNI (C)
Proof. Assume Γ, λκ ` C. To prove PWNI (C), assume τ = Υ(T(λ, C),M) and
τ ′ = Υ(T(λ, C),M′). We prove dpNI (λ, τ, τ ′). From Lemma 3 and Γ, λκ ` C, we
get Γ, λκ ` T(λ, C). From Lemma 1, we then get dpNI (λ, τ, τ ′).
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Lemma 1. If τ = Υ(C,M), τ ′ = Υ(C,M′), and Γ, λκ ` C, then dpNI (λ, τ, τ ′), for all
λ.
Proof. For what follows, we define pi to be a λ-dpiece iff
• pi = 〈C1,M1〉 → . . .→ 〈Cn,Mn〉with n ≥ 2,
• ∀1 < i < |pi|: ∆−Ĉ(λ, pi[i].C) = ∅, and
• ∆−Ĉ(λ, pi[n].C) 6= ∅ or pi[n].C = •.
Notice that a λ-piece of a trace is a maximal λ-dpiece that starts at the first state
of that trace or at a downgrade.
We also define SPNI(λ, pi) to stipulate that there is no illicit λ-flow within
λ-dpiece pi.
SPNI(λ, pi): Let pi = 〈C,M〉 ∗→ 〈Cd,Md〉 be a λ-dpiece. For all λ-dpieces
pi′ = 〈C,M′〉 ∗→ 〈C ′d,M′d〉 such that
M =λM′ (SPNI−H1 )
∀E ∈ ∆−Ĉ(λ, C): M(E) =M
′(E) (SPNI−H2 )
the following should hold
pi =λ pi
′, (SPNI−C1 )
Cd = C ′d, (SPNI−C2 )
Md =λM′d. (SPNI−C3 )
We prove that if τ = Υ(C,M), τ ′ = Υ(C,M′), and Γ, λκ ` C, then
dpNI (λ, τ, τ ′), for all λ. By definition, τ and τ ′ are not empty. Thus, we can
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apply induction on the number of λ-pieces that comprise τ and τ ′ using the fol-
lowing induction hypothesis IH. There, define trace τi to be a strict λ-piece-suffix
of τ iff τi is a strict suffix of τ and the first state of τi is the first state of a λ-piece
in τ .
IH: If τi is a strict λ-piece-suffix of τ , τ ′i is a strict λ-piece-suffix of τ ′, τi.C = τ ′i .C,
and Γ, λκ ` τi.C, then dpNI (λ, τi, τ ′i), for all λ.
Base case: τ and τ ′ are λ-pieces.
So,
→λ
τ = τ ,
→λ
τ ′ = τ ′,
λ→
τ = ,
λ→
τ ′ = .
We prove dpNI (λ, τ, τ ′) assuming Γ, λκ ` C holds. Because→λτ = τ ,
→λ
τ ′ = τ ′,
λ→
τ = ,
λ→
τ ′ = , and because dpNI (λ, , ) holds by definition, we have that
dpNI (λ, τ, τ ′) is
(∀E ∈ ∆−Ĉ(λ, τ.C): τ.M(E) = τ
′.M(E))
∧ τ.M =λ τ ′.M
⇒ τ =λ τ ′
So, to prove dpNI (λ, τ, τ ′) it suffices to assume
(∀E ∈ ∆−Ĉ(λ, τ.C): τ.M(E) = τ
′.M(E)) (A.1)
τ.M =λ τ ′.M (A.2)
and prove τ =λ τ ′.
Because τ and τ ′ are λ-pieces, then they are λ-dpieces, too. From Lemma
2, and because τ is a λ-dpiece and Γ, λκ ` C, we get SPNI (λ, τ). From (A.1)
and (A.2), and because τ ′ is a λ-dpiece, we then get τ =λ τ ′.
Induction case: τ and τ ′ are not both λ-pieces.
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We show dpNI (λ, τ, τ ′). By definition of dpNI , it suffices to assume
(∀E ∈ ∆−Ĉ(λ, τ.C): τ.M(E) = τ
′.M(E)) (A.3)
τ.M =λ τ ′.M (A.4)
and show
τ [|→λτ |].C = τ ′[|
→λ
τ ′ |].C (A.5)
→λ
τ =λ
→λ
τ ′ (A.6)
dpNI (λ,
λ→
τ ,
λ→
τ ′ ) (A.7)
We first show (A.5) and (A.6). We have that
→λ
τ and
→λ
τ ′ are λ-dpieces. So,
from Γ, λκ ` C and Lemma 2, we then get SPNI (λ,→λτ ). Consequently,
from (A.3) and (A.4), we then get (A.5) and (A.6).
We now show (A.7). From (A.5) and the hypothesis of this case, we get that
both τ and τ ′ contain at least two λ-pieces, and thus
λ→
τ 6=  and λ→τ ′ 6= .
From Γ, λκ ` C and Lemma 4, we get
Γ, λκ ` λ→τ .C (A.8)
From (A.5) and definition of λ-pieces, we have
λ→
τ .C = λ→τ ′ .C. From IH and
(A.8), we then get dpNI (λ,
λ→
τ ,
λ→
τ ′ ). So, we get (A.7).
Lemma 2. For each C,M, and λ, and for each λ-dpiece pi = 〈C,M〉 ∗→ 〈Cd,Md〉:
Γ, λκ ` C ⇒ SPNI (λ, pi).
Proof. Consider a memory M, a mapping Γ, a context-type λκ, and a label λ.
Define C ′ ∈ C to hold iff C ′ is a subcommand of C. We use structural induction
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on C, using the following induction hypothesis:
IH: For each Cˆ ∈ C, Mˆ, λˆ, and for each λˆ-dpiece pˆi = 〈Cˆ,Mˆ〉 ∗→ 〈Cˆd,Mˆd〉:
Γˆ, λˆκ ` Cˆ ⇒ SPNI (λˆ, pˆi).
For what follows, we defineM|λ , {〈x,M(x)〉 | Γ(x) v λ}. Notice thatM|λ =
M′|λ holds iffM =λM′ holds.
1. C is skip:
From rule SKIP, we have:
pi = 〈skip,M〉 → 〈•,M〉. (A.9)
By definition, pi is an λ-dpiece. Also, ∆−Ĉ(λ, skip) = ∅ and
Γ, λκ ` skip. (A.10)
We prove SPNI (λ, pi).
Using SKIP, consider:
pi′ = 〈skip,M′〉 → 〈•,M′〉, (A.11)
where
M =λM′. (A.12)
By definition, pi′ is an λ-dpiece.
We prove (SPNI−C1 ), (SPNI−C2 ), and (SPNI−C3 ). We have pi|λ =  and
pi′|λ = . So, pi =λ pi′, and thus (SPNI−C1 ) holds. From (A.9), (A.11), and
(A.12), we get that (SPNI−C2 ) and (SPNI−C3 ) hold.
2. C is x := [E ]¯f :
From ASGN, we have:
pi = 〈x := [E ]¯f ,M〉 → 〈•,M[x 7→ M([E ]¯f)]〉. (A.13)
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By definition, pi is an λ-dpiece. Assume
Γ, λκ ` C. (A.14)
We prove SPNI (λ, pi).
Using ASGN, consider:
pi′ = 〈x := [E ]¯f ,M′〉 → 〈•,M′[x 7→ M′([E ]¯f)]〉, (A.15)
where
M =λM′, (A.16)
∀E ∈ ∆−Ĉ(λ, C): M(E) =M
′(E). (A.17)
By definition, pi′ is a λ-dpiece. Also, (SPNI−H1 ) holds due to (A.16), and
(SPNI−H2 ) holds due to (A.17). To prove SPNI (λ, pi), we must prove
(SPNI−C1 ), (SPNI−C2 ), and (SPNI−C3 ).
pi in (A.13) instantiates pi in SPNI definition with
Cd = •, (A.18)
Md =M[x 7→ M([E ]¯f)]. (A.19)
pi′ in (A.15) instantiates pi′ in SPNI definition with
C ′d = •, (A.20)
M′d =M′[x 7→ M′([E ]¯f)]. (A.21)
From (A.18) and (A.20), we get Cd = C ′d, so (SPNI−C2 ) holds.
To prove (SPNI−C1 ) and (SPNI−C3 ), we proceed by cases.
2.1. Γ(x) 6v λ:
(SPNI−C1 ) follows because from (A.13) we have pi|λ = ; from (A.15)
we have pi′|λ = . So, pi|λ = pi′|λ.
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We prove (SPNI−C3 ). From (A.19) we haveMd|λ =M|λ. From (A.16),
we then have Md|λ = M′|λ. From (A.21), we have M′d|λ = M′|λ. By
transitivity, we then getMd|λ =M′d|λ. So, (SPNI−C3 ) holds.
2.2. Γ(x) v λ:
2.2.1. ∆−Ĉ(λ, C) = {E}:
From (A.17), we getM([E ]¯f) =M′([E ]¯f). From (A.16) we then get
M[x 7→ M([E ]¯f)]|λ =M′[x 7→ M′([E ]¯f)]|λ. From (A.19) and (A.21),
we now getMd|λ =M′d|λ. So, (SPNI−C3 ) holds.
From hypothesis of case 2.2. and (A.16), we haveM(x) = M′(x).
If M(x) = Md(x), then M′(x) = M′d(x), pi|λ = , and pi′|λ = .
Thus (SPNI−C1 ) holds. IfM(x) 6=Md(x), thenM′(x) 6=M′d(x),
and pi|λ = pi′|λ = 〈x,M([E ]¯f)〉. So, (SPNI−C1 ) holds.
2.2.2. ∆−Ĉ(λ, C) = ∅:
From the definition of ∆−Ĉ(λ, C) and hypothesis of case 2.2. we
have:
Γ(E) v λ ∨ Γ([E ]¯f) 6v λ. (A.22)
From (A.14) and ASGN-T, we get Γ([E ]¯f) v Γ(x). From Γ(x) v λ
(hypothesis of case 2.2.), we then get Γ([E ]¯f) v λ. From (A.22), we
then get Γ(E) v λ.
From type rule EXPR-T and definition of unionsq, we get for all y ∈ E that
Γ(y) v Γ(E). Because Γ(E) v λ, we then have Γ(y) v λ. Thus,
from (A.16), we then getM(E) = M′(E). So,M([E ]¯f) = M′([E ]¯f).
Similarly to case 2.2.1., we then have pi|λ = pi′|λ and Md|λ = M ′d|`.
So, (SPNI−C1 ) and (SPNI−C3 ) hold.
3. C is if [E ]¯f then Ct else Ce end:
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Consider a λ-dpiece:
pi = 〈if [E ]¯f then Ct else Ce end,M〉 ∗→ 〈Cd,Md〉. (A.23)
Assume
Γ, λκ ` C. (A.24)
We prove SPNI (λ, pi).
Consider also an λ-dpiece:
pi′ = 〈if [E ]¯f then Ct else Ce end,M′〉 ∗→ 〈C ′d,M′d〉, (A.25)
where
M =λM′, (A.26)
∀E ∈ ∆−Ĉ(λ, C): M(E) =M
′(E). (A.27)
(SPNI−H1 ) holds due to (A.26), and (SPNI−H2 ) holds due to (A.27).
To prove SPNI (λ, pi), we must prove (SPNI−C1 ), (SPNI−C2 ), and
(SPNI−C3 ). We proceed by cases.
3.1. Γ([E ]¯f) v λ and ∃x ∈ lhs(Ct) ∪ lhs(Ce): Γ(x) v λ:
We first prove thatM([E ]¯f) =M′([E ]¯f) by considering the following two
cases.
• ∆−Ĉ(λ, C) = ∅:
From the definition of ∆−Ĉ(λ, C), ∆
−
Ĉ(λ, C) = ∅, and (3.1.) we get
Γ(E) v λ. From (A.26), we then getM([E ]¯f) =M′([E ]¯f).
• ∆−Ĉ(λ, C) = {E}:
From (A.27), we getM([E ]¯f) =M′([E ]¯f).
Thus, in all casesM([E ]¯f) = M′([E ]¯f) holds. So, pi and pi′ take the same
branch. Say Ct. We prove (SPNI−C1 ), (SPNI−C2 ), and (SPNI−C3 ).
138
3.1.1. ∆−Ĉ(λ, Ct) 6= ∅:
Due to BRCH1, (A.23) and (A.25) are:
pi = 〈if [E ]¯f then Ct else Ce end,M〉 → 〈Ct,M〉 (A.28)
and
pi′ = 〈if [E ]¯f then Ct else Ce end,M′〉 → 〈Ct,M′〉. (A.29)
pi in (A.28) instantiates pi in SPNI definition with
Cd = Ct, (A.30)
Md =M. (A.31)
pi′ in (A.29) instantiates pi′ in SPNI definition with
C ′d = Ct, (A.32)
M′d =M′. (A.33)
(SPNI−C2 ) holds because (A.30) and (A.32) imply Cd = C ′d.
No update occurs during pi and pi′, so pi|λ =  and pi′|λ = . Thus,
(SPNI−C1 ) holds because pi|λ = pi′|λ.
We have:
Md|λ
=(A.31)
M|λ
=(A.26)
M′|λ
=(A.33)
M′d|λ
So, Md|λ = M ′d|λ and thus (SPNI−C3 ) holds.
139
3.1.2. ∆−Ĉ(λ, Ct) = ∅:
So,
∀E ∈ ∆−Ĉ(λ, Ct): M(E) =M
′(E). (A.34)
Due to BRCH1, (A.23) and (A.25) are:
pi = 〈if [E ]¯f then Ct else Ce end,M〉 → 〈Ct,M〉 ∗→ 〈Cd,Md〉, and
pi′ = 〈if [E ]¯f then Ct else Ce end,M′〉 → 〈Ct,M′〉 ∗→ 〈C ′d,M′d〉,
where Cd and C ′d are the first downgrade commands or termination
symbols after starting executing the branches (because pi and pi are
λ-dpieces).
Consider suffixes of pi and pi′:
pit = 〈Ct,M〉 ∗→ 〈Cd,Md〉, (A.35)
and
pi′t = 〈Ct,M′〉 ∗→ 〈C ′d,M′d〉. (A.36)
By construction, both pit and pi′t are λ-dpieces.
Because Ct ∈ C, we can instantiate IH with:
Cˆ = Ct,Mˆ =M, λˆ = λ, λˆκ = λκ unionsq Γ([E ]¯f), pˆi = pit. (A.37)
We get
Γ, λκ unionsq Γ([E ]¯f) ` Ct ⇒ SPNI (λ, pit). (A.38)
From typing rule BRCH-T and (A.24), we have that
Γ, λκ unionsq Γ([E ]¯f) ` Ct holds. So, from (A.38), we get that SPNI (λ, pit)
holds, too. In the definition of SPNI , we instantiate pi with pit
and pi′ with pi′t. Because (SPNI−H1 ) holds due to (A.26) and
(SPNI−H2 ) holds due to (A.34), we get pit|λ = pi′t|λ, Cd = C ′d, and
Md|λ =M′d|λ. Thus, (SPNI−C2 ) and (SPNI−C3 ) hold.
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We now prove (SPNI−C1 ). The observations generated by pit are
the same with the observations generated by pi, so pi|λ = pit|λ. Simi-
larly, pi′|λ = pi′t|λ. From pit|λ = pi′t|λ, and pi|λ = pit|λ we get pi|λ = pi′t|λ.
From pi′|λ = pi′t|λ, we then get pi|λ = pi′|λ. So, (SPNI−C1 ) holds.
3.2. Γ([E ]¯f) 6v λ or ∀x ∈ lhs(Ct) ∪ lhs(Ce): Γ(x) 6v λ:
We first prove that Γ([E ]¯f) 6v λ implies ∀x ∈ lhs(Ct) ∪ lhs(Ce): Γ(x) 6v λ.
Assume Γ([E ]¯f) 6v λ holds. From type rule BRCH-T, we get Γ, λκ unionsq Γ([E ]¯f) `
Ct and Γ, λκ unionsq Γ([E ]¯f) ` Ce. From Γ([E ]¯f) v λκ unionsq Γ([E ]¯f) and Γ([E ]¯f) 6v λ,
we get λκ unionsq Γ([E ]¯f) 6v λ. From Lemma 5, we then get: ∀x ∈ lhs(Ct) ∪
lhs(Ce): Γ(x) 6v λ. So, during execution, no update to an λ variable will
happen, and no downgrade to λ will happen. Thus, pi|λ = pi′|λ = ,
Cd = C ′d = • and Md|λ = M |λ = M ′|λ = M ′d|λ. Thus, (SPNI−C1 ),
(SPNI−C2 ), and (SPNI−C3 ) hold.
4. C is C1; C2
Consider a λ-dpiece:
pi = 〈C1; C2,M〉 ∗→ 〈Cd,Md〉. (A.39)
Assume
Γ, λκ ` C. (A.40)
We prove SPNI (λ, pi).
Consider also a λ-dpiece:
pi′ = 〈C1; C2,M′〉 ∗→ 〈C ′d,M′d〉. (A.41)
where
M =λM′, (A.42)
∀E ∈ ∆−Ĉ(λ, C): M(E) =M
′(E). (A.43)
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(SPNI−H1 ) holds due to (A.42), and (SPNI−H2 ) holds due to (A.43).
To prove SPNI (λ, pi), we must prove (SPNI−C1 ), (SPNI−C2 ), and
(SPNI−C3 ).
pi involves the execution of C1. Consider the λ-dpieces below:
pi1 = 〈C1,M〉 ∗→ 〈Cd1,Md1〉 (A.44)
and
pi′1 = 〈C1,M′〉 ∗→ 〈C ′d1,M′d1〉. (A.45)
Because C1 ∈ C, we can instantiate IH with:
Cˆ = C1,Mˆ =M, λˆ = λ, λˆκ = λκ, pˆi = pi1. (A.46)
We get
Γ, λκ ` C1 ⇒ SPNI (λ, pi1). (A.47)
From typing rule SEQ-T and (A.40), we have that Γ, λκ ` C1 holds. So, from
(A.47), we get that SPNI (λ, pi1) holds, too.
In the definition of SPNI , we instantiate pi with pi1 and pi′ with pi′1.
(SPNI−H1 ) holds because ∆−Ĉ(λ, C1; C2) = ∆
−
Ĉ(λ, C1) (by definition) and
(A.43) hold. (SPNI−H2 ) holds due to (A.42). Thus, we get:
pi1|λ = pi′1|λ, Cd1 = C ′d1, Md1|λ =M′d1|λ. (A.48)
For what follows, we write C = . . . C ′ to denote ∃M,M′: 〈C,M〉 ∗→ 〈C ′,M′〉.
Due to SEQ1, SEQ2, and because Cd is a downgrade or termination, Cd is either
• partial execution of C1 followed by C2:
Cd = C ′1; C2 and C1 = . . . C ′1, or
• C2, or
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• partial execution of C2 or termination:
C2 = . . . Cd or Cd = •.
We prove (SPNI−C1 ), (SPNI−C2 ), and (SPNI−C3 ), by examining the
above cases.
4.1. Cd is C ′1; C2 or C2.
So, pi involves the execution of only C1, and not C2. We distinguish two
cases based on the last command Cd1 of λ-dpieces pi1 and pi′1.
4.1.1. Cd1 6= •: So, while executing C1 in pi1, Cd1 is the first downgrade
that occurs. Thus, while executing C1 in pi, Cd1; C2 should be the
first downgrade that occurs. Similarly, while executing C1 in pi′,
Cd1′ ; C2 should be the first downgrade that occurs. From SEQ, and
using pi1, pi′1, we get: pi = 〈C1; C2,M〉 ∗→ 〈Cd1; C2,Md1〉, and
pi′ = 〈C1; C2,M′〉 ∗→ 〈Cd1′ ; C2,M′d1〉.
pi in instantiates pi in SPNI definition with
Cd = Cd1; C2, (A.49)
Md =Md1. (A.50)
pi′ instantiates pi′ in SPNI definition with
C ′d = Cd1′ ; C2, (A.51)
M′d =M′d1. (A.52)
(SPNI−C2 ) holds because from Cd1 = C ′d1 in (A.48), (A.49), and
(A.51), we have Cd = C ′d.
We now prove (SPNI−C3 ). From (A.48), we getMd1|λ = M′d1|λ.
From (A.50), we getMd|λ = Md1|λ. And thus, by transitivity, we
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have Md|λ = M′d1|λ. From (A.52), we get M′d|λ = M′d1|λ. And
thus, by transitivity, we haveMd|λ =M′d|λ.
We now prove (SPNI−C1 ). Pieces pi and pi1 generate the same
observations, so pi|λ = pi1|λ. From pi1|λ = pi′1|λ in (A.48), we then
get pi|λ = pi′1|λ. Pieces pi′ and pi′1 generate the same observations, so
pi′|λ = pi′1|λ. By transitivity, we get pi|λ = pi′|λ. Thus, (SPNI−C1 )
holds.
4.1.2. Cd1 = •: Due to (A.48), we also get C ′d1 = •. So, λ-dpieces pi1 (in
(A.44)) and pi′1 (in (A.45)) are:
pi1 = 〈C1,M〉 ∗→ 〈•,Md1〉 (A.53)
and
pi′1 = 〈C1,M′〉 ∗→ 〈•,M′d1〉. (A.54)
Because Cd1 = • (C ′d1 = •) holds, and because pi1 and pi′1 are λ-
dpieces, no downgrade occurs while executing C1 in pi1 and pi′1. So,
no downgrade occurs while executing C1 in pi and pi′. By assump-
tion 4.1., Cd is either C ′1; C2 or C2, and because no downgrade oc-
curs while executing C1 in pi and pi′, Cd (in (A.39)) and C ′d (in (A.41))
should be C2. Thus, (SPNI−C2 ) holds because Cd = C ′d = C2.
We now prove (SPNI−C3 ). From SEQ, and using pi1 in (A.53), pi′1
in in (A.54), pieces pi and pi′ are: pi = 〈C1; C2,M〉 ∗→ 〈C2,Md1〉, and
pi′ = 〈C1; C2,M′〉 ∗→ 〈C2,M′d1〉.
pi instantiates pi in SPNI definition with
Md =Md1. (A.55)
pi′ instantiates pi′ in SPNI definition with
M′d =M′d1. (A.56)
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We have:
Md|λ
=(A.55)
Md1|λ
=(A.48)
M′d1|λ
=(A.56)
M′d|λ.
So,Md|λ =M′d|λ and thus (SPNI−C3 ) holds.
We now prove (SPNI−C1 ). Pieces pi and pi1 generate the same
observations because both execute only C1, so pi|λ = pi1|λ. Similarly,
pieces pi′ and pi′1 generate the same observations, so pi′|λ = pi′1|λ.
From pi1|λ = pi′1|λ in (A.48), we then get pi|λ = pi′|λ.
4.2. For Cd (in (A.39)), either C2 = . . . Cd or Cd = • holds.
So, pi involves the execution of both C1 and some of C2. Because Cd is
not C ′1; C2 (where C1 = . . . C ′1), no downgrade occurs while executing C1.
Thus, λ-dpiece pi1 (in A.44) that involves the execution of only C1 should
end at a termination. So, Cd1 (in (A.44)) is •. From Cd1 = C ′d1 in (A.48), we
then get that C ′d1 (in (A.45)) is •. So, pi1 (in (A.44)) and pi′1 (in (A.44)) are:
pi1 = 〈C1,M〉 ∗→ 〈•,Md1〉, and
pi′1 = 〈C1,M′〉 ∗→ 〈•,M′d1〉.
Consider now pieces:
pi2 = 〈C2,Md1〉 ∗→ 〈Cd2,Md2〉, and
pi′2 = 〈C2,M′d1〉 ∗→ 〈C ′d2,M′d2〉.
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Because C2 ∈ C, we can instantiate IH with:
Cˆ = C2,Mˆ =Md1, λˆ = λ, λˆκ = λκ, pˆi = pi2. (A.57)
We get
Γ, λκ ` C2 ⇒ SPNI (λ, pi2). (A.58)
From typing rule SEQ-T and (A.40), we have that Γ, λκ ` C2 holds. So, from
(A.58), we get that SPNI (λ, pi2) holds, too. In the definition of SPNI , we
instantiate pi with pi2 and pi′ with pi′2. (SPNI−H1 ) holds due to (A.48).
We prove (SPNI−H2 ). Cd is not C2, and thus, no downgrade happens at
C2. So, by the definition of ∆−Ĉ(λ, C) we have ∆
−
Ĉ(λ, C2) = ∅.
Thus ∀E ∈ ∆−Ĉ(λ, C2): Md1(E) =M′d1(E). Thus, we get:
pi2|λ = pi′2|λ, Cd2 = C ′d2, Md2|λ =M′d2|λ. (A.59)
From SEQ, pi is constructed out of pi1 and pi2, and pi′ is constructed out of
pi′1 and pi′2:
pi = 〈C1; C2,M〉 ∗→ 〈C2,Md1〉 ∗→ 〈Cd2,Md2〉, and
pi′ = 〈C1; C2,M′〉 ∗→ 〈C2,M′d1〉 ∗→ 〈C ′d2,M′d2〉.
pi instantiates pi in SPNI definition with:
Cd = Cd2, (A.60)
Md =Md2. (A.61)
pi′ instantiates pi′ in SPNI definition with
C ′d = C ′d2, (A.62)
M′d =M′d2. (A.63)
From (A.60), (A.62) and (A.59), we get Cd = C ′d. So, (SPNI−C2 ) holds.
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We prove (SPNI−C3 ). We have:
Md|λ
=(A.61)
Md2|λ
=(A.59)
M′d2|λ
=(A.63)
M′d|λ.
So,Md|λ =M′d|λ. Thus, (SPNI−C3 ) holds.
We now prove (SPNI−C1 ). We have pi|λ = (pi1 → pi2)|λ and pi′|λ = (pi′1 →
pi′2)|λ. So, from pi1|λ = pi′1|λ in (A.48) and pi2|λ = pi′2|λ in (A.59), we then
have pi|λ = pi′|λ.
5. C is while [E ]¯f do Ct end.
Consider a λ-dpiece:
pi = 〈while [E ]¯f do Ct end,M〉 ∗→ 〈Cd,Md〉. (A.64)
Assume
Γ, λκ ` C. (A.65)
We prove SPNI (λ, pi).
Consider also a λ-dpiece:
pi′ = 〈while [E ]¯f do Ct end,M′〉 ∗→ 〈C ′d,M′d〉, (A.66)
where
M =λM′, (A.67)
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∀E ∈ ∆−Ĉ(λ, C): M(E) =M
′(E). (A.68)
(SPNI−H1 ) holds due to (A.67), and (SPNI−H2 ) holds due to (A.68).
To prove SPNI (λ, pi), we must prove (SPNI−C1 ), (SPNI−C2 ), and
(SPNI−C3 ).
We use induction on the maximum number of instantiations of rule LOOP1 for
C in pi, with the following induction hypothesis:
IHw: If pˆi , 〈while [E ]¯f do Ct end,Mˆ〉 ∗→ 〈Cˆd,Mˆd〉 involves strictly less
iterations than those involved in pi, then SPNI (λ, pˆi) holds.
Base case: pi involves no iteration.
So, pi executes only LOOP2.
5.1. Γ([E ]¯f) v λ and ∃x ∈ lhs(Ct): Γ(x) v `.
We first prove thatM([E ]¯f) =M′([E ]¯f) by considering the following two
cases.
5.1.1. ∆−Ĉ(λ, C) = ∅:
From the definition of ∆−Ĉ(λ, C), (5.1.1.), and (5.1.) we get Γ(E) v λ.
From (A.67), we then getM([E ]¯f) =M′([E ]¯f).
5.1.2. ∆−Ĉ(λ, C) = {E}:
From (A.68), we getM([E ]¯f) =M′([E ]¯f).
So, in all cases, we haveM([E ]¯f) = M′([E ]¯f), and thus, pi′ executes only
LOOP2. Then, pi and pi′ are:
pi = 〈while [E ]¯f do Ct end,M〉 → 〈•,M〉, and
pi′ = 〈while [E ]¯f do Ct end,M′〉 → 〈•,M′〉.
pi instantiates pi in SPNI definition with
Cd = •, (A.69)
Md =M. (A.70)
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pi′ instantiates pi′ in SPNI definition with
C ′d = •, (A.71)
M′d =M′. (A.72)
(SPNI−C2 ) holds because from (A.69) and (A.71), we get Cd = C ′d.
We prove (SPNI−C3 ). We have:
Md|λ
=(A.70)
M|λ
=(A.67)
M′|λ
=(A.72)
M′d|λ.
So,Md|λ =M′d|λ.
For (SPNI−C1 ), no observations are generated during pi and pi′, so pi|λ =
 and pi′|λ = , and thus pi|λ = pi′|λ.
5.2. Γ([E ]¯f) 6v λ or ∀x ∈ lhs(Ct): Γ(x) 6v λ:
We first prove that Γ([E ]¯f) 6v λ implies ∀x ∈ lhs(Ct): Γ(x) 6v λ. Assume
Γ([E ]¯f) 6v λ. From type rule LOOP-T, we get Γ, λκ unionsq Γ([E ]¯f) ` Ct. From
Γ([E ]¯f) v λκ unionsq Γ([E ]¯f) and Γ([E ]¯f) 6v λ, we get λκ unionsq Γ([E ]¯f) 6v λ. From
Lemma 5, we then get:
∀x ∈ lhs(Ct): Γ(x) 6v λ. (A.73)
Thus, we get (SPNI−C1 ), because pi|λ =  and pi′|λ = , and we get
(SPNI−C3 ), because Md|λ = M |λ, M ′d|λ = M ′|λ and (A.67). Also, during
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execution no downgrade to λ will happen, due to (A.73). Thus, we get
(SPNI−C2 ), because Cd = • and C ′d = •.
Induction case: pi involves the execution of at least one iteration.
So, pi executes at least one LOOP1.
5.1. Γ([E ]¯f) v λ and ∃x ∈ lhs(Ct): Γ(x) v λ:
Similar to (5.1.) of the base case, we haveM([E ]¯f) =M′([E ]¯f). Thus, both
pi and pi′ take LOOP1. Thus, bothM([E ]¯f) andM′([E ]¯f) evaluate to true.
Using rules BRCH and LOOP, we get that executing
C = while [E ]¯f do Ct end (A.74)
onM orM′ is equivalent to executing
Cf = if [E ]¯f then Ct else C0 end;while [E ]¯f do Ct end (A.75)
on M or M′, where C0 is a skip that is not executed (because M([E ]¯f)
andM′([E ]¯f) evaluate to true). This means that λ-dpieces of C onM and
M′ (i.e., pi and pi′) are the same with the λ-dpieces of Cf onM andM′t,
except for the first state.
Consider λ-dpieces for Cf :
pi∗ = 〈if [E ]¯f then Ct else C0 end;while [E ]¯f do Ct end,M〉 ∗→ 〈Cd,Md〉,
(A.76)
pi′∗ = 〈if [E ]¯f then Ct else C0 end;while [E ]¯f do Ct end,M′〉 ∗→ 〈C ′d,M′d〉,
(A.77)
Because C and Cf are equivalent onM andM′, we have
pi∗|λ = pi|λ , pi′∗|λ = pi′|λ. (A.78)
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pi∗ and pi′∗ first execute the if-statement.
Consider two λ-dpieces of that if-statement:
pi1 = 〈if [E ]¯f then Ct else C0 end,M〉 ∗→ 〈Cd1,Md1〉, (A.79)
pi′1 = 〈if [E ]¯f then Ct else C0 end,M′〉 ∗→ 〈C ′d1,M′d1〉. (A.80)
Due to case 2, SPNI (λ, pi1) holds. pi1 instantiates pi in SPNI definition.
pi′1 instantiates pi′ in SPNI definition. (SPNI −H1) holds due to (A.67).
(SPNI−H2) holds due to (A.68) and because
∆−Ĉ(λ, if [E ]¯f then Ct else C0 end) = ∆
−
Ĉ(λ,while [E ]¯f do Ct end). So,
we get:
pi1|λ = pi′1|λ, Cd1 = C ′d1, Md1|λ =M′d1|λ. (A.81)
5.1.1. Cd1 6= •:
From (A.81), we then have C ′d1 6= •. So, a downgrade occurs while
executing the if-statement. Thus, pi∗ and pi∗ does not reach the
while-statement. Instead, pi∗ and pi∗ execute only the steps that
are executed in pi1 and pi′1, correspondingly. So, pi∗ and pi∗ are con-
structed from pi1 and pi′1 by concatenating all commands with “; C”:
pi∗ = 〈if [E ]¯f then Ct else C0 end; C,M〉 ∗→ 〈Cd1; C,Md1〉, (A.82)
pi′∗ = 〈if [E ]¯f then Ct else C0 end; C,M′〉 ∗→ 〈C ′d1; C,M′d1〉. (A.83)
Also,
pi∗|λ = pi1|λ, pi′∗|λ = pi′1|λ. (A.84)
Because pi and pi′ are the same as pi∗ and pi′∗, except for the first
state, we have:
pi = 〈C,M〉 ∗→ 〈Cd1; C,Md1〉, (A.85)
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pi′ = 〈C,M′〉 ∗→ 〈C ′d1; C,M′d1〉. (A.86)
pi instantiates pi in SPNI definition with:
Cd = Cd1; C (A.87)
Md =Md1. (A.88)
pi′ instantiates pi′ in SPNI definition with:
C ′d = C ′d1; C (A.89)
M′d =M′d1. (A.90)
From Cd1 = C ′d1 in (A.81), from (A.87) and (A.89), we get Cd = C ′d.
Thus, (SPNI−C2) holds.
From Md1|λ = M′d1|λ in (A.81), from (A.88) and (A.90), we get
Md|λ =M′d|λ. Thus, (SPNI−C3) holds.
From (A.78), pi1|λ = pi′1|λ in (A.81), and (A.84), we get pi|λ = pi′|λ.
Thus, (SPNI−C1) holds.
5.1.2. Cd1 = •:
From (A.81), we then have C ′d1 = •. Consider suffixes of pi∗ (in
(A.76)) and pi′∗ (in (A.77)):
pi2 = 〈while [E ]¯f do Ct end,Md1〉 ∗→ 〈Cd,Md〉, (A.91)
pi′2 = 〈while [E ]¯f do Ct end,M′d1〉 ∗→ 〈C ′d,M′d〉. (A.92)
pi2 and pi′2 are λ-dpieces. Because pi2 involves strictly fewer it-
erations than those involved in pi, we can apply IHw to get
SPNI (λ, pi2). pi2 instantiates pi in SPNI definition. pi′2 instantiates pi′
in SPNI definition. (SPNI−H1) holds due to (A.81). (SPNI−H2)
holds due to (A.68). Thus, we get:
pi2|λ = pi′2|λ, Cd = C ′d, Md|λ =M′d|λ. (A.93)
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Thus (SPNI−C2) and (SPNI−C3) hold.
Observations in pi∗ are the observations in pi1 followed by the ob-
servations in pi2: pi∗|λ = (pi1 → pi2)|λ. Similarly, pi′∗|λ = (pi′1 → pi′2)|λ.
Because pi|λ = pi∗|λ = (pi1 → pi2)|λ and pi′|λ = pi∗|λ = (pi′1 → pi′2)|λ,
equations (A.81) and (A.93) imply pi|λ = pi′|λ. So, (SPNI −C1)
holds.
5.2. Γ([E ]¯f) 6v λ or ∀x ∈ lhs(Ct): Γ(x) 6v λ:
Similar to case 5.2. in Base case.
Lemma 3. If Γ, λκ ` C, then Γ, λκ ` T(λ, C).
Proof. By structural induction on C.
Lemma 4. If Γ, λκ ` C and 〈C,M〉 ∗→ 〈C ′,M′〉 and C ′ 6= •, then Γ, λκ ` C ′.
Proof. Assume Γ, λκ ` C. We use structural induction on C.
IH: If Cˆ ∈ C and Γ, λκ ` Cˆ and 〈Cˆ,Mˆ〉 ∗→ 〈Cˆ ′,Mˆ′〉 and C ′ 6= •, then Γ, λκ ` Cˆ ′.
1. C is skip
Trivially true, because C ′ = •.
2. C is x := [E ]¯f
Trivially true, because C ′ = •.
3. C is if [E ]¯f then Ct else Ce end
From typing rule BRCH-T and Γ, λκ ` C, we have
Γ, λκ unionsq Γ([E ]¯f) ` Ct and Γ, λκ unionsq Γ([E ]¯f) ` Ce.
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From Lemma 6, we then get:
Γ, λκ ` Ct and Γ, λκ ` Ce. (A.94)
From BRCH1 and BRCH2, we have C ′ = Ct, or C ′ = Ce, or 〈Ct,Mt〉 ∗→ 〈C ′,M′〉, or
〈Ce,Me〉 ∗→ 〈C ′,M′〉.
3.1. C ′ = Ct or C ′ = Ce:
From (A.94), we get Γ, λκ ` C ′.
3.2. 〈Ct,Mt〉 ∗→ 〈C ′,M′〉 or 〈Ce,Me〉 ∗→ 〈C ′,M′〉:
Assume 〈Ci,Mi〉 ∗→ 〈C ′,M′〉, where Ci is Ct or Ce. We instantiate IH with
Cˆ = Ci. Because Ci ∈ C, (A.94) holds, and 〈Ci,Mi〉 ∗→ 〈C ′,M′〉 (hypothesis
of this subcase), we get Γ, λκ ` C ′.
4. C is C1; C2
From typing rule SEQ-T and Γ, λκ ` C, we have
Γ, λκ ` C1 and Γ, λκ ` C2. (A.95)
From SEQ1 and SEQ2, and because 〈C,M〉 ∗→ 〈C ′,M′〉, we have:
• C ′ is partial execution of C1, followed by C2:
〈C1,M〉 ∗→ 〈C ′′,M′〉 and C ′ = C ′′; C2, or
• C ′ is C2, or
• C ′ is partial execution of C2:
〈C2,M2〉 ∗→ 〈C ′,M′〉.
We examine these cases here:
4.1. 〈C1,M〉 ∗→ 〈C ′′,M′〉 and C ′ = C ′′; C2:
We instantiate IH with Cˆ = C1. From C1 ∈ C, (A.95), and 〈C1,M〉 ∗→
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〈C ′′,M′〉 (hypothesis of this subcase), we get Γ, λκ ` C ′′. From (A.95),
C ′ = C ′′; C2, and type rule SEQ-T, we then have Γ, λκ ` C ′.
4.2. C ′ = C2:
From (A.95) we get Γ, λκ ` C ′.
4.3. 〈C2,M2〉 ∗→ 〈C ′,M′〉:
We instantiate IH with Cˆ = C2. From C2 ∈ C, (A.95), and 〈C2,M2〉 ∗→
〈C ′,M′〉 (hypothesis of this subcase), we get Γ, λκ ` C ′.
5. C is while [E ]¯f do Ct end
From Lemma typing rule LOOP-T and Γ, λκ ` C, we have
Γ, λκ unionsq Γ([E ]¯f) ` Ct.
From Lemma 6, we then get:
Γ, λκ ` Ct. (A.96)
From LOOP1, and because 〈C,M〉 ∗→ 〈C ′,M′〉, we have:
• C ′ = Ct;while [E ]¯f do Ct end, or
• C ′ is partial execution of Ct followed by the loop:
〈Ct,M〉 ∗→ 〈C ′′,M′〉 and C ′ is C ′′;while [E ]¯f do Ct end, or
• C ′ = while [E ]¯f do Ct end
We examine these cases here:
5.1. C ′ = Ct;while [E ]¯f do Ct end:
From (A.96), Γ, λκ ` C, and type rule SEQ-T, we get Γ, λκ ` C ′.
5.2. 〈Ct,M〉 ∗→ 〈C ′′,M′〉 and C ′ = C ′′;while [E ]¯f do Ct end:
We instantiate IH with Cˆ = Ct. From Ct ∈ C, (A.96), and 〈Ct,M〉 ∗→
〈C ′′,M′〉 (hypothesis of this subcase), we get Γ, λκ ` C ′′. From Γ, λκ ` C,
and type rule SEQ-T, we get Γ, λκ ` C ′.
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5.3. C ′ = while [E ]¯f do Ct end:
From Γ, λκ ` C, we get Γ, λκ ` C ′.
Lemma 5. If Γ, λκ ` C and λκ 6v λ, then ∀y ∈ lhs(C): Γ(y) 6v λ.
Proof. Assume Γ, λκ ` C and λκ 6v λ.
We prove ∀y ∈ lhs(C): Γ(y) 6v λ by structural induction on C.
IH: If Cˆ ∈ C and Γ, λˆκ ` Cˆ and λˆκ 6v λ, then ∀y ∈ lhs(Cˆ): Γ(y) 6v λ.
1. C is skip:
Trivially true, because lhs(C) = ∅.
2. C is x := [E ]¯f :
Here, lhs(C) = {x}. We prove that Γ(x) 6v λ. From ASGN-T, we get λκ v Γ(x).
From λκ 6v λ, we then get Γ(x) 6v λ.
3. C is if [E ]¯f then Ct else Ce end:
We have lhs(C) = lhs(Ct) ∪ lhs(Ct). From BRCH we get Γ, λκ unionsq Γ([E ]¯f) ` Ct and
Γ, λκunionsqΓ([E ]¯f) ` Ce. From λκ v λκunionsqΓ([E ]¯f) and λκ 6v λ, we get λκunionsqΓ([E ]¯f) 6v λ.
And because Ct, Ce ∈ C, we apply IH on Ct and Ce: we instantiate Cˆ with Ct or
Ce and λˆκ with λκunionsqΓ([E ]¯f). So, ∀y ∈ lhs(Ct): Γ(y) 6v λ and ∀y ∈ lhs(Ce): Γ(y) 6v
λ. Thus, ∀y ∈ lhs(C): Γ(y) 6v λ.
4. C is while [E ]¯f do Ct end:
Similar to the above case.
5. C is C1; C2:
Similar to the above case.
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Lemma 6. If Γ, λκ ` C and λ′κ v λκ, then Γ, λ′κ ` C.
Proof. By structural induction on C.
A.2 Completeness of vRA and unionsqRA for RIF automata
Proposition 1. Consider algorithm rstr , which takes as input two RIF automata λ1 =
〈Q1,F , δ1, q1, r1〉, λ2 = 〈Q2,F , δ2, q2, r2〉, and a sequence visited of pairs of automata
states:
rstr(λ1, λ2, visited) ,
1. if (〈q1, q2〉 ∈ visited) then return true.
2. if r1(q1) 6vR r2(q2) then return false.
3. visited ′ := visited ∪ {〈q1, q2〉}
4. return (∀f ∈ F : rstr(TRA(λ1, f), TRA(λ2, f), visited ′))
Then, rstr(λ1, λ2, ) holds iff λ1 vRA λ2 holds.
Proof.
1. Soundness
Assume rstr(λ1, λ2, ) holds. (h1)
We prove that λ1 vRA λ2 holds. So, we prove that
∀F : RRA(TRA(λ1,F )) vR RRA(TRA(λ2,F )).
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Fix F . We should prove thatRRA(TRA(λ1,F )) vR RRA(TRA(λ2,F )).
Assume, for contradiction, thatRRA(TRA(λ1,F )) 6vR RRA(TRA(λ2,F )). (h2)
Due to Lemma 7 and (h1), rstr(TRA(λ1,F ), TRA(λ2,F ), visited) must have been
called. If step 1 of executing rstr(TRA(λ1,F ), TRA(λ2,F ), visited) holds, then
there must have been a previous call rstr(TRA(λ1,F ), TRA(λ2,F ), visited ′),
such that step 1 does not hold.
So, consider a call rstr(TRA(λ1,F ), TRA(λ2,F ), visited) where step 1 does
not hold. From (h2) we get that step 2 returns false. So,
rstr(TRA(λ1,F ), TRA(λ2,F ), visited) does not hold, and thus rstr(λ1, λ2, ) does
not hold, which contradicts (h1). So, we proved that RRA(TRA(λ1,F )) vR
RRA(TRA(λ2,F )) holds.
2. Completeness
Assume λ1 vRA λ2 holds. (h3)
We should prove that rstr(λ1, λ2, ) holds. Assume for contradic-
tion that rstr(λ1, λ2, ) does not hold. So, there is an F such that
rstr(TRA(λ1,F ), TRA(λ2,F ), visited) does not hold. So, when executing
rstr(TRA(λ1,F ), TRA(λ2,F ), visited), step 2 must have returned false. This
means thatRRA(TRA(λ1,F )) 6vR RRA(TRA(λ2,F )), which contradicts (h3). So,
we proved that rstr(λ1, λ2, ) holds.
Lemma 7. If rstr(λ1, λ2, ) holds, then for every sequence F there exists a recursive call
of rstr with the first two arguments being equal to TRA(λ1,F) and TRA(λ2,F).
Proof. Assume rstr(λ1, λ2, ) holds (h1).
Fix an F ′.
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We prove that, when rstr(λ1, λ2, ) is executed, rstr(TRA(λ1,F ′), TRA(λ2,F ′), visited)
is called, for some visited . We use induction on the length of F ′, with induction
hypothesis:
IH : If |F | < |F ′|, and if rstr(λ1, λ2, ) is executed,
then rstr(TRA(λ1,F ), TRA(λ2,F ), visited) is called.
Assume rstr(λ1, λ2, ) is executed. If F ′ = , then rstr(TRA(λ1,F ), TRA(λ2,F ), visited)
is rstr(λ1, λ2, ).
Now, assume that F ′ = F f. By IH, we get that rstr(TRA(λ1,F ), TRA(λ2,F ), visited)
has been called. We prove that rstr(TRA(λ1,F f), TRA(λ2,F f), visited ′) has been
called, too. Consider the execution of rstr(TRA(λ1,F ), TRA(λ2,F ), visited), and
assume TRA(λ1,F ) = 〈Q1,F , δ1, q1, r1〉 and TRA(λ2,F ) = 〈Q2,F , δ2, q2, r2〉
1. Assume step 1 does not return false.
Due to (h1), step 2 does not return false, either. So, step 4 is executed. For
f ∈ Σ, we have that rstr(TRA(λ1,F f), TRA(λ2,F f), visited ′) is called.
2. Assume step 1 returns false.
Then, there must have been a previous call rstr(λ′1, λ′2, visited
′), such
that steps 3 and 4 are executed, where λ′1 = 〈Q′1,F ′, δ′1, q′1, r′1〉, λ′2 =
〈Q′2,F ′, δ′2, q′2, r′2〉, and q′1 = q1 and q′2 = q2. By the definition of rstr and TRA,
we get:
Q′1 = Q1, Σ′ = Σ, δ′1 = δ1, Prins
′
1 = Prins1,
Q′2 = Q2, δ′2 = δ2, Prins
′
2 = Prins2.
So, λ′1 = TRA(λ1,F ) and λ′2 = TRA(λ2,F ). Thus, when step 4
in call rstr(λ′1, λ′2, visited
′) is executed we have, for f ∈ F , that
rstr(TRA(λ1,F f), TRA(λ2,F f), visited ′′) is called.
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Proposition 2. λ unionsqRA λ′ is the least upper bound of λ and λ′.
Proof. We first prove that λ vRA λ unionsqRA λ′ and λ′ vRA λ unionsqRA λ′.
W.l.o.g., we prove λ vRA λ unionsqRA λ′.
So, we should prove
∀F : RRA(TRA(λ,F )) vR RRA(TRA(λ unionsqRA λ′,F )).
Fix an F .
We proveRRA(TRA(λ,F )) vR RRA(TRA(λ unionsqRA λ′,F )).
By definition of unionsqRA, we have that the current state of TRA(λ unionsqRA λ′,F ) is 〈q, q′〉,
where q is the current state of TRA(λ,F ), and q′ is the current state of TRA(λ′,F ).
So,
RRA(TRA(λ unionsqRA λ′,F )) = RRA(TRA(λ,F )) unionsqR RRA(TRA(λ′,F )). (A.97)
Thus,RRA(TRA(λ,F )) vR RRA(TRA(λ unionsqRA λ′,F )).
Now, we prove that if λ vRA λ′′ and λ′ vRA λ′′, then λ′′ 6@RA λ unionsqRA λ′.
Assume for contradiction that λ′′ @RA λ unionsqRA λ′.
So, there is an F such thatRRA(TRA(λ′′,F )) @R RRA(TRA(λ unionsqRA λ′,F )).
From (A.97), we then have
RRA(TRA(λ′′,F )) @R RRA(TRA(λ,F )) unionsqR RRA(TRA(λ′,F )). (A.98)
From λ vRA λ′′ and λ′ vRA λ′′, we have RRA(TRA(λ,F )) vR RRA(TRA(λ′′,F ))
andRRA(TRA(λ′,F )) vR RRA(TRA(λ′′,F )).
So, RRA(TRA(λ,F )) unionsqR RRA(TRA(λ′,F )) vR RRA(TRA(λ′′,F )), which contradicts
(A.98).
So, we proved that λ′′ 6@RA λ unionsqRA λ′.
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A.3 Completeness of vκ and unionsqκ for κ-labels
We first prove completeness of vκ for κ-atoms that are singleton sets. For
brevity, we write 〈F , B〉 instead of {〈F , B〉}.
Proposition 3.
Rκ(Tκ(〈F2, B2〉,Fc2)) ⊇ Rκ(Tκ(〈F1, B1〉,Fc2))
⇔
∀F: Rκ(Tκ(〈F2, B2〉,F)) ⊇ Rκ(Tκ(〈F1, B1〉,F))
Proof.
1. ⇒
Assume the following holds:
Rκ(Tκ(〈F 2, B2〉,F c2)) ⊇ Rκ(Tκ(〈F 1, B1〉,F c2)). (A.99)
We prove that:
∀F : Rκ(Tκ(〈F 2, B2〉,F )) ⊇ Rκ(Tκ(〈F 1, B1〉,F )).
Fix F . We prove Rκ(Tκ(〈F 2, B2〉,F )) ⊇ Rκ(Tκ(〈F 1, B1〉,F )). By definition of
Tκ and (4.11), it suffices to prove
Rκ(〈LF 2F M, B2〉) ⊇ Rκ(〈LF 1F M, B1〉). (A.100)
1.1. Assume F 2 is not fully complementable.
By definition of 〈F 2, B2〉 we have that F 2 is reduced. Lemma 11 then
givesRκ(〈LF 2F M, B2〉) = P. So, (A.100) holds.
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1.2. Assume instead that F 2 is fully complementable.
By definition of Tκ and (4.11), (A.99) becomes
Rκ(〈LF 2F c2M, B2〉) ⊇ Rκ(〈LF 1F c2M, B1〉)
Because LF 2F c2M = , we then have
Rκ(〈, B2〉) ⊇ Rκ(〈LF 1F c2M, B1〉) (A.101)
From (A.101), Lemma 9, and (4.11), we get
Rκ(〈LF 2F M, B2〉) ⊇ Rκ(〈LF 1F c2F 2F M, B1〉) (A.102)
From Lemma 8, we get
Rκ(〈LF 1F c2F 2F M, B1〉) ⊇ Rκ(〈LF 1F M, B1〉) (A.103)
By transitivity on (A.102) and (A.103), we get (A.100).
2. ⇐
Assume the following holds:
∀F : Rκ(Tκ(〈F 2, B2〉,F )) ⊇ Rκ(Tκ(〈F 1, B1〉,F )). (A.104)
We prove that the algorithm decides that 〈F 2, B2〉 vκ 〈F 1, B1〉 holds. Let F be
F c2. From (A.104), we have Rκ(Tκ(〈F 2, B2〉,F c2)) ⊇ Rκ(Tκ(〈F 1, B1〉,F c2)). So,
the algorithm decides that 〈F 2, B2〉 vκ 〈F 1, B1〉 holds.
For the following proof we define F to be a subcollection of F ′ iff:
f ∈ F ⇒ f ∈ F ′
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Lemma 8. Rκ(〈LF2Fc1F1FM,B〉) ⊇ Rκ(〈LF2FM,B〉 if F1 is fully complementable.
Proof. Assume F 1 is fully complementable. We first prove that LF 2F M is a sub-
collection of LF 2F c1F 1F M. We use induction on |F 1|, with induction hypothesis:
IH: If F i is fully complementable and |F i| < |F 1|, then for all F a,F b,
LF aF bM is a subcollection of LF aF ciF iF bM.
1. |F 1| = 0.
So, F 1 = . We have LF 2F c1F 1F M = LF 2cF M = LF 2F M = LF 2F M.
2. |F 1| = 1.
So F 1 = f. From (4.11), we have:
LF 2F M = LLF 2MLF MM = LF 2rF rM (A.105)
and
LF 2fcfF M = LLF 2MfcfLF MM = LF 2rfcfF rM (A.106)
It suffices to prove that LF 2rF rM is a subcollection of LF 2rfcfF rM.
2.1. (fc)c exists.
So, (fc)c = f. From (4.11), we then have LF 2rF rM = LF 2rfcfF rM.
2.2. F 2r = F ′2rf
Using (4.11), we then have
LF 2rfcfF rM = LF ′2rffcfF rM = LF ′2rfF rM = LF 2rF rM (A.107)
2.3. F r = fcF ′r
Using (4.11), we then have
LF 2rfcfF rM = LF 2rfcffcF ′rM = LF 2rfcF ′rM = LF 2rF rM (A.108)
163
2.4. (fc)c does not exist, F 2r 6= F ′2rf, and F r 6= fcF ′r
By definition (4.10) of reduction we have that LF 2rfcfF rM = F 2rfcfF r.
Also LF 2rF rM is a subcollection of F 2rF r. Because F 2rF r is a subcollec-
tion of F 2rfcfF r, we then get by transitivity that F 2rF r is a subcollection
of LF 2rfcfF rM, too.
3. |F 1| > 1
Let F 1 = F 1hF 1t. From (4.20) and because F 1 is fully complementable, we
then have LF 2F c1F 1F M = LF 2F c1tF c1hF 1hF 1tF M. Applying IH with F i = F 1h,
F a = F 2F c1t, and F b = F 1tF , we have that LF 2F c1tF 1tF M is a subcollection ofLF 2F c1tF c1hF 1hF 1tF M. Applying IH with F i = F 1t, F a = F 2, and F b = F , we
have that LF 2F M is a subcollection of LF 2F c1tF 1tF M. So, by transitivity, LF 2F M
is a subcollection of LF 2F c1F 1F M.
So, LF 2F M is a subcollection of LF 2F c1F 1F M. From Lemma 10 we then have:⋃
f∈LF2F c1F1F MX (f) ⊇ ⋃f∈LF2F MX (f). So, ⋃f∈LF2F c1F1F MX (f) ∪ B ⊇ ⋃f∈LF2F MX (f) ∪ B.
Thus,Rκ(〈LF 2F c1F 1F M,B〉) ⊇ Rκ(〈LF 2F M,B〉.
Lemma 9. Rκ(〈, B2〉) ⊇ Rκ(〈F1, B1〉) ⇒ ∀F: Rκ(〈LFM, B2〉) ⊇ Rκ(〈LF1FM, B1〉)
Proof. Assume
Rκ(〈, B2〉) ⊇ Rκ(〈F 1, B1〉). (A.109)
Fix F . We proveRκ(〈LF M, B2〉) ⊇ Rκ(〈LF 1F M, B1〉).
Let q 6∈ Rκ(〈LF M, B2〉). We prove
q 6∈ Rκ(〈LF 1F M, B1〉). (A.110)
From q 6∈ Rκ(〈LF M, B2〉), we get q 6∈ B2 ∪ ⋃f∈LF MX (f). So, q 6∈ B2 and q 6∈⋃
f∈LF MX (f). Thus, q 6∈ Rκ(〈, B2〉) and q 6∈ ⋃f∈LF MX (f). From (A.109), we then
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get q 6∈ Rκ(〈F 1, B1〉) and q 6∈
⋃
f∈LF MX (f). So, q 6∈ Rκ(〈F 1, B1〉) ∪ ⋃f∈LF MX (f),
which gives q 6∈ B1 ∪
⋃
f∈F1 X (f) ∪
⋃
f∈LF MX (f). Thus,
q 6∈ (B1 ∪
⋃
f∈F1LF M
X (f)). (A.111)
We have that LF 1F M is a subcollection of F 1LF M. From (A.111) and Lemma
10 we then get that q 6∈ (B1 ∪
⋃
f∈LF1F MX (f)). So, q 6∈ Rκ(〈LF 1F M, B1〉), which is
(A.110).
Lemma 10. If F′ is a subcollection of F, then
⋃
f∈FX (f) ⊇
⋃
f∈F′ X (f)
Proof. Assume p ∈ ⋃f∈F ′ X (f). Then p ∈ X (f) for some f ∈ F ′. Because F ′
is a subcollection of F , we then have f ∈ F . So, p ∈ X (f) for f ∈ F . Thus,
p ∈ ⋃f∈F X (f). So,⋃f∈F X (f) ⊇ ⋃f∈F ′ X (f).
Lemma 11. If F′ is reduced and not fully complementable, then
∀F: Rκ(〈LF′FM, B〉) = P.
Proof. Assume F ′ is reduced and not fully complementable. Then, there is fu in
F ′ such that fcu does not exist. Fix F . We proveRκ(〈LF ′F M, B〉) = P.
We first prove that fu ∈ LF ′F M, by induction on |F |, with induction hypothe-
sis IH.
IH: If |F i| < |F |, then fu ∈ LF ′F iM.
1. |F | = 0.
So, F = . We have LF ′F M = LF ′M = LF ′M = F ′. So, fu ∈ LF ′F M.
2. |F | > 0.
So, F = F ′′f. We prove fu ∈ LF ′F M.
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We have LF ′F M = LF ′F ′′fM. From (4.11), we have LF ′F ′′fM = LLF ′F ′′MfM. So, by
transitivity, we have
LF ′F M = LLF ′F ′′MfM. (A.112)
By IH on F ′′, we have that fu ∈ LF ′F ′′M, and thus, LF ′F ′′M 6= .
2.1. LF ′F ′′M = F afa and f 6= fca.
Then LLF ′F ′′MfM = LF ′F ′′Mf. Because fu ∈ LF ′F ′′M, we get fu ∈ LLF ′F ′′MfM.
From (A.112), we then get fu ∈ LF ′F M.
2.2. LF ′F ′′M = F afa and f = fca.
Then fa 6= fu, because fu does not have a complement, while fa has a
complement, namely f. Because fu ∈ LF ′F ′′M and fa 6= fu, we then get
fu ∈ F a.
We have LLF ′F ′′MfM = LF afafM = LF aM = F a, because F a is by assumption
reduced.
Because fu ∈ F a, we then get fu ∈ LLF ′F ′′MfM. From (A.112), we then get
fu ∈ LF ′F M.
Thus, fu ∈ LF ′,F M.
We now prove Rκ(〈LF ′F M, B〉) = P. By definition of Rκ, we have
Rκ(〈LF ′F M, B〉) = B ∪ ⋃f∈LF ′F MX (f). Because fu ∈ LF ′F M, we then have:
Rκ(〈LF ′F M, B〉) ⊇ X (fu). Because fu does not have a complement, we get that
X (fu) = ∅. So, X (fu) = P. Thus, Rκ(〈LF ′F M, B〉) ⊇ P. So, Rκ(〈LF ′F M, B〉) =
P.
Proposition 4. The decision algorithm for λ2 vκ λ1 is sound with respect to (4.19),
but not complete. The decision algorithm for λ2 vκ λ1 is complete with respect to (4.19)
when λ1 is a singleton set.
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Proof. First we prove that the algorithm for λ2 vκ λ1 is sound with respect to
(4.19). Assume the algorithm decides that λ2 vκ λ1 holds. So, the following
holds:
∀〈F 1,B1〉∈λ1, 〈F 2,B2〉∈λ2:
Rκ(Tκ(〈F 2,B2〉,F c2)) ⊇ Rκ(Tκ(〈F 1,B1〉,F c2))
(A.113)
We prove ∀F : Rκ(Tκ(λ2,F )) ⊇ Rκ(Tκ(λ1,F )), which is the right-hand side of
(4.19).
Fix F . We prove Rκ(Tκ(λ2,F )) ⊇ Rκ(Tκ(λ1,F )). From (A.113) and Proposi-
tion 3, we get:
∀〈F 1, B1〉 ∈ λ1, 〈F 2, B2〉 ∈ λ2:
Rκ(Tκ(〈F 2, B2〉,F )) ⊇ Rκ(Tκ(〈F 1, B1〉,F ))
(A.114)
We haveRκ(Tκ(λ1,F )) =
⋂
〈F1,B1〉∈λ1Rκ(Tκ(〈F 1, B1〉,F )).
Similarly,Rκ(Tκ(λ2,F )) =
⋂
〈F2,B2〉∈λ2Rκ(Tκ(〈F 2, B2〉,F )).
Assume p ∈ Rκ(Tκ(λ1,F )). We prove p ∈ Rκ(Tκ(λ2,F )).
From p ∈ Rκ(Tκ(λ1,F )), we get ∀〈F 1, B1〉∈λ1: p∈Rκ(Tκ(〈F 1, B1〉,F )). From
(A.114), we then get ∀〈F 2, B2〉∈λ2: p∈Rκ(Tκ(〈F 2, B2〉,F )). So, p ∈ Rκ(Tκ(λ2,F )).
Now, we prove that the algorithm for λ2 vκ λ1 is not complete. Let λ1 =
{〈, Ba〉, 〈, Bb〉} and λ2 = {〈, B′a〉, 〈, B′b〉}. Assume Ba = ∅, Bb = {p}, B′a = {p},
and B′b = ∅. We have: Rκ(Tκ(λ1,F )) = X (F ) ∪ Ba ∩ Bb and Rκ(Tκ(λ2,F )) =
X (F ) ∪ B′a ∩ B′b. So, (4.19) holds. But Rκ(〈, Bb〉) = {p} and Rκ(〈, B′b〉) = ∅. So,
Rκ(〈, B′b〉) 6⊇ Rκ(〈, Bb〉). Thus, the algorithm decides that λ2 vκ λ1 does not
hold.
Now, we prove that the decision algorithm for λ2 vκ λ1 is complete with
respect to (4.19) when λ1 is a singleton set. Assume λ1 = {〈F 1, B1〉}. Assume
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the right-hand side of (4.19) holds:
∀F : Rκ(Tκ(λ2,F )) ⊇ Rκ(Tκ(λ1,F )) (A.115)
We prove that the algorithm decides that λ2 vκ λ1 holds. So, we prove
∀〈F 2, B2〉 ∈ λ2: Rκ(Tκ(〈F 2,B2〉,F c2)) ⊇ Rκ(Tκ(〈F 1,B1〉,F c2)).
Assume, for contradiction, that
∃〈F 2, B2〉 ∈ λ2: Rκ(Tκ(〈F 2,B2〉,F c2)) 6⊇ Rκ(Tκ(〈F 1,B1〉,F c2)).
We have Rκ(Tκ(λ2,F c2)) =
⋂
〈F2,B2〉∈λ2Rκ(Tκ(〈F 2, B2〉,F c2)). From (A.115), we
have
⋂
〈F2,B2〉∈λ2Rκ(Tκ(〈F 2, B2〉,F c2)) ⊇ Rκ(Tκ(λ1,F c2)).
So,Rκ(Tκ(〈F 2, B2〉,F c2)) ⊇ Rκ(Tκ(λ1,F c2)).
ThusRκ(Tκ(〈F 2, B2〉,F c2)) ⊇ Rκ(Tκ(〈F 1, B1〉,F c2)), which is a contradiction.
Proposition 5. λ unionsqκ λ′ is the least upper bound of λ and λ′.
Proof. First we prove that λ vκ λ unionsqκ λ′ and λ′ vκ λ unionsqκ λ′.
Fix F .
We have:
Rκ(Tκ(λ unionsqκ λ′,F )) = Rκ(Tκ(λ ∪ λ′,F ))
=
⋂
〈F ′,B′〉∈λ∪λ′
R̂κ(Tκ(〈F ′, B′〉,F ))
=
⋂
〈F ′,B′〉∈λ
R̂κ(Tκ(〈F ′, B′〉,F )) ∩
⋂
〈F ′,B′〉∈λ′
R̂κ(Tκ(〈F ′, B′〉,F ))
= Rκ(Tκ(λ,F )) ∩Rκ(Tκ(λ′,F ))
Thus
Rκ(Tκ(λ unionsqκ λ′,F )) = Rκ(Tκ(λ,F )) ∩Rκ(Tκ(λ′,F )) (A.116)
So,Rκ(Tκ(λ,F )) ⊇ Rκ(Tκ(λ unionsqκ λ′,F )) andRκ(Tκ(λ′,F )) ⊇ Rκ(Tκ(λ unionsqκ λ′,F )).
So, λ vκ λ unionsqκ λ′ and λ′ vκ λ unionsqκ λ′.
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Now, we prove that if λ vκ λ′′ and λ′ vκ λ′′, then λ′′ 6@κ λ unionsqκ λ′. As-
sume for contradiction that λ′′ @κ λ unionsqκ λ′. So, there is an F such that we have
Rκ(Tκ(λ′′,F )) ⊃ Rκ(Tκ(λ unionsqκ λ′,F )). From (A.116), we then have
Rκ(Tκ(λ′′,F )) ⊃ Rκ(Tκ(λ,F )) ∩Rκ(Tκ(λ′,F )). (A.117)
From λ vκ λ′′ and λ′ vκ λ′′, we have Rκ(Tκ(λ,F )) ⊇ Rκ(Tκ(λ′′,F )) and
Rκ(Tκ(λ′,F )) ⊇ Rκ(Tκ(λ′′,F )). So,Rκ(Tκ(λ′′,F )) ⊆ Rκ(Tκ(λ,F ))∩Rκ(Tκ(λ′,F )),
which contradicts (A.117). So, we proved that λ′′ 6@κ λ unionsqκ λ′.
To prove that (4.11) holds, we introduce the folowing definitions:
• F i F ′ iff F [i+ 1] = F [i]c ∧ F ′ = F [1..i− 1]F [i+ 2..].
• F  F ′ iff
∃i: 1 ≤ i < |F |: (∀j: 1 ≤ j < i: F [j + 1] 6= F [j]c)
∧ F i F ′
Define F ∗ F ′′ iff F  F ′ . . . F ′′.
Notice that is a deterministic function.
• We denote with G a sequence of reclassifiers that is reduced.
Notice that if F ∗ G, then LF M = G.
Lemma 12. F ∗ G ∧ F i F ′ ∗ G′ ⇒ G = G′
Proof. By definition of F i F ′, we have that 1 ≤ i < |F |, F [i + 1] = F [i]c, and
F ′ = F [1..i− 1]F [i+ 2..]. Let F 1 = F [1..i− 1] and F 2 = F [i+ 2..]. So, we have:
F = F 1F [i..] and F ′ = F 1F 2. (A.118)
We examine two cases based on the value of i.
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1. i = 1
So, we have that hypothesis F [i + 1] = F [i]c becomes F [2] = F [1]c, and hy-
pothesis F i F ′ ∗ G′ becomes F 1 F ′ ∗ G′. By definition of  and
because F [2] = F [1]c, we have that F 1 F ′ ∗ G′ implies F  F ′ ∗ G′. By
definition of F ∗ G and because is deterministic we then get G = G′.
2. 1 < i < |F |
Due to (A.118), hypothesis F ∗ G becomes
F 1F [i..]
∗
G (A.119)
and hypothesis F i F ′ ∗ G′ becomes
F 1F [i..]
i F 1F 2
∗
G′. (A.120)
So, given (A.119) and (A.120), we prove G = G′.
F 1 is either reduced or not reduced. So, there exists a reduced sequence G1
such that either G1 = F 1 or F 1
∗
G1. For sequence F 1F [i..], we then get
that either F 1F [i..] = G1F [i..] (due to G1 = F 1) or F 1F [i..]
∗
G1F [i..] (due to
F 1
∗
G1). From (A.119) and because G1F [i..] is not reduced (since F [i+ 1] =
F [i]c), we then get for both cases that the following holds:
G1F [i..]
∗
G (A.121)
Also, for sequence F 1F 2, we then get that either F 1F 2 = G1F 2 (due to G1 =
F 1) or F 1F 2
∗
G1F 2 (due to F 1
∗
G1). We examine these two cases.
• F 1F 2 = G1F 2
From F 1F 2
∗
G′ in (A.120), we then get G1F 2
∗
G′.
• F 1F 2 ∗ G1F 2
We examine two cases based on G1F 2.
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– G1F 2 is reduced.
From F 1F 2
∗
G′ in (A.120) and F 1F 2
∗
G1F 2, we then get that
G′ = G1F 2.
– G1F 2 is not reduced.
From F 1F 2
∗
G′ in (A.120) and F 1F 2
∗
G1F 2, we then have
G1F 2
∗
G′.
So, we have that
either G1F 2
∗
G′ or G′ = G1F 2. (A.122)
To show G = G′, it suffices to use (A.121), (A.122), and prove that G1F [i..]
∗
G1F 2 holds. So, we first show that (A.121), (A.122), and G1F [i..]
∗
G1F 2
imply G = G′; we then prove G1F [i..]
∗
G1F 2. We examine two cases.
• G1F 2 is reduced.
From G1F [i..]
∗
G1F 2 and (A.121), we then get that G = G1F 2. From
(A.122) and because G1F 2 is reduced, we get that G′ = G1F 2 holds. By
transitivity, we then get G = G′.
• G1F 2 is not reduced.
From G1F [i..]
∗
G1F 2 and (A.121), we then get G1F [i..]
∗
G1F 2
∗
G.
From (A.122) and because G1F 2 is not reduced, we get that G1F 2
∗
G′
holds. Because is deterministic, we then get G = G′.
So, in both cases we have G = G′.
We now prove G1F [i..]
∗
G1F 2 by examining the cases below.
2.1. G1 =  or G1 = G′1f and F [i] 6= fc.
Because F [i+ 1] = F [i]c, we then have G1F [i..] G1F 2.
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2.2. G1 = G′1f and F [i] = f
c.
So, we haveG1F [i..] G′1F [i+1..]. Because F [i] = fc and F [i+1] = F [i]c,
we get F [i + 1] = f. So, G′1F [i + 1..] = G′1F [i + 1]F 2 = G1F 2. Thus
G1F [i..] G1F 2.
Proposition 6. LF1FF2M = LF1LFMF2M
Proof. If F is reduced, then it is trivially true, because LF M = F .
Assume F is not reduced. By definition of ∗ , there exists G′ such that
F 1FF 2
∗
G′ and LF 1FF 2M = G′. Also, there exits G such that F ∗ G andLF M = G. Thus LF 1LF MF 2M = LF 1GF 2M. By definition of ∗ , there exists G′′ such
that F 1GF 2
∗
G′′ and LF 1GF 2M = G′′.
To prove LF 1FF 2M = LF 1LF MF 2M, it suffices to prove G′ = G′′. So, given
F 1FF 2
∗
G′, F 1GF 2
∗
G′′ and F ∗ G, (A.123)
we prove that G′ = G′′ holds. We use induction on the number n of  steps
in F ∗ G, with the following induction hypothesis, where H is a sequence of
cryptographic reclassifiers.
IH: If H ∗ G with n− 1 steps, F 1HF 2 ∗ G′,
and F 1GF 2
∗
G′′, then G′ = G′′.
1. Base case: F  G
So, there is i such that F i G. Thus, we can write F 1FF 2
i+|F1| F 1GF 2.
From F 1GF 2
∗
G′′ in (A.123), we then have F 1FF 2
i+|F1| F 1GF 2
∗
G′′.
From Lemma 12 and F 1FF 2
∗
G′ in (A.123), we then get G′ = G′′.
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2. Inductive case: F  F ′ ∗ G
So, there is i such that F i F ′ ∗ G. Let F 1F ′F 2
∗
G′′′. Because F ′ ∗ G
involves n − 1 steps (since F  F ′ ∗ G involves n steps), F 1F ′F 2 ∗ G′′′,
and F 1GF 2
∗
G′′ in (A.123), we can apply IH with H = F ′ and get G′′′ = G′′.
Using F i F ′ from F i F ′ ∗ G, we can write F 1FF 2
i+|F1| F 1F ′F 2.
From F 1F ′F 2
∗
G′′′, we then have F 1FF 2
i+|F1| F 1F ′F 2
∗
G′′′. From
F 1FF 2
∗
G′ in (A.123) and Lemma 12, we then haveG′′′ = G′. By transitivity
on G′′′ = G′′ and G′′′ = G′, we get G′ = G′′.
A.4 Significance of Type-correctness with κ-labels
Theorem 2. Consider a principal p ∈ P and κ-label λp. Assume Γ, λκ ` C for a
context-type λκ ∈ Λκ and a mapping Γ that maps variables in a command C to κ-
labels in Λκ. Let Θ(E , K) perform a λp-downgrade in C. Then, p ∈ X (Θ(·, K)) and
p ∈ X (Θ(E , ·)).
Proof. By the definition of λp-downgrade, and because Θ(E , K) performs a λp-
downgrade, we conclude that E or K is high and Θ(E , K) is low.
We first show that p ∈ X (Θ(E , ·)). Because no principal can complement
Θ(E , ·), we have X (Θ(E , ·)) = P. So, p ∈ X (Θ(E , ·)).
We now show that p ∈ X (Θ(·, K)). Because Θ(E , K) is low, we have that
p ∈ Rκ(Γ(Θ(E , K))). By the rule ANNEXPR-T, we have
Γ(Θ(E , K)) = Tκ(Γ(E),Θ(·, K)) unionsqκ Tκ(Γ(K),Θ(E , ·)).
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By definition ofRκ, we then get that
Rκ(Γ(Θ(E , K))) = Rκ(Tκ(Γ(E),Θ(·, K))) ∩Rκ(Tκ(Γ(K),Θ(E , ·))).
Because Rκ(Tκ(Γ(K),Θ(E , ·))) = P, since no principal can complement Θ(E , ·),
we then get
Rκ(Γ(Θ(E , K))) = Rκ(Tκ(Γ(E),Θ(·, K))).
From p ∈ Rκ(Γ(Θ(E , K))) we then have
p ∈ Rκ(Tκ(Γ(E),Θ(·, K))). (A.124)
Because E is high, we have
p 6∈ Rκ(Γ(E)). (A.125)
Due to the definition of Rκ and Tκ, (A.124) and (A.125), it should be the case
that Rκ(Tκ(Γ(E),Θ(·, K))) = Rκ(Γ(E)) ∪ X (Θ(·, K)). From the above equation,
(A.124), and (A.125) we get p ∈ X (Θ(·, K)).
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APPENDIX B
PROOFS FOR LABEL CHAINS
B.1 Definitions
The following definitions are used in the proofs appearing in this appendix.
• We abbreviate τ |S` by τ |`, when S is the set of all variables and their tags.
• We extend the projection of a memory with respect to a label ` to include
bc (blocking context) and cc (conditional context):
M |` =
{〈q,M(q)〉 | q, T (q) ∈ dom(M) ∧ M(T (q)) v `} ∪
{〈bc,M(bc)〉 |M(bc) v `} ∪
{〈cc,M(cc)〉 |M(bccc) unionsqM(bc) v `}
(B.1)
• Define equality of sequences of observations when omitting the empty
sets:
 =obs 
∅ =obs 
 =obs ∅
Θ ⇀ θ =obs Θ
′ ⇀ θ′ iff
Θ = Θ′ ∧ θ =obs θ′, or
Θ = ∅ ∧ Θ′ 6= ∅ ∧ θ =obs Θ′ ⇀ θ′, or
Θ 6= ∅ ∧ Θ′ = ∅ ∧ Θ ⇀ θ =obs θ′
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• Define kstut(M) to hold when the kth label in all label chains in M is in-
finitely repeated:
kstut(M) ,
∀x∈dom(M): ∀i > k: T i(x)∈dom(M)⇒M(T i(x)) = M(T k(x))
for k ≥ 1
• We write mon(M) to denote that all label chains in M are monotonically
decreasing:
mon(M) ,
∀x∈dom(M): ∀i ≥ 1: T i+1(x)∈dom(M)⇒M(T i+1(x)) vM(T i(x))
• We write M =k M ′ iff
1. ∀x: ∀0 ≤ i ≤ k: M(T i(x)) = M ′(T i(x)),
2. M(cc) = M ′(cc), and
3. M(bc) = M ′(bc).
• To prove inductively that our enforcers satisfy BNI, we strengthen BNI to
BNI+ and prove BNI+ instead.
BNI+(E,L, C). ∀` ∈ L: ∀M,M ′:
If
M |= H(E,L, C) ∧ M ′ |= H(E,L, C),
M |` = M ′|`,M(cc) = M ′(cc),mon(M),mon(M ′)
τ = traceE(C,M),
τ ′ = traceE(C,M ′),
where τ = 〈C,M〉 ∗→ 〈Ct,Mt〉, τ ′ = 〈C,M ′〉 ∗→ 〈C ′t,M ′t〉, and Ct, C ′t are
terminations (i.e., stop or block),
then:
176
c1 If Ct and C ′t are both stop, then τ |` =obs τ ′|`, Mt|` = M ′t|`, and Mt(cc) =
M ′t(cc).
c2 If Ct or C ′t is block, then τ |` =obs τ ′|`.
c3 If Ct is stop, C ′t is block, and M ′t(bc) 6v `, then Mt(bc) 6v `.
c4 If Ct is stop, C ′t is block, 〈C ′tp,M ′tp〉 → 〈C ′t,M ′t〉 are the last two states of
τ ′, and M ′tp(bccc) v `, then there exists 〈C ′′,M ′′〉 ∈ τ , with C ′′ = C ′tp and
M ′′|` = M ′tp|`.
• For enforcers k-Enf with 2 ≤ k ≤ ∞, EH,L, and k-Eopt with k ≥ 2, we
extend the domain of function traceE(C,M) to also include any memory
M such that M |= H(E,L, C) holds.
Also, if M |= H(E,L, C) holds, then for any M ′ in traceE(C,M) and any
subcommand C ′ of C, we have M ′ |= H(E,L, C ′) (based on the corre-
sponding operational semantics).
B.2 Soundness of∞-Enf and k-Enf for k ≥ 2
Theorem 3. ∞-Enf is an enforcer on R for BNI.
Proof. It is easy to prove that∞-Enf is an enforcer onR and satisfies restrictions
(E1), (E2), and (E3) by induction on the rules of∞-Enf . We omit the details.
To prove that ∞-Enf satisfies BNI, we will prove that k-BNI(∞-Enf ,L, C)
holds for a lattice L, a command C, and k ≥ 0. From Lemma 13, we have
that BNI+(∞-Enf ,L,C) holds. By definition, M |= H0(∞-Enf ,L, C) and M ′ |=
H0(∞-Enf ,L, C) imply M(cc) = M ′(cc),mon(M),mon(M ′). Also, τ |` =obs τ ′|`
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implies τ |k` =obs τ ′|k` . Thus, BNI+(∞-Enf ,L,C) implies k-BNI(∞-Enf ,L, C). Be-
cause k, C, and Lwere arbitrary, we then get that∞-Enf enforces BNI.
Lemma 13. For a command C and lattice L, BNI+(∞-Enf ,L,C) holds.
Proof. Let ` ∈ L. We use structural induction on C.
1. C is skip:
From rule SKIP, we get Ct = C ′t = stop. So, c2, c3, and c4 are trivially true.
We prove c1. We have, τ |` =obs  and τ ′|` =obs . Because Mt = M and
M ′t = M
′, we get Mt|` = M ′t|` and Mt(cc) = M ′t(cc). So, c1 holds.
2. C is a := e:
From M |` = M ′|` and M(T 2(a)) = M ′(T 2(a)) = ⊥, we get
M(T (a)) = M ′(T (a)). (B.2)
2.1. M(T (a)) v `
We first prove that the command is executed normally in both mem-
ories or blocked in both memories. W.l.o.g, assume that the com-
mand is executed normally in M . We prove that the command is ex-
ecuted normally in M ′, too. Because the command is executed nor-
mally in M , rule ASGNA in Figure 5.3 has been triggered, meaning that
M(T (e)) unionsq M(bccc) unionsq M(bc) v M(T (a)) holds. From hypothesis (2.1.),
we then get M(T (e)) v `, M(bccc) v `, and M(bc) v `. Because
M |` = M ′|`, we then get M(cc) = M ′(cc) and M(bc) = M ′(bc). From
mon(M ) and M(T (e)) v `, we get M(T 2(e)) v ` and M(T 3(e)) v `.
From Lemma 17 and M |` = M ′|`, we then get M(T 2(e)) = M ′(T 2(e)),
M(T (e)) = M ′(T (e)), M(e) = M ′(e). From (B.2), we then get that
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M ′(T (e)) unionsq M ′(bccc) unionsq M ′(bc) v M ′(T (a)) holds. So, rule ASGNA is trig-
gered, meaning that the command is executed normally in M ′. Taking
the contrapositive of the statement we just proved (i.e., if the command
is executed normally in M , then it will be executed normally in M ′), we
get that if the command is blocked in M ′, then it will be blocked in M .
Because M and M ′ are arbitrary, we consequently have that the com-
mand is either (i) executed normally in both memories or (ii) blocked in
both memories. So, c3 and c4 are trivially true. To prove c1 and c2, we
examine cases (i) and (ii).
2.1.1. The command is executed normally in both memories.
c2 is trivially true.
We prove c1. We have:
τ = 〈a := e,M〉 → 〈stop,M [a 7→M(e), bc 7→ `g]〉
τ ′ = 〈a := e,M′〉 → 〈stop,M ′[a 7→M ′(e), bc 7→ `′g]〉,
where
`g = M(T
2(e)) unionsqM(bccc) unionsqM(bc) and
`′g = M
′(T 2(e)) unionsqM ′(bccc) unionsqM ′(bc).
We have τ |` = τ ′|` = 〈a,M(e)〉, because M(e) = M ′(e). Also,
`g = `
′
g. So, Mt(bc) = M ′t(bc). Because Mt(cc) = M(cc) = M ′(cc) =
M ′t(cc), then Mt(cc) = M ′t(cc) holds. Because Mt(a) = M ′t(a),
Mt(bc) = M
′
t(bc), and Mt(cc) = M ′t(cc), then we get Mt|` = M ′t|`.
So c1 holds.
2.1.2. The command is blocked in both memories.
τ = 〈a := e,M〉 → 〈block,M [bc 7→ `g]〉
τ ′ = 〈a := e,M′〉 → 〈block,M ′[bc 7→ `′g]〉.
So, τ |` = τ ′|` = , and thus c2 holds. Also, c1 is trivially true.
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2.2. M(T (a)) 6v `
We then have τ |` =obs  and τ ′|` =obs , and thus c2 holds.
To prove c1, assume Ct = C ′t = stop. We show Mt(cc) = M ′t(cc) and
Mt|` = M ′t|`.
Because M(cc) = M ′(cc) and M ′t(cc) = M ′(cc), we have Mt(cc) =
M ′t(cc).
We now prove Mt|` = M ′t|` as per (B.1). Because M(T (a)),M ′(T (a)) 6v `,
thenMt andM ′t do not need to agree on a. IfMt(bc) 6v `, thenMt|` = M ′t|`
trivially holds. Assume instead Mt(bc) v `. So, rule ASGNA in Figure
5.3 then gives M(T 2(e)) unionsq M(bccc) unionsq M(bc) v `. Thus, M(T 2(e)) v `,
M(bccc) v `, and M(bc) v `. From mon(M ) and M(T 2(e)) v `, we get
M(T 3(e)) v `. From M |` = M ′|`, M(T 3(e)) v `, and Lemma 17, we get
M(T 2(e)) = M ′(T 2(e)). From M |` = M ′|`, M(bccc) v `, and M(bc) v `,
we get: M(bccc) = M ′(bccc) and M(bc) = M ′(bc). Because ASGNA in Figure
5.3 givesMt(bc) = M(T 2(e))unionsqM(bccc)unionsqM(bc) andM ′t(bc) = M ′(T 2(e))unionsq
M ′(bccc)unionsqM ′(bc), we then have Mt(bc) = M ′t(bc). From Mt(cc) = M ′t(cc),
we then get Mt|` = M ′t|`. So, c1 holds.
To prove c3, assume Ct is stop, C ′t is block, and M ′t(bc) 6v `. We must
show Mt(bc) 6v `. We show the contrapositive. Assume Mt(bc) v `, then
following the same arguments as above, we get Mt(bc) = M ′t(bc), and
thus, M ′t(bc) v `, as wanted. So, c3 holds.
To prove c4, assume Ct is stop, C ′t is block, 〈C ′tp,M ′tp〉 → 〈C ′t,M ′t〉 are the
last two states of τ ′, and M ′tp(bccc) v `. So, M ′tp = M ′ and C ′tp = a := e.
We have that 〈C ′′,M ′′〉 in c4 is 〈a := e,M〉, which satisfies C ′′ = C ′tp and
M ′′|` = M ′tp|`. Thus c4 holds.
3. C is w := e
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τ = 〈w := e,M〉 → 〈stop,Mt〉
τ ′ = 〈w := e,M ′〉 → 〈stop,M ′t〉
c2, c3, and c4 are trivially true.
We prove c1. Mt(cc) = M ′t(cc) holds because we have M(cc) = M ′(cc),
Mt(cc) = M(cc), and M ′t(cc) = M ′(cc).
3.1. ∃r ≥ 1: Mt(T r(w)) v `
From mon(M ), we then get ∀i ≥ r: Mt(T i(w)) v `. Then we have ∀i ≥ r :
M(T i(e)) v `,M(bccc) v `, andM(bc) v `. From,M |` = M ′|` and Lemma
17, we then get ∀i ≥ r − 1 :M(T i(e)) = M ′(T i(e)), M(cc) = M ′(cc), and
M(bc) = M ′(bc). So, ∀i ≥ r − 1 : Mt(T i(w)) = M ′t(T i(w)), and thus,
∀i ≥ r: M ′t(T i(w)) v `.
• If r = 1, we then get Mt|` = M ′t|` and τ |` = τ ′|`. Thus c1 holds.
• Assume r > 1 holds. Then we have ∀i: 1 < i < r: Mt(T i(w)) 6v `. Be-
cause ∀i ≥ r−1:Mt(T i(w)) = M ′t(T i(w)), we then getM ′t(T r−1(w)) 6v
`. From mon(M ′) we then get ∀i < r : M ′t(T i(w)) 6v `. Thus,
Mt|` = M ′t|` and τ |` = τ ′|`. Thus c1 holds.
3.2. ∀i ≥ 1: Mt(T i(w)) 6v `
By symmetry of preceding case, ∀i ≥ 1: M ′t(T i(w)) 6v `. So,τ |` =obs  and
τ ′|` =obs . Because ∀i ≥ 1: Mt(T i(w)) 6v ` and ∀i ≥ 1: M ′t(T i(w)) 6v `
holds, we get Mt|` = M ′t|`. Thus c1 holds.
4. C1;C2
4.1. C1 terminates normally in τ and τ ′.
Let
τ = 〈C1;C2,M〉 ∗→ 〈C2,M2〉 ∗→ 〈C2t,Mt〉 and
τ ′ = 〈C1;C2,M ′〉 ∗→ 〈C2,M ′2〉 ∗→ 〈C ′2t,M ′t〉.
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Consider:
τ1 = 〈C1,M〉 ∗→ 〈stop,M2〉,
τ2 = 〈C2,M2〉 ∗→ 〈C2t,Mt〉,
τ ′1 = 〈C1,M ′〉 ∗→ 〈stop,M ′2〉,
τ ′2 = 〈C2,M ′2〉 ∗→ 〈C ′2t,M ′t〉.
From c1 of IH on C1, we get τ1|` =obs τ ′1|`, M2|` = M ′2|`, and M2(cc) =
M ′2(cc). From mon(M ), mon(M ′) and Lemma 14, we get mon(M2 ),
mon(M ′2 ). So, we can apply IH on C2.
To prove c1, assume C2t = C ′2t = stop. From IH on C2, we get τ2|` =obs
τ ′2|`, Mt|` = M ′t|`, and Mt(cc) = M ′t(cc). From τ1|` =obs τ ′1|` and τ2|` =obs
τ ′2|`, we get τ |` =obs τ ′|`. Thus c1 holds.
To prove c2, assume C2t = block or C ′2t = block. From IH on C2, we
get τ2|` =obs τ ′2|`. From τ1|` =obs τ ′1|` and τ2|` =obs τ ′2|`, we get τ |` =obs τ ′|`.
Thus c2 holds.
To prove c3, assume C2t = stop, C ′2t = block, and M ′t(bc) 6v `. From IH
on C2, we get Mt(bc) 6v `. Thus c3 holds.
To prove c4, assume C2t = stop, C ′2t = block, 〈C ′tp,M ′tp〉 → 〈C ′2t,M ′t〉 are
the last two states of τ ′, and M ′tp(bccc) v `. Then 〈C ′tp,M ′tp〉 → 〈C ′2t,M ′t〉
are the last two states of τ ′2. From IH on C2, we get that there exists
〈C ′′,M ′′〉 ∈ τ2, with C ′′ = C ′tp and M ′′|` = M ′tp|`. Thus, there exists
〈C ′′,M ′′〉 ∈ τ , with C ′′ = C ′tp and M ′′|` = M ′tp|`. Thus c4 holds.
4.2. C1 is blocked in both τ, τ ′
Similar to the above case, we apply IH on C1.
4.3. C1 is blocked in τ , terminates normally in τ ′ (C2 may term/block in τ ′).
c1 is trivially true.
Let:
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τ = 〈C1;C2,M〉 ∗→ 〈C1t;C2,Mt〉 and
τ ′ = 〈C1;C2,M ′〉 ∗→ 〈C2,M ′2〉 ∗→ 〈C ′2t,M ′t〉.
Consider:
τ1 = 〈C1,M〉 ∗→ 〈C1t,Mt〉,
τ ′1 = 〈C1,M ′〉 ∗→ 〈stop,M ′2〉,
τ ′2 = 〈C2,M ′2〉 ∗→ 〈C ′2t,M ′t〉.
So, we have
τ |` = τ1|` and τ ′|` = τ ′1|` ⇀ τ ′2|`. (B.3)
We prove c3. We have Ct = C1t = block. Assume C ′t = C ′2t = stop and
Mt(bc) 6v `. We prove M ′t(bc) 6v `. For IH on C1, we get M ′2(bc) 6v `. From
Lemma 19, we then get M ′t(bc) 6v `. Thus c3 holds.
We prove c4. We have Ct = block. Assume C ′2t = stop, 〈Ctp;C2,Mtp〉 →
〈C1t;C2,Mt〉 are the last two states of τ , and Mtp(bccc) v `. Then
〈Ctp,Mtp〉 → 〈C1t,Mt〉 are the last two states of τ1. From IH on C1, we
get that there exists 〈C ′′,M ′′〉 ∈ τ ′1, with C ′′ = Ctp and M ′′|` = Mtp|`.
Thus, there exists 〈C ′′;C2,M ′′〉 ∈ τ ′, with C ′′ = Ctp and M ′′|` = Mtp|`.
Thus c4 holds.
We prove c2. From IH on C1, we get we get τ1|` =obs τ ′1|`. Given also
(B.3), to prove τ |` =obs τ ′|`, it suffices that τ ′2|` = . So, we prove τ ′2|` = .
Assume the last transition of τ1 is 〈C1tp,Mtp〉 → 〈C1t,Mt〉. τ1 is blocked
due to ASGNAFAIL, so C1tp is a := e;C ′.
4.3.1. Mtp(bc) 6v `
From Lemma 19 and 〈C1tp,Mtp〉 → 〈C1t,Mt〉, we have Mtp(bc) v
Mt(bc). Hypothesis (4.3.1.) then gives Mt(bc) 6v `. From IH[c3] on
C1, we get M ′2(bc) 6v `. From Lemma 16, τ ′2|` = . Thus c2 holds.
4.3.2. Mtp(bc) v ` and Mtp(cc) v `
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From IH[c4] on C1, there exists 〈C1tp,M ′1〉 ∈ τ ′1 such that Mtp|` =
M ′1|`. So, Mtp(bc) = M ′1(bc) and Mtp(cc) = M ′1(cc). Because τ1
is blocked, we have Mtp(T (e)) unionsqMtp(bccc) unionsqMtp(bc) 6v Mtp(T (a)).
Since the inequality is satisfied in τ ′1, it means that the value of T (e)
is different inM ′1 andMtp. So,M ′1(T 2(e)) 6v `. Consider 〈C1,M ′〉 ∗→
〈C1tp,M ′1〉 → 〈Cn,Mn〉 a prefix of τ ′1. From ASGNA, we then have
Mn(bc) 6v `. From Lemma 19, we then get M ′2(bc) 6v `. From
Lemma 16, we then have τ ′2|` = . Thus c2 holds.
4.3.3. Mtp(bc) v ` and Mtp(bccc) 6v `
From ASGNAFAIL, Mtp(bccc) v Mt(bc). So, Mt(bc) 6v `. We work simi-
larly to case 4.3.1..
5. if e then C1 else C2 end
5.1. M(bccc) v ` and M(T (e)) v `
From mon(M ) and M(T (e)) v `, we have M(T 2(e)) v `. Because
M |` = M ′|` and Lemma 17, we then have M(T (e)) = M ′(T (e)) and
M(e) = M ′(e). So, τ and τ ′ get the same branch, say C1.
τ = 〈if e then C1 else C2 end,M〉 → 〈C1; exit,M1〉 ∗→ 〈Ct,Mt〉
τ ′ = 〈if e then C1 else C2 end,M ′〉 → 〈C1; exit,M ′1〉 ∗→ 〈C ′t,M ′t〉.
From M1(cc) = M(cc).push(〈M(T (e)),W,A〉), M(cc) = M ′(cc),
M(T (e)) = M ′(T (e)), and M ′1(cc) = M ′(cc).push(〈M ′(T (e)),W,A〉), we
get M1(cc) = M ′1(cc).
We prove M1|` = M ′1|` as per (B.1). Because M |` = M ′|`, it is trivially true
when M1(bc) 6v `. Assume M1(bc) v `. Because M1(cc) = M ′1(cc) holds,
it suffices to also prove M1(bc) = M ′1(bc). Because M1(bc) = M(bc),
we then get M(bc) v `. From M |` = M ′|`, we then get M(bc) = M ′(bc).
BecauseM ′1(bc) = M ′(bc), we then getM1(bc) = M ′1(bc). So, M1|` = M ′1|`.
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From mon(M ), mon(M ′) and Lemma 14, we get mon(M1 ), mon(M ′1 ). We
apply IH on C1; exit and get c1, c2, c3, and c4.
5.2. M(bccc) 6v ` or M(T (e)) 6v `
We first prove that M ′(bccc) 6v ` or M ′(T (e)) 6v ` holds. If M(T (e)) 6v `,
then from M |` = M ′|` and Lemma 18, we get M ′(T (e)) 6v `. Now, if
M(bccc) 6v `, then M(cc) = M ′(cc) gives M ′(bccc) 6v `. Thus, we have
M ′(bccc) 6v ` or M ′(T (e)) 6v `.
So, Lemma 15 gives:
(i) τ |` =obs  and τ ′|` =obs .
(ii) If Ct = stop (or C ′t = stop), and w ∈ targetFlex (C), then ∀i :
Mt(T
i(w)) 6v ` ( or ∀i :M ′t(T i(w)) 6v ` ).
(iii) If Ct = stop (or C ′t = stop), and targetAnchor(C) 6= ∅ then Mt(bc) 6v
` or (M ′t(bc) 6v `).
So, c2 holds.
We prove c1. Assume Ct = C ′t = stop. Because τ |` =obs  and τ ′|` =obs ,
it suffices to prove Mt|` = M ′t|` and Mt(cc) = M ′t(cc). From Lemma 20,
we get M(cc) = Mt(cc) and M ′(cc) = M ′t(cc). From M(cc) = M ′(cc), we
then get Mt(cc) = M ′t(cc). We prove Mt|` = M ′t|`. If Mt(T i+1(x)) v `,
then (ii) gives x 6∈ targetFlex (C). So, Mt(T i(x)) = M(T i(x)), M ′(T i(x)) =
M ′t(T
i(x)),Mt(T i+1(x)) = M(T i+1(x)),M ′(T i+1(x)) = M ′t(T i+1(x)). Thus,
M(T i+1(x)) v `. From M |` = M ′|`, we then have M ′(T i+1(x)) v `
and M(T i(x)) = M ′(T i(x)). By transitivity, Mt(T i(x)) = M ′t(T i(x)) and
M ′t(T
i+1(x)) v `. Assume Mt(bc) v `. So, (iii) gives targetAnchor(C) = ∅.
So, M(bc) = Mt(bc) and M ′(bc) = M ′t(bc). From Mt(bc) v `, we then
get M(bc) v `. From M |` = M ′|`, we then get M(bc) = M ′(bc). Thus,
Mt(bc) = M
′
t(bc). So, Mt|` = M ′t|`. Thus c1 holds.
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We prove c3. If C ′t = block, then targetAnchor(C) 6= ∅. So, (iii) gives
Mt(bc) 6v `. Thus c3 holds.
We prove c4. We have that M ′(bccc) 6v ` or M ′(T (e)) 6v `.
So, if C ′t = block, then M ′tp(bccc) 6v `. Thus c4 holds.
6. while e do C1 end
Induction on the maximum number of iterations in τ and τ ′.
Base case: Both τ and τ ′ take (Wl2).
τ = 〈while e do C1 end,M〉 → 〈exit,Me〉 → 〈stop,Mt〉
τ ′ = 〈while e do C1 end,M′〉 → 〈exit,M ′e〉 → 〈stop,M ′t〉.
So, c2, c3, c4 are trivially true.
We prove c1. We have τ |` =obs  and τ ′|` =obs .
6.1. M(T (e)) v `:
We prove Me(cc) = M ′e(cc). From M(T (e)) v ` and mon(M ), we then
have M(T 2(e)) v `. From M |` = M ′|` and Lemma 17, we then get
M(T (e)) = M ′(T (e)). Both τ and τ ′ have the same W and A. So, from
M(cc) = M ′(cc) and M(T (e)) = M ′(T (e)), we then get Me(cc) = M ′e(cc).
We now prove Me|` = M ′e|`. If Me(bc) 6v `, then it is trivial, given
M |` = M ′|`. Assume Me(bc) v `. Given Me(cc) = M ′e(cc), it suffices to
prove Me(bc) = M ′e(bc). We have M(bc) = Me(bc) and M ′(bc) = M ′e(bc).
Because Me(bc) v `, we then get M(bc) v `. From M |` = M ′|`, we then
get M(bc) = M ′(bc). Because M(bc) = Me(bc) and M ′(bc) = M ′e(bc), we
then get by transitivity Me(bc) = M ′e(bc).
So, Me(cc) = M ′e(cc) and Me|` = M ′e|`. From Lemma 14, mon(M ), and
mon(M ′), we get mon(Me) and mon(Me). We use the proof for exit to
get Mt|` = M ′t|` and Mt(cc) = M ′t(cc). Thus c1 holds.
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6.2. M(T (e)) 6v `:
In case (6.1.), we showed that M(T (e)) v ` implies M(T (e)) = M ′(T (e)),
which gives M ′(T (e)) v `. The contrapositive of this statement is that
M ′(T (e)) 6v ` gives M(T (e)) 6v `. Because M,M ′ are arbitrary and be-
cause M(T (e)) 6v ` (hypothesis of this case), we then get M ′(T (e)) 6v `.
We proveMt(cc) = M ′t(cc). From Lemma 20, we getM(cc) = Mt(cc) and
M ′(cc) = M ′t(cc). From M(cc) = M ′(cc), we then get Mt(cc) = M ′t(cc).
We prove Mt|` = M ′t|`. Using Lemma 15, if Mt(T i+1(x)) v `,
then x 6∈ targetFlex (C). So, Mt(T i(x)) = M(T i(x)), M ′(T i(x)) =
M ′t(T
i(x)),Mt(T i+1(x)) = M(T i+1(x)),M ′(T i+1(x)) = M ′t(T i+1(x)). Thus,
M(T i+1(x)) v `. From M |` = M ′|`, we then have M ′(T i+1(x)) v `
and M(T i(x)) = M ′(T i(x)). By transitivity, Mt(T i(x)) = M ′t(T i(x)) and
M ′t(T
i+1(x)) v `. Assume Mt(bc) v `. From Lemma 15, we then get that
targetAnchor(C) = ∅. So, M(bc) = Mt(bc) and M ′(bc) = M ′t(bc). From
Mt(bc) v ` and Lemma 19, we get M(bc) v `. From M |` = M ′|`, we then
get M(bc) = M ′(bc). Thus, by transitivity, we get Mt(bc) = M ′t(bc). And
because Mt(cc) = M ′t(cc), we consequently have Mt|` = M ′t|`. Thus c1
holds.
Induction case:
6.1. M(bccc) v ` and M(T (e)) v `
From mon(M ), we then have M(T 2(e)) v `. From M |` = M ′|` and
Lemma 17, we then get M(T (e)) = M ′(T (e)) and M(e) = M ′(e). So,
τ and τ ′ take the same branch. If both take (WL2), then we follow the Base
case.
Assume that both take (WL1):
τ = 〈while e do C1 end,M〉 → 〈C1;while e do C1 end; exit,M1〉 ∗→
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〈Ct,Mt〉,
τ ′ = 〈while e do C1 end,M ′〉 → 〈C1;while e do C1 end; exit,M ′1〉 ∗→
〈C ′t,M ′t〉.
We get M1(cc) = M ′1(cc) from M(cc) = M ′(cc) and M(T (e)) = M ′(T (e)).
We prove M1|` = M ′1|`. Assume M1(bc) v `. Because M1(bc) = M(bc),
we then get M(bc) v `. From M |` = M ′|`, we then get M(bc) = M ′(bc).
BecauseM ′1(bc) = M ′(bc), we then getM1(bc) = M ′1(bc). So, M1|` = M ′1|`.
We get mon(M1 ) and mon(M1 ), from Lemma 14, mon(M ), and mon(M ′).
6.1.1. C1 terminates normally in the 1st iteration in τ and τ ′.
τ = 〈while e do C1 end,M〉 → 〈C1;while e do C1 end; exit,M1〉 ∗→
〈while e do C1 end; exit,M2〉 ∗→ 〈Ct,Mt〉,
τ ′ = 〈while e do C1 end,M ′〉 → 〈C1;while e do C1 end; exit,M ′1〉 ∗→
〈while e do C1 end; exit,M ′2〉 ∗→ 〈C ′t,M ′t〉.
Consider:
τ1 = 〈C1,M1〉 ∗→ 〈stop,M2〉
τ ′1 = 〈C1,M ′1〉 ∗→ 〈stop,M ′2〉
Because M1(cc) = M ′1(cc), M1|` = M ′1|`, mon(M1 ), and mon(M1 ),
we can apply IH[c1] on C1. So, we get τ1|` =obs τ ′1|`, M2|` = M ′2|`,
and M2(cc) = M ′2(cc). From mon(M1 ), mon(M ′1 ) and Lemma 14,
we get mon(M2 ), mon(M ′2 ).
Consider traces:
τ2 = 〈while e do C1 end,M2〉 ∗→ 〈C3,M3〉
τ ′2 = 〈while e do C1 end,M ′2〉 ∗→ 〈C ′3,M ′3〉
that terminate (normally or blocked). Because M2|` = M ′2|`,
M2(cc) = M
′
2(cc), mon(M2 ), and mon(M ′2 ), we can apply IH on
the max-number of iterations on τ2 and τ ′2.
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We prove c2. Say that Ct is block. Then C3 should be block. From
IH[c2] on τ2 and τ ′2, we then get τ2|` =obs τ ′2|`. Because we have
τ |` =obs τ1|` ⇀ τ2|`, τ ′|` =obs τ ′1|` ⇀ τ ′2|`, τ1|` =obs τ ′1|`, and τ2|` =obs
τ ′2|`, we get τ |` =obs τ ′|`. So, c2 holds.
We similarly prove c3 and c4.
We prove c1. Assume τ and τ ′ terminate normally:
τ = 〈while e do C1 end,M〉 → 〈C1;while e do C1 end; exit,M1〉 ∗→
〈while e do C1 end; exit,M2〉 ∗→ 〈exit,M3〉 → 〈stop,Mt〉,
τ ′ = 〈while e do C1 end,M ′〉 → 〈C1;while e do C1 end; exit,M ′1〉 ∗→
〈while e do C1 end; exit,M ′2〉 ∗→ 〈exit,M ′3〉 → 〈stop,M ′t〉.
Then τ2 and τ ′2 terminate normally. So, we have
τ2 = 〈while e do C1 end,M2〉 ∗→ 〈stop,M3〉
τ ′2 = 〈while e do C1 end,M ′2〉 ∗→ 〈stop,M ′3〉
By IH[c1] on τ2 and τ ′2, we then get τ2|` =obs τ ′2|`, M3|` = M ′3|` and
M3(cc) = M
′
3(cc). Because τ |` =obs τ1|` ⇀ τ2|`, τ ′|` =obs τ ′1|` ⇀ τ ′2|`,
τ1|` =obs τ ′1|`, and τ2|` =obs τ ′2|`, we get τ |` =obs τ ′|`.
To prove c1, we also need to prove that Mt|` = M ′t|` and Mt(cc) =
M ′t(cc). Consider:
τ3 = 〈exit,M3〉 → 〈stop,Mt〉
τ ′3 = 〈exit,M ′3〉 → 〈stop,M ′t〉.
From mon(M2 ), mon(M ′2 ) and Lemma 14, we get mon(M3 ),
mon(M ′3 ). Because M3|` = M ′3|` and M3(cc) = M ′3(cc), mon(M3 ),
and mon(M ′3 ), we can use the proof for exit (case 7.) to get
Mt|` = M ′t|` and Mt(cc) = M ′t(cc). So, c1 holds.
6.1.2. C1 blocked in both τ and τ ′ during 1st iteration.
We use IH on C1.
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6.1.3. C1 blocked in τ , terminates normally in τ ′.
τ = 〈while e do C1 end,M〉 → 〈C1;while e do C1 end; exit,M1〉 ∗→
〈C1t;while e do C1 end; exit,Mt〉,
τ ′ = 〈while e do C1 end,M ′〉 → 〈C1;while e do C1 end; exit,M ′1〉 ∗→
〈while e do C1 end; exit,M ′2〉 ∗→ 〈C ′t,M ′t〉.
Consider:
τ1 = 〈C1,M1〉 ∗→ 〈C1t,Mt〉
τ ′1 = 〈C1,M ′1〉 ∗→ 〈stop,M ′2〉
τ ′2 = 〈while e do C1 end; exit,M ′2〉 ∗→ 〈C ′t,M ′t〉
IH can be applied to τ1 and τ ′1, because M1|` = M ′1|`, M1(cc) =
M ′1(cc), mon(M ′1 ), and C1 is a subcommand of while e do C1 end.
We invoke (4.3.) for τ1, τ ′1, and τ ′2.
6.2. M(bccc) 6v ` or M(T (e)) 6v `
Consider:
τw = 〈if e then (C1;while e do C1 end) else skip end,M〉 ∗→
〈Cwt,Mwt〉, and
τw = 〈if e then (C1;while e do C1 end) else skip end,M ′〉 ∗→
〈C ′wt,M ′wt〉.
We invoke case 5.2. for τw, τ ′w, and we get:
c1w If Cwt and C ′wt are both stop, then τw|` =obs τ ′w|`, Mwt|` = M ′wt|`, and
Mwt(cc) = M
′
wt(cc).
c2w If Cwt or C ′wt is block, then τw|` =obs τ ′w|`.
c3w If Cwt is stop, C ′wt is block, and M ′wt(bc) 6v `, then Mwt(bc) 6v `.
We prove c1. Assume Ct and C ′t are both stop. Because Ct = Cwt and
C ′t = C
′
wt, we have that Cwt and C ′wt are both stop. From c1w, we have
τw|` = τ ′w|`, Mwt|` = M ′wt|`, and Mwt(cc) = M ′wt(cc). We have Mt = Mwt,
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M ′t = M
′
wt, τ |` =obs τw|`, and τ ′|` =obs τ ′w|`. So, τ |` =obs τ ′|`, Mt|` = M ′t|`,
and Mt(cc) = M ′t(cc). Thus c1 holds.
Similarly, we get c2 and c3.
c4 is trivially true: from M(bccc) 6v ` or M(T (e)) 6v ` we get M ′tp(bccc) 6v `.
7. exit
We have:
τ = 〈exit,M〉 → 〈stop,Mt〉
τ ′ = 〈exit,M ′〉 → 〈stop,M ′t〉.
c2, c3, c4 are trivially true.
We prove c1. We have τ |` =obs  and τ ′|` =obs . So, we need to prove Mt|` =
Mt|` and Mt(cc) = M ′t(cc). Because M(cc) = M ′(cc), Mt(cc) = M(cc).pop,
andM ′t(cc) = M ′(cc).pop, we then getMt(cc) = M ′t(cc). We now proveMt|` =
Mt|`.
7.1. Mt(bccc) unionsqMt(bc) 6v ` and M(cc).top.A 6= ∅.
We first prove that Mt(bc) 6v ` and M ′t(bc) 6v `. Because M(cc).top.A 6= ∅,
we have Mt(bc) = M(bc) unionsqM(bccc). Because Mt(bccc) v M(bccc), we get
Mt(bccc) unionsqM(bc) v M(bccc) unionsqM(bc), which becomes Mt(bccc) unionsqM(bc) unionsq
M(bccc) vM(bccc)unionsqM(bc)unionsqM(bccc), which becomes Mt(bccc)unionsqMt(bc) v
M(bccc) unionsq M(bc), due to Mt(bc) = M(bc) unionsq M(bccc). From Mt(bccc) unionsq
Mt(bc) 6v ` we get M(bccc) unionsqM(bc) 6v `. From Mt(bc) = M(bc) unionsqM(bccc),
we then have Mt(bc) 6v `. From M(bccc) unionsqM(bc) 6v ` and M |` = M ′|`, we
get M ′(bccc)unionsqM ′(bc) 6v `. Because M(cc).top.A 6= ∅ and M(cc) = M ′(cc),
we have M ′(cc).top.A 6= ∅, too. So, M ′t(bc) = M ′(bc) unionsqM ′(bccc). From
M ′(bccc) unionsq M ′(bc) 6v `, we then have M ′t(bc) 6v `. So, Mt(bc) 6v ` and
M ′t(bc) 6v `.
Only variables in W change their labels. Let x ∈ M(cc).top.W . Be-
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cause M(bccc) unionsq M(bc) 6v `, we have ∀i ≥ 1.Mt(T i(x)) 6v `. Because
M(cc) = M ′(cc), we get x ∈ M ′(cc).top.W , too. From M ′t(bc) 6v `,
we have M ′(bccc) unionsq M ′(bc) 6v `, and thus, ∀i ≥ 1.M ′t(T i(x)) 6v `. So,
Mt|` = M ′t|`. Thus c1 holds.
7.2. Mt(bccc) unionsqMt(bc) 6v ` and M(cc).top.A = ∅.
Because M(cc).top.A = ∅, we have Mt(bc) = M(bc). We have Mt(bccc) v
M(bccc). We get Mt(bccc) unionsq M(bc) v M(bccc) unionsq M(bc), which becomes
Mt(bccc) unionsq Mt(bc) v M(bccc) unionsq M(bc), due to Mt(bc) = M(bc). From
Mt(bccc) unionsqMt(bc) 6v `, we then have M(bccc) unionsqM(bc) 6v `. Because M |` =
M ′|`, we also get M ′(bccc) unionsqM ′(bc) 6v `.
We prove that if Mt(bc) v `, then Mt(bc) = M ′t(bc). Assume Mt(bc) v `.
From Mt(bc) = M(bc), we then get M(bc) v `. From M |` = M ′|`, we
then get M(bc) = M ′(bc). Because M(cc).top.A = ∅ and M(cc) = M ′(cc),
we have that M ′(cc).top.A = ∅. So, M ′t(bc) = M ′(bc). By transitivity, we
then get Mt(bc) = M ′t(bc).
From Mt(cc) = M ′t(cc), Mt(bc) = M ′t(bc), and Mt(bccc) unionsqMt(bc) 6v `, we
then get M ′t(bccc) unionsqM ′t(bc) 6v `.
Only variables in W change their labels. Let x ∈ M(cc).top.W . Because
M(bccc) unionsqM(bc) 6v `, we have ∀i ≥ 1.Mt(T i(x)) 6v `. Because M(cc) =
M ′(cc), we get x ∈M ′(cc).top.W , too. Because M ′(bccc) unionsqM ′(bc) 6v `, we
have ∀i ≥ 1.M ′t(T i(x)) 6v `. So, Mt|` = M ′t|`. Thus c1 holds.
7.3. Mt(bccc) unionsqMt(bc) v `
So, Mt(bc) v `. From Lemma 19, we get M(bc) v `. From M |` = M ′|`
and M(bc) v `, we also get M(bc) = M ′(bc). From M(cc) = M ′(cc), we
then get Mt(bc) = M ′t(bc).
• Let M(bccc) unionsqM(bc) v `. Let x ∈ M(cc).top.W . Because M(cc) =
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M ′(cc), we get x ∈M ′(cc).top.W . We have:
Mt(T
i(x)) v ` ⇒ M(T i(x)) v ` ⇒ M(T i−1(x)) = M ′(T i−1(x)) and
M ′(T i(x)) v `.
Because M(cc) = M ′(cc) and M(bc) = M ′(bc), we then have
Mt(T
i−1(x)) = M ′t(T
i−1(x)) and M ′t(T i(x)) v `. Thus, Mt|` = M ′t|`.
Thus c1 holds.
• Let M(bccc) unionsqM(bc) 6v `.
So, M ′(bccc) unionsqM ′(bc) 6v `. Let x ∈ M(cc).top.W . Consequently, we
have that ∀i ≥ 1: Mt(T i(x)) 6v `. Because M(cc) = M ′(cc), we get
x ∈ M ′(cc).top.W , and thus ∀i ≥ 1: M ′t(T i(x)) 6v `. Thus, Mt|` =
M ′t|`. Thus c1 holds.
Lemma 14. Let 〈C,M〉 ∗→ 〈C ′,M ′〉 be a trace generated by∞-Enf .
If mon(M), then mon(M ′).
Proof. We first prove the statement for one-step transition: 〈C,M〉 → 〈C ′,M ′〉,
and then we use induction on the number of steps in 〈C,M〉 ∗→ 〈C ′,M ′〉. We
prove the statement for one-step transition, using induction on the rules of
∞-Enf ’s operational semantics. Assume mon(M). We prove mon(M ′).
1. (SKIP):
Because M = M ′, we then get mon(M ′).
2. (ASGNA):
Trivially true, because no label chain is being updated, and thus, mon(M ′).
3. (ASGNAFAIL):
Same arguments as in above case.
193
4. (ASGNF):
From mon(M ′), we have that for every x we have
∀i ≥ 1: M(T i+1(x)) vM(T i(x)),
So, we get ∀i ≥ 1: M(T i+1(e)) vM(T i(e)). We then have
∀i ≥ 1: M(T i+1(e)) unionsqM(bccc) unionsqM(bc) vM(T i(e)) unionsqM(bccc) unionsqM(bc),
and thus ∀i ≥ 1: M ′(T i+1(w)) vM ′(T i(w)). So, mon(M ′).
5. (IF1),(IF2),(WL1),(WL2):
Trivially true, because no label chain is being updated, and thus, mon(M ′).
6. (EXIT):
Only label chains of w ∈ V change. From mon(M), we have for i ≥ 1,
M(T i+1(w)) vM(T i(w)). Thus, M(T i+1(w))unionsqM(bccc)unionsqM(bc) vM(T i(w))unionsq
M(bccc) unionsqM(bc). So, M ′(T i+1(w)) vM ′(T i(w)). So, mon(M ′).
7. (SEQ1),(SEQ2),(SEQF):
We use the IH.
Lemma 15. If C does not include exit (or i-exit), if τ = 〈C,M〉 ∗→ 〈C ′,M ′〉 is gen-
erated by∞-Enf and M(bccc) unionsqM(bc) 6v `, or C is a conditional command (executed
under IF, IF’, or WL rule—not IFS rules) with guard e and M(T (e)) 6v `, then
(i) τ |` =obs .
(ii) if C ′ = stop and w ∈ targetFlex (C), then M ′(T i(w)) 6v `, for all T i(w) ∈
dom(M ′) where i ≥ 1.
(iii) if C ′ = stop and targetAnchor(C) 6= ∅, then M ′(bc) 6v `.
Proof. Induction on C (which should not include exit).
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1. a := e
Assume M(bccc) unionsqM(bc) 6v `.
If C ′ = block, then τ |` = , so (i) holds, and (ii), (iii) are trivially true.
Assume C ′ = stop. So, M(bccc) unionsq M(bc) v M(T (a)). Because M(bccc) unionsq
M(bc) 6v `, we then get M(T (a)) 6v `. Thus τ |` =obs  and (i) holds.
(ii) is trivially true.
We have M(bccc) unionsqM(bc) v M ′(bc). Because M(bccc) unionsqM(bc) 6v `, we then
get M ′(bc) 6v `. Thus (iii) holds.
2. w := e
Assume M(bccc) unionsqM(bc) 6v `.
(iii) is trivially true.
Because M(bccc) unionsqM(bc) 6v ` and ∀i ≥ 1: M(bccc) unionsqM(bc) v M ′(T i(w)), we
get ∀i ≥ 1: M ′(T i(w)) 6v `. Thus (ii) holds.
Also, τ |` =obs . Thus (i) holds.
3. C1;C2
Assume M(bccc) unionsqM(bc) 6v `.
• Assume τ involves only the execution of C1.
So, τ is blocked, and thus, (ii), (iii) are trivially true.
We prove (i). Because τ involves only the blocked execution of C1, con-
sider τ1 = 〈C1,M〉 ∗→ 〈block,M ′〉. From IH on C1, we get τ1|` =obs .
Because τ |` = τ1|`, we then get τ |` =obs . Thus (i) holds.
• Assume τ involves execution of C1 and C2.
Then C1 is executed to normal termination. Consider:
τ1 = 〈C1,M〉 ∗→ 〈stop,M1〉.
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Also, C2 might be executed to termination or blocked. Consider:
τ2 = 〈C2,M1〉 ∗→ 〈C ′,M ′〉.
From Lemma 20, we get M(cc) = M1(cc). From Lemma 19, we get
M(bc) vM1(bc). So, M(bc)unionsqM(cc) vM1(bc)unionsqM1(bccc). From M(bccc)unionsq
M(bc) 6v `, we then have M1(bc) unionsqM1(bccc) 6v `.
We prove (i). From IH on C1, we get τ1|` =obs . From IH on C2, we get
τ2|` =obs . Because τ |` =obs τ1|` ⇀ τ2|`, we get τ |` =obs . Thus (i) holds.
We prove (ii). Assume C ′ = stop and w ∈ targetFlex (C1;C2). Then
w ∈ targetFlex (C1) or w ∈ targetFlex (C2). Assume w ∈ targetFlex (C2).
From IH on C2, we get ∀i ≥ 1: M ′(T i(w)) 6v `. Thus (ii) holds. As-
sume w 6∈ targetFlex (C2). From w ∈ targetFlex (C1;C2), we get w ∈
targetFlex (C1). From IH on C1, we get ∀i ≥ 1: M1(T i(w)) 6v `. Be-
cause w 6∈ targetFlex (C2), we have ∀i ≥ 1: M1(T i(w)) = M ′(T i(w)). So,
∀i ≥ 1: M ′(T i(w)) 6v `. Thus (ii) holds.
We prove (iii). Assume C ′ = stop and targetAnchor(C1 ; C2 ) 6= ∅.
Then targetAnchor(C1 ) 6= ∅ or targetAnchor(C2 ) 6= ∅. Assume that
targetAnchor(C2 ) 6= ∅. From IH on C2, we get M ′(bc) 6v `. Thus (iii)
holds. Assume targetAnchor(C2 ) = ∅. From targetAnchor(C1 ; C2 ) 6= ∅,
we then have targetAnchor(C1 ) 6= ∅. From IH on C1, we get M1(bc) 6v `.
From Lemma 19, we have M1(bc) v M ′(bc). So, we have M ′(bc) 6v `.
Thus (iii) holds.
4. if e then C1 else C2 end
Assume M(bccc)unionsqM(bc) 6v ` or M(T (e)) 6v `. W.l.o.g. assume that τ involves
the execution of C1.
So:
τ = 〈if e then C1 else C2 end,M〉 → 〈C1; exit,M1〉 ∗→ 〈C ′,M ′〉.
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Consider:
τ1 = 〈C1,M1〉 ∗→ 〈C ′1,M ′1〉.
We have M(bc) = M1(bc) and M(bccc) v M1(bccc). So, M(bccc) unionsq M(bc) v
M1(bccc)unionsqM1(bc). If M(bccc)unionsqM(bc) 6v `, we then have M1(bc)unionsqM1(bccc) 6v `.
If M(T (e)) 6v `, we then have M1(bc) unionsq M1(bccc) 6v `, because M(T (e)) v
M1(bccc). So, in any case, M1(bc) unionsqM1(bccc) 6v `. So, we can apply IH on C1.
We prove (i). From IH on C1, we get τ1|` =obs . Because τ |` = τ1|`, we have
τ |` =obs . Thus (i) holds.
We prove (ii). Assume C ′ = stop and w ∈ targetFlex (C ). Then C ′1 = stop
and w ∈ targetFlex (C1 ) or w ∈ targetFlex (C2 ). We have:
τ = 〈if e then C1 else C2 end,M〉 → 〈C1; exit,M1〉 ∗→ 〈exit,M ′1〉 → 〈C ′,M ′〉
and
τ1 = 〈C1,M1〉 ∗→ 〈stop,M ′1〉.
Assume w ∈ targetFlex (C1 ). From IH on C1, we get ∀i ≥ 1: M ′1(T i(w)) 6v `.
Due to the rule for exit, we get ∀i ≥ 1: M ′1(T i(w)) v M ′(T i(w)). So, ∀i ≥
1: M ′(T i(w)) 6v `. Thus (ii) holds.
Assume w 6∈ targetFlex (C1 ). From w ∈ targetFlex (C ), we then have w ∈
targetFlex (C2 ). So, w ∈ M1(cc).top.W . From Lemma 20, we then have w ∈
M ′1(cc).top.W . Due to the rule for exit, we get ∀i ≥ 1: M ′1(bccc) unionsqM ′1(bc) v
M ′(T i(w)). We have M1(bccc) unionsqM1(bc) v M ′1(bccc) unionsqM ′1(bc). So, M ′1(bccc) unionsq
M ′1(bc) 6v `. Thus, ∀i ≥ 1: M ′(T i(w)) 6v `. Thus (ii) holds.
We prove (iii). Assume C ′ = stop and targetAnchor(C) 6= ∅ Then C ′1 = stop
and targetAnchor(C1) 6= ∅ or targetAnchor(C2 ) 6= ∅.
Assume targetAnchor(C1 ) 6= ∅. From IH on C1, we get M ′1(bc) 6v `. From
Lemma 19, we get M ′1(bc) v M ′(bc). Thus, we have M ′(bc) 6v `. Thus (iii)
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holds.
Assume targetAnchor(C1 ) = ∅. From targetAnchor(C ) 6= ∅, we then have
targetAnchor(C2 ) 6= ∅. So, M1(cc).top.A 6= ∅. From Lemma 20, we then have
M ′1(cc).top.A 6= ∅. Due to the rule for exit, we getM ′(bc) = M ′1(bccc)unionsqM ′1(bc).
We have M1(bccc) unionsqM1(bc) v M ′1(bccc) unionsqM ′1(bc). So, M ′1(bccc) unionsqM ′1(bc) 6v `.
Thus, M ′(bc) 6v `. Thus (iii) holds.
5. while e do C1 end
We use induction on the number of iterations executed in τ , and IH on C1,
similar to the above cases.
Lemma 16. If τ = 〈C,M〉 ∗→ 〈C ′,M ′〉 is generated by∞-Enf , and M(bc) 6v `, then
τ |` = .
Proof. By structural induction on C and Lemma 19.
Lemma 17. If M |` = M ′|` and M(T i(e)) v `, for i ≥ 1, then M(T i−1(e)) =
M ′(T i−1(e)).
Proof. We use structural induction on e.
1. e is n:
By definition M(n) = M ′(n) = n. By definition M(T i(n)) = M ′(T i(n)) = ⊥,
for i ≥ 1.
2. e is x:
From M |` = M ′|` and M(T i(x)) v `, we have M(T i−1(x)) = M ′(T i−1(x)).
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3. e is e1 ⊕ e2:
We have M(T i(e)) = M(T i(e1))unionsqM(T i(e2)). From M(T i(e)) v `, we then get
M(T i(e1)) v ` and M(T i(e2)) v `. By IH on e1 and e2, we get M(T i−1(e1)) =
M ′(T i−1(e1)) and M(T i−1(e2)) = M ′(T i−1(e2)). We have M(e) = M(e1) ⊕
M(e2) = M
′(e1)⊕M ′(e2) = M ′(e). For i ≥ 1, we haveM(T i(e)) = M(T i(e1))unionsq
M(T i(e2)) = M
′(T i(e1)) unionsqM ′(T i(e2)) = M ′(T i(e)).
Lemma 18. IfM |` = M ′|`, mon(M ), mon(M ′) andM(T i(e)) 6v `, thenM ′(T i(e)) 6v
`.
Proof. We prove it by contradiction. Assume M ′(T i(e)) v `. From mon(M ), we
then have M ′(T i+1(e)) v `. From Lemma 17, we then get M(T i(e)) = M ′(T i(e)).
So, M(T i(e)) v `, which is a contradiction.
Lemma 19. Let 〈C,M〉 ∗→ 〈C ′,M ′〉 be a trace generated by∞-Enf .
Then M(bc) vM ′(bc).
Proof. We first prove that: if 〈C,M〉 → 〈C ′,M ′〉 is generated by ∞-Enf , then
M(bc) v M ′(bc). To prove this, we use induction on the rules for∞-Enf ’s op-
erational semantics. We then use induction on the number of steps in 〈C,M〉 →
〈C ′,M ′〉.
Lemma 20. Let 〈C,M〉 ∗→ 〈stop,Mt〉 be a trace generated by∞-Enf and let C have
no exit (or i-exit), then M(cc) = Mt(cc).
Proof. We use structural induction on C.
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Lemma 21. Let 〈C,M〉 ∗→ 〈C ′,M ′〉 be a trace generated by∞-Enf .
If 2stut(M), then 2stut(M ′).
Proof. We first prove the statement for one-step transition:
〈C,M〉 → 〈C ′,M ′〉, and then we use induction on the number of steps in
〈C,M〉 ∗→ 〈C ′,M ′〉. We prove the statement for one-step transition, using in-
duction on the rules of ∞-Enf ’s operational semantics. Assume, for all x, we
have M(T 2(x)) vM(T (x)) and ∀i > 1: M(T 2(x)) = M(T i(x)).
1. (SKIP):
Because M = M ′, we then get M ′(T 2(x)) vM ′(T (x)) and
∀i > 1: M ′(T 2(x)) = M ′(T i(x)).
2. (ASGNA):
Trivially true, because no label chain is being updated, and thus, we have
∀i ≥ 1: M(T i(x)) = M ′(T i(x)).
3. (ASGNAFAIL):
Same arguments as in above case.
4. (ASGNF):
Because for every x we have M(T 2(x)) v M(T (x)), we get M(T 2(e)) v
M(T (e)). We then have
M(T 2(e)) unionsqM(bccc) unionsqM(bc) vM(T (e)) unionsqM(bccc) unionsqM(bc),
and thus M ′(T 2(w)) vM ′(T (w)).
Similarly, we get ∀i > 1: M ′(T 2(w)) = M ′(T i(w)).
5. (IF1),(IF2),(WL1),(WL2):
Trivially true, because no label chain is being updated, and thus,
∀i ≥ 1: M(T i(x)) = M ′(T i(x)).
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6. (EXIT):
Only label chains of w ∈ W change. We have M ′(T 2(w)) = M(T 2(w)) unionsq
M(bccc) unionsq M(bc) and M ′(T (w) = M(T (w)) unionsq M(bccc) unionsq M(bc). Because
M(T 2(w)) v M(T (w)), we then get M ′(T 2(w)) v M ′(T (w)). Similarly, we
get ∀i > 1: M ′(T 2(w)) = M ′(T i(w)).
7. (SEQ1),(SEQ2),(SEQF):
We use IH.
Theorem 4. k-Enf is an enforcer on R for k-BNI(L), for any L and k ≥ 2.
Proof. It is easy to prove that k-Enf is an enforcer on R and satisfies restrictions
(E1), (E2), and (E3) by induction on the rules for k-Enf . We omit the details.
We now prove k-BNI(k-Enf ,L, C), for a command C, a lattice L, and k ≥ 2.
Consider ` ∈ L. Take M,M ′ with M |= H0(k-Enf ,L, C), M ′ |= H0(k-Enf ,L, C),
M |` = M ′|`, and finite traces τ = tracek-Enf (C,M) and τ ′ = tracek-Enf (C,M ′),
where τ = 〈C,M〉 ∗→ 〈Ct,Mt〉, and τ ′ = 〈C,M ′〉 ∗→ 〈C ′t,M ′t〉.
We prove τ |k` =obs τ ′|k` or equivalently τ |` =obs τ ′|`, because k-Enf gen-
erates observation up to kth tag. From M |= H0(k-Enf ,L, C) and M ′ |=
H0(k-Enf ,L, C), we get M(cc) = M ′(cc), mon(M), and mon(M ′). There exists
MI such that MI |= H0(∞-Enf ,L, C), MI =k M , and kstut(MI). Similarly, there
exists M ′I such that M
′
I |= H0(∞-Enf ,L, C), M ′I =k M ′, and kstut(M ′I).
We prove MI |` = M ′I |`. Due to M |` = M ′|`, MI =k M , and M ′I =k M ′, it
suffices to examine ∀x: ∀i > k: T i(x). Assume MI(T i(x)) v `. From kstut(MI),
we then get MI(T k(x)) v `. From MI =k M , we then have M(T k(x)) v `. By
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definition of k-Enf , we have T k+1(x) = T k(x), and thus M(T k+1(x)) v `. From
M |` = M ′|`, we then get M(T k(x)) = M ′(T k(x)). From MI =k M , kstut(MI),
M ′I =k M
′, and kstut(M ′I), we have MI(T
i−1(x)) = M ′I(T
i−1(x)) and MI(T i(x)) =
M ′I(T
i(x)). So, MI |` = M ′I |`.
We have MI(cc) = M ′I(cc), due to M(cc) = M
′(cc), MI =k M , and M ′I =k M
′.
We have mon(MI), due to mon(M),MI =k M , and kstut(MI). Similarly, we have
mon(M ′I).
Consider
τI = trace∞-Enf (C,MI) = 〈C,MI〉 ∗→ 〈Ct,MIt〉, and
τ ′I = trace∞-Enf (C,M
′
I) = 〈C,M ′I〉 ∗→ 〈C ′t,M ′It〉.
From Lemma 22, and applying induction on the number of steps in τ and τ ′, we
get τI |k` = τ |` and τ ′I |k` = τ ′|`. Because∞-Enf satisfies BNI+ (Lemma 13), we get
τI |` =obs τ ′I |`. We then get τI |k` =obs τ ′I |k` . So, τ |` =obs τ ′|`.
Lemma 22. Consider τ = 〈C,M〉 → 〈Cn,Mn〉 be a step under k-Enf with k ≥ 2. Let
M ′ =k M , kstut(M ′), and τ ′ = 〈C,M ′〉 → 〈C ′n,M ′n〉 be a step under∞-Enf . Then,
M ′n =k Mn, kstut(M ′n), Cn = C ′n, and τ |` = τ ′|k` .
Proof. Structural induction on C.
1. C is skip:
We have M = Mn and M ′ = M ′n. So, M ′n =k Mn and kstut(M ′n). Also,
Cn = C
′
n = stop and τ |` = τ ′|k` = .
2. C is a := e:
Ga:=e is T (e) unionsqM(bccc) unionsq bc v T (a). Because M ′ =k M and k ≥ 2, we have
M(e) = M ′(e), M(T (e)) = M ′(T (e)), M(T 2(e)) = M ′(T 2(e)), M(T (a)) =
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M ′(T (a)), M(cc) = M ′(cc), M(bc) = M ′(bc). So, τ and τ ′ both are generated
from ASGNA, or both from ASGNAFAIL. So, Cn = C ′n. Also, Mn(bc) = M ′n(bc).
Thus, M ′n =k Mn. Because no label chain changed, kstut(M ′) gives kstut(M ′n).
Because M(e) = M ′(e), we also get τ |` = τ ′|k` .
3. C is w := e:
We have Cn = C ′n = stop. We have ∀0 ≤ i ≤ k:
M ′n(T
i(w)) = M ′(T i(e)) unionsqM ′(cc) unionsqM ′(bc) =
M(T i(e)) unionsqM(cc) unionsqM(bc) = Mn(T i(w)).
Also, ∀i > k, we haveM ′n(T i(w)) = M ′n(T k(w)). So,M ′n =k Mn and kstut(M ′n).
We have τ |` = τ ′|k` , because ∀0 ≤ i ≤ k + 1 we have Mn(T i(w)) = M ′n(T i(w)).
4. C is if e then C1 else C2 end:
From M ′ =k M , we get M(e) = M ′(e), M(T (e)) = M ′(T (e)), M(cc) = M ′(cc),
M(bc) = M ′(bc). Both τ and τ ′ take the same branch. Say C1:
τ = 〈C,M〉 → 〈C1; exit,M1〉
τ ′ = 〈C,M ′〉 → 〈C1; exit,M ′1〉.
We have M1(cc) = M ′1(cc). So, M ′1 =k M1. Because no label chain changed,
kstut(M ′) gives kstut(M ′1). Also, τ |` = τ ′|` =  and Cn = C ′n = C1; exit.
5. C is while e do C1 end:
Similarly to above.
6. C is C1;C2:
By IH on C1.
7. C is exit:
We have Cn = C ′n = stop. Also τ |` = τ ′|` = . From M ′ =k M , we get
M(cc) = M ′(cc) and M(bc) = M ′(bc). So, Mt(cc) = M ′t(cc) and Mt(bc) =
M ′t(bc). Only variables in W change. Assume w ∈ W . We have that
∀0 ≤ i ≤ k: M ′n(T i(w)) = M ′(T i(w)) unionsqM ′(cc) unionsqM ′(bc) =
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M(T i(w)) unionsqM(cc) unionsqM(bc) = Mn(T i(w)).
Alos, ∀i > k, we haveM ′n(T i(w)) = M ′n(T k(w)). So,M ′n =k Mn and kstut(M ′n).
Lemma 23. If 〈C,M〉 → 〈C ′,M ′〉 according to k-Enf , and 2stut(M), then 2stut(M ′).
Proof. Assume 〈C,MI〉 → 〈C ′I ,M ′I〉 according to ∞-Enf , where MI =k M
and kstut(MI). From Lemma 22, we get M ′I =k M
′ and kstut(M ′I). Because
2stut(M), MI =k M , and kstut(MI), we have 2stut(MI). From Lemma 21, we
get 2stut(M ′I). From M
′
I =k M
′, we then get 2stut(M ′).
B.3 Optimized Enforcer k-Eopt
We sketch the construction of k-Eopt . We add two rules for if command (one
for each truth value of the guard) to k-Enf . These new rules apply to a simple
if command. We add a premise to the existing rules for if command, so that
these rules are triggered when this if command is not simple. The new rules for
simple if command augment the taken branch with a new delimiter i-end, and
we add one rule for i-end to k-Enf ; this rule sets certain labels of label chains
to ⊥. Notice, there are programs where k-Eopt produces more permissive label
chains than those produced by k-Enf .
Figure B.1 gives the rules for augmenting k-Enf in order to obtain k-Eopt .
Function isSimple(C,M, i) decides whether a command C is simple:
(i) C is of the form if a > 0 then wi := e else wi := n end,
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(IFS1)
∃i: 1 ≤ i ≤ k: isSimple(if e then C1 else C2 end,M, i)
M(e) 6= 0 cc′ = M(cc).push(〈M(T (e)), ∅, ∅〉
〈if e then C1 else C2 end,M〉 → 〈C1; i-exit,M [cc 7→ cc′]〉
(IFS2)
∃i: 1 ≤ i ≤ k: isSimple(if e then C1 else C2 end,M, i)
M(e) = 0 cc′ = M(cc).push(〈M(T (e)), ∅, ∅〉
〈if e then C1 else C2 end,M〉 → 〈C2; i-exit,M [cc 7→ cc′]〉
(EXIT IFS)
cc′ = cc.pop
〈i-exit,M〉 → 〈stop,M [∀j: i<j≤k: T j(wi) 7→ ⊥, cc 7→ cc′]〉
Figure B.1: Rules for simple if command
(ii) a is an anchor variable,
(iii) wi is a flexible variable,
(iv) i = 1 and M(T (e)) = ⊥, or
i > 1, M(T i−1(e)) 6= ⊥, and M(T i(e)) = ⊥,
(v) n is a constant,
(vi) C is context-free (e.g., M(cc) =  and M(bc) = ⊥).
Notice that if isSimple(C,M, i) holds, then isSimple(C,M, j) does not hold for
j 6= i, due to (iv) and monotonically decreasing label chains.
As an example, we show how k-Eopt deduces label chains for the following
simple if :
if m > 0 then w := h else w := 4 end (B.4)
where anchor variable m is associated with 〈M,⊥,⊥,⊥〉, anchor variable h is
associated with 〈H,⊥,⊥,⊥〉, and h 6= 4. Without considering the context (i.e.,
m > 0), flexible variable w would be associated with either 〈H,⊥,⊥,⊥〉 (due to
w := h) or 〈⊥,⊥,⊥,⊥〉 (due to w := 4), when execution of assignments ends.
Here, only w and T (w) reveal information about guard m > 0. So, at the end
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of the conditional command, only T (w) and T 2(w) should be updated with the
sensitivity of the context T (m) = M. Thus, if m > 0, then w is associated with
〈H,M,⊥,⊥〉, at the end of the conditional command. Otherwise, w is associated
with 〈M,M,⊥,⊥〉. Notice that, in both cases, the meta-meta label of w is strictly
less restrictive than its metalabel. So, using the metalabel to specify its own sen-
sitivity would be conservative. In particular, using rules from k-Enf , w would
be associated with 〈M,M,M,M〉 or 〈H,M,M,M〉 at the end of the execution. Con-
sequently, k-Enf deduces less permissive label chains than k-Eopt .
Consider now how k-Eopt produces label chains for the following simple if :
if a > 0 then wi := e else wi := n end
where T (a) = A, T j(e) 6= ⊥ for j < i, and T j(e) = ⊥ for j ≥ i. Without
considering the context, we have
∀j ≥ i: T j(wi) = ⊥
at the end of both branches. Only T j(wi), for j < i, reveal information about
guard a > 0. So, at the end of the conditional command, only T j+1(wi), for
j < i, should be updated with T (a) = A. Thus, at the end of the conditional
command, we always have
∀j > i: T j(wi) = ⊥.
So, when execution exits a simple if command, T j(wi) can be set to ⊥, for every
j > i.
Consider now lattice L3 , 〈{H,M, L},v〉 with ⊥ = L @ M @ H and the
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following program:
if m > 0 then w := h else w := 4 end;
if l > 0 then w′ := w else w := m end;
w′′ := w′
where l is anchor variable with T (l) = ⊥ and w′, w′′ are flexible variables. If
m 6> 0 and l > 0, then w′′ is associated with 〈M,M,⊥,⊥〉. If l 6> 0, then w′′
is associated with 〈M,⊥,⊥,⊥〉. So, k-Eopt produces 2-precise 2-varying label
chains for the target variable w′′. Such an example can be extended to show that
k-Eopt can produce k-precise k-varying label chains.
For enforcer k-Eopt , we have nk-Eopt = k + 1, Aux k-Eopt = {cc, bc},
Initk-Eopt(cc) = , and Initk-Eopt(bc) = ⊥.
B.4 Soundness of k-Eopt
Lemma 24. k-Eopt is an enforcer on R for k-BNI with k ≥ 2.
Proof. We first add the rules in Figure B.1 to k-Enf and retrieve k-Eopt . Also,
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we substitute (IF1) and (IF2) with:
(IF1’)
@i: 1 ≤ i ≤ k: isSimple(if e then C1 else C2 end,M, i)
M(e) 6= 0 W = targetFlex (C2)
A = targetAnchor(C2) cc
′ = M(cc).push(〈M(T (e)), W, A〉)
〈if e then C1 else C2 end,M〉 → 〈C1; exit,M [cc 7→ cc′]〉
(IF2’)
@i: 1 ≤ i ≤ k: isSimple(if e then C1 else C2 end,M, i)
M(e) = 0 W = targetFlex (C1)
A = targetAnchor(C1) cc
′ = M(cc).push(〈M(T (e)), W, A〉)
〈if e then C1 else C2 end,M〉 → 〈C2; exit,M [cc 7→ cc′]〉
It is easy to prove that k-Eopt is an enforcer on R and satisfies restrictions (E1),
(E2), and (E3) by induction on the rules for k-Eopt .1 We omit the details.
We prove that BNI+(k-Eopt ,L,C) holds, for a command C and a lattice L.
Assume ` ∈ L and
M |` = M ′|`,
M(cc) = M ′(cc),mon(M),mon(M ′)
τ = 〈C,M〉 ∗→ 〈Ct,Mt〉 according to k-Eopt ,
τ ′ = 〈C,M ′〉 ∗→ 〈C ′t,M ′t〉 according to k-Eopt
where Ct and C ′t are terminations (normal or blocked).
We prove c1, c2, c3, and c4. We use structural induction on C. We build on
the proof of Lemma 13. That proof uses lemmata 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 20,
which all still hold for k-Eopt .
If C is skip or a := e, then k-Eopt and∞-Enf use the same rules. So, we follow
1 For k-Eopt , we could use exit and introduce a new auxiliary for tracking when a simple if
is executed. For simplicity, we instead introduce a new conditional delimiter i-exit and extend
definition 〈C,M〉 =0 〈C ′,M ′〉 to hold even if the syntax of conditional delimiters that appear in
C and C ′ is different.
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the same proof as in Case 1 and Case 2 of Lemma 13.
If C is w := e, then k-Eopt and∞-Enf use the same rule up to the kth tag. So, we
follow the same proof as in Case 3 of Lemma 13 by bounding r ≤ k and i ≤ k
and recalling T k(x) = T k+1(x) (dy definition of k-Eopt).
If C is C1;C2, while e do Ct end, or exit, then k-Eopt and∞-Enf use the same
rules up to the kth tag. We follow the same proof as in Cases 4,6,7 of Lemma 13
by bounding i ≤ k and recalling T k(x) = T k+1(x) (dy definition of k-Eopt).
Now, it suffices to prove that BNI+(k-Eopt ,L,C) holds, where C is an if .
We first prove that if isSimple(C,M, i) holds for some 1 ≤ i ≤ k, then
isSimple(C,M ′, i) holds, too. Because isSimple(C,M, i) holds, we get:
C is of the form if a > 0 then wi := ei else wi := n end, (B.5)
a is an anchor variable, (B.6)
wi is a flexible variable, (B.7)
i = 1 and M(T (ei)) = ⊥, or
i > 1 and M(T i−1(ei)) 6= ⊥ and M(T i(ei)) = ⊥ (B.8)
n is a constant, (B.9)
C is context-free (e.g., M(cc) =  and M(bc) = ⊥). (B.10)
• From (B.8), mon(M), andM |` = M ′|`, we haveM(T i(ei)) = M ′(T i(ei)) and
if i > 1, then M(T i−1(ei)) = M ′(T i−1(ei)).
So,
i = 1 and M ′(T (ei)) = ⊥, or
i > 1 and M ′(T i−1(ei)) 6= ⊥ and M ′(T i(ei)) = ⊥
(B.11)
• From (B.10), we have M(cc) = . From M(cc) = M ′(cc), we then get
M ′(cc) = . (B.12)
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• From (B.10), we have M(bc) = ⊥. From M |` = M ′|`, we then get
M ′(bc) = ⊥. (B.13)
From (B.5), (B.6), (B.7), (B.11), (B.9), (B.12), and (B.13), we get that
isSimple(C,M ′, i) holds. So, if isSimple(C,M, i) holds, then isSimple(C,M ′, i)
holds, too. Similarly, if isSimple(C,M ′, i) holds, then isSimple(C,M, i) holds.
Thus, τ and τ ′ both use IFS or IF’. If both τ and τ ′ use IF’ (i.e, IF1’ or IF2’), then we
follow Case 5 of Lemma 13.
So, it remains to handle the case where τ and τ ′ both use IFS. A simple if
does not contain assignments to anchor variables. So, a trace of a simple if
never stops before normal termination. Thus, c2, c3, and c4 are trivially true.
We prove c1. Assume C is if a > 0 then wi := ei else wi := n end and
M |` = M ′|`,
M(cc) = M ′(cc),mon(M),mon(M ′)
τ = 〈C,M〉 → 〈Cb; i-exit,Mb〉 → 〈i-exit,Me〉 → 〈stop,Mt〉,
τ ′ = 〈C,M ′〉 → 〈C ′b; i-exit,M ′b〉 → 〈i-exit,M ′e〉 → 〈stop,M ′t〉
where Cb and C ′b are either wi := ei or wi := n.
We prove τ |` =obs τ ′|`, Mt|` = M ′t|`, and Mt(cc) = M ′t(cc), in the case τ and
τ ′ both use IFS (i.e, IFS1 or IFS2). From M(cc) = M ′(cc), IFS, and EXIT IFS, we get
Mt(cc) = M
′
t(cc). It remains to prove that τ |` =obs τ ′|` and Mt|` = M ′t|`.
We first compute the possible label chains that wi may be associated with at
different points of the execution of C. Notice that by the definition of simple if
we have bccc = ⊥ and bc = ⊥ at the beginning of its execution.
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(I) After execution of wi := ei:
From ASGNF, IFS, and (B.8) we have:
∀j: 1 ≤ j < i: T j(wi) = T j(ei) unionsq T (a) and
∀j: i ≤ j ≤ k: T j(wi) = T (a).
(II) After execution of wi := n:
From ASGNF and IFS we have:
∀j: 1 ≤ j ≤ k: T j(wi) = T (a).
(III) After execution of i-exit when a > 0 holds:
From EXIT IFS and (I) we have:
∀j: 1 ≤ j < i: T j(wi) = T j(ei) unionsq T (a) and T i(wi) = T (a) and
∀j: i < j ≤ k: T j(wi) = ⊥.
(IV) After execution of i-exit when a 6> 0 holds:
From EXIT IFS and (II) we have:
∀j: 1 ≤ j ≤ i: T j(wi) = T (a) and ∀j: i < j ≤ k: T j(wi) = ⊥.
By definition of anchor variables, M(T 2(a)) = ⊥. From M |` = M ′|`, we then get
M(T (a)) = M ′(T (a)).
We prove τ |` =obs τ ′|` and Mt|` = M ′t|`.
1. M(T (a)) v `:
From M |` = M ′|`, we get M(a) = M ′(a). So, τ and τ ′ take the same
branch. We first prove τ |` =obs τ ′|`. Because these observations might in-
volve only wi and its associated label chain, it suffices to show that: for j
such that 1 ≤ j ≤ k + 1, if Me(T j(wi)) v `, then M ′e(T j(wi)) v ` and
Me(T
j−1(wi)) = M ′e(T
j−1(wi)). We examine two cases based on the branch
that is executed.
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• Branch wi := ei is executed.
Consider j such that i+ 1 ≤ j ≤ k + 1.
Due to (I), we have Me(T j−1(wi)) = M ′e(T j−1(wi)) = M(T (a)). Be-
cause T k+1(wi) = T k(wi), we also have Me(T k+1(wi)) = M ′e(T k+1(wi)) =
M(T (a)).
Consider j = i. Me(T j(wi)) v ` and M ′e(T j(wi)) v ` hold because from
(I), we have Me(T j(wi)) = M ′e(T j(wi)) = M(T (a)) and M(T (a)) v `.
From (B.8) and M |` = M ′|` we have M(T i−1(ei)) = M ′(T i−1(ei)), and
thus, (I) gives Me(T j−1(wi)) = M(T i−1(ei)) unionsqM(T (a)) = M ′(T i−1(ei)) unionsq
M ′(T (a)) = M ′e(T
j−1(wi)).
Consider j < i. Assume Me(T j(wi)) v `. Then, from (I), we have
M(T j(ei)) v `. From M |` = M ′|` and Lemma 17, we then have
M(T j−1(ei)) = M ′(T j−1(ei)). For j = 1, we then have M(ei) =
M ′(ei). For j 6= 1, (I) gives Me(T j−1(wi)) = M(T j−1(ei)) unionsqM(T (a)) =
M ′(T j−1(ei)) unionsqM ′(T (a)) = M ′e(T j−1(wi)).
• Branch wi := n is executed.
From (II) and because T k+1(wi) = T k(wi), we get
∀j: 1 ≤ j ≤ k + 1: Me(T j(wi)) = M ′e(T j(wi)) = M(T (a)).
Also, Me(wi) = M ′e(wi) = n.
So, τ |` =obs τ ′|` holds.
We now prove Mt|` = M ′t|`. Because Mt(cc) = M ′t(cc) and because bc is not
modified, it suffices to prove Mt|` = M ′t|` for the label chain of wi. We prove
for j with 1 ≤ j ≤ k + 1 that if Mt(T j(wi)) v `, then M ′t(T j(wi)) v ` and
Mt(T
j−1(wi)) = M ′t(T
j−1(wi)). We examine two cases based on the branch
that is executed.
212
• Branch wi := ei is executed.
From (III) and because T k+1(wi) = T k(wi), we get
∀j: i ≤ j ≤ k + 1: Mt(T j(wi)) = M ′t(T j(wi)).
So, it suffices to examine j ≤ i.
Consider j = i. From (B.8) and M |` = M ′|` we have M(T i−1(ei)) =
M ′(T i−1(ei)), and thus, (III) gives Mt(T j−1(wi)) = M(T i−1(ei)) unionsq
M(T (a)) = M ′(T i−1(ei)) unionsqM(T (a)) = M ′t(T j−1(wi)).
Consider j < i. Assume Mt(T j(wi)) v `. Then, from (III), we have
M(T j(ei)) v `. From M |` = M ′|`, we then have M(T j−1(ei)) =
M ′(T j−1(ei)). For j = 1, we then have M(ei) = M ′(ei). For j 6= 1,
we then have Mt(T j−1(wi)) = M(T j−1(ei)) unionsqM(T (a)) = M ′(T j−1(ei)) unionsq
M ′(T (a)) = M ′t(T
j−1(wi)).
• Branch wi := n is executed.
From (IV) and because T k+1(wi) = T k(wi), we get
∀j: 1 ≤ j ≤ k + 1: Mt(T j(wi)) = M ′t(T j(wi)).
Also, Mt(wi) = M ′t(wi) = n.
Thus, Mt|` = M ′t|` holds.
2. M(T (a)) 6v `:
Traces τ and τ ′ may take different branches. From (I), (II), M(T (a)) 6v `, and
because T k+1(wi) = T k(wi), we get that:
∀j: 1 ≤ j ≤ k + 1: Me(T j(wi)) 6v ` ∧M ′e(T j(wi)) 6v `.
Thus, τ |` =obs  and τ ′|` =obs .
We now prove Mt|` = M ′t|`. Because Mt(cc) = M ′t(cc) and because bc is not
modified, it suffices to prove Mt|` = M ′t|` for the label chain of wi. We prove
for j with 1 ≤ j ≤ k + 1 that if Mt(T j(wi)) v `, then M ′t(T j(wi)) v ` and
Mt(T
j−1(wi)) = M ′t(T
j−1(wi)). (III) and (IV) give ∀j: 1 ≤ j ≤ i: T j(wi) 6v `. It
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then suffices to prove that the following holds:
∀j: i ≤ j ≤ k + 1: Mt(T j(wi)) = M ′t(T j(wi)).
For j = i, we have Mt(T j(wi)) = M(T (a)) = M ′t(T j(wi)). For j with i < j <
k+ 1, we have Mt(T j(wi)) = ⊥ = M ′t(T j(wi)). Because T k+1(wi) = T k(wi), we
also have Mt(T k+1(wi)) = ⊥ = M ′t(T k+1(wi)). So, Mt|` = M ′t|` holds.
So, BNI+(k-Eopt ,L,C) holds. Because BNI+(k-Eopt ,L,C) implies k-BNI(k-Eopt ,L,C),
we get that k-BNI(k-Eopt ,L,C) holds, too.
B.5 Permissiveness of k-Enf versus Chain Length
Theorem 5. k-Enf <k,Lρk (k + 1)-Enf , for k ≥ 2 and any lattice L with at least one
non-bottom element.
Proof. We first prove k-Enf ≤k,Lρk (k + 1)-Enf . Consider τ = tracek-Enf (C,M)
with M |= H0(k-Enf ,L, C). Consider M ′ such that M ′ |= H0((k + 1)-Enf ,L, C),
M |k = M ′|k, and τ ′ = trace(k+1)-Enf (C,M ′). Using induction on the number of
steps in τ and Lemma 25, we get that τ |k`  τ ′|k` , for all ` ∈ L. So, k-Enf ≤k,Lρk
(k + 1)-Enf .
To prove k-Enf <k,Lρk (k+1)-Enf , it suffices to also show that (k+1)-Enf 6≤k,Lρk
k-Enf . Because L contains at least one non-bottom element `, with ⊥ @ `, there
exists M1 such that M1 |= H0((k + 1)-Enf ,L, C),
τ = trace(k+1)-Enf (w := w1,M1) = 〈w := w1,M1〉 → 〈stop,M2〉,
and M1(T k+1(w1)) @ M1(T k(w1)). There exists M ′1 such that M ′1 |=
H0(k-Enf ,L, C), M1|k = M ′1|k, and
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τ ′ = tracek-Enf (w := w1,M ′1) = 〈w := w1,M ′1〉 → 〈stop,M ′2〉.
From M1|k = M ′1|k, we have M ′1(T k(w1)) = M1(T k(w1)). By definition of k-Enf
(i.e., ∀x :T k+1(x) = T k(x)), we then have
M ′1(T
k+1(w1)) = M
′
1(T
k(w1)) = M1(T
k(w1)) AM1(T k+1(w1)),
and thus, we get M ′2(T k+1(w)) A M2(T k+1(w)). So, τ generates observation
involving T k(w) to label M2(T k+1(w)), but τ ′ does not generate observation
involving T k(w) to label M2(T k+1(w)). So, (k + 1)-Enf 6≤k,Lρk k-Enf . Thus,
k-Enf <k,Lρk (k + 1)-Enf .
Lemma 25. Consider step τ = 〈C,M1〉 → 〈C2,M2〉 generated by k-Enf for k ≥ 2.
Consider step τ ′ = 〈C,M ′1〉 → 〈C ′2,M ′2〉 generated by (k + 1)-Enf .
If M1 =k M ′1, then C2 = C ′2, M2 =k M ′2, and τ |k`  τ ′|k` , for all `.
Proof. By structural induction on C.
Theorem 6. k-Enf ∼=k,Lc (k + 1)-Enf for any lattice L and k ≥ 2
Proof. We prove k-Enf ≤k,Lc (k + 1)-Enf and (k + 1)-Enf ≤k,Lc k-Enf .
Consider conventionally initialized memory M with M |= H0(k-Enf ,L, C) and
τ = tracek-Enf (C,M). Consider M ′ such that M ′ |= H0((k + 1)-Enf ,L, C),
ρ1(M,M
′), and τ ′ = trace(k+1)-Enf (C,M ′). So, M ′ is conventionally initialized,
too. Thus, we have 2stut(M) and 2stut(M ′). Also, because M and M ′ are con-
ventionally initialized and ρ1(M,M ′) holds, we get that M =k M ′ holds. Using
induction on the number of steps in τ and Lemma 26, we get that τ |k` = τ ′|k` ,
for all ` ∈ L. So, k-Enf ≤k,Lc (k + 1)-Enf and (k + 1)-Enf ≤k,Lc k-Enf . Thus,
k-Enf ∼=k,Lc (k + 1)-Enf .
Lemma 26. Consider step τ = 〈C,M1〉 → 〈C2,M2〉 generated by k-Enf for k ≥ 2.
Consider step τ ′ = 〈C,M ′1〉 → 〈C ′2,M ′2〉 generated by (k + 1)-Enf .
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If M1 =k M ′1, 2stut(M1), and 2stut(M ′1), then C2 = C ′2, M2 =k M ′2, 2stut(M2),
2stut(M ′2), and τ |k` = τ ′|k` , for all `.
Proof. By structural induction on C.
Theorem 7. k-Enf ∼=0,Lρk (k + 1)-Enf for any lattice L and k ≥ 2.
Proof. Lemma 27 gives 2-Enf ∼=0,Lρ2 k-Enf for any lattice L and k ≥ 2. Because
ρk ⇒ ρ2, we then get 2-Enf ∼=0,Lρk k-Enf for k ≥ 2. By transitivity, we then have
k-Enf ∼=0,Lρk (k + 1)-Enf .
Lemma 27. 2-Enf ∼=0,Lρ2 k-Enf for any lattice L and k > 2.
Proof. We prove k-Enf ≤0,Lρ2 2-Enf and 2-Enf ≤0,Lρ2 k-Enf . Consider memory
M with M |= H0(2-Enf,L, C) and τ = trace2-Enf(C,M). Consider memory M ′
such that M ′ |= H0(k-Enf ,L, C), ρ2(M,M ′), and τ ′ = tracek-Enf (C,M ′). Using
induction on the number of steps in τ and Lemma 28, we get that τ |0` = τ ′|0` , for
all ` ∈ L. So, k-Enf ≤0,Lρ2 2-Enf and 2-Enf ≤0,Lρ2 k-Enf . Thus, 2-Enf ∼=0,Lρ2 k-Enf .
Lemma 28. Consider step τ = 〈C,M1〉 → 〈C2,M2〉 generated by k-Enf for k ≥ 2.
Consider step τ ′ = 〈C,M ′1〉 → 〈C ′2,M ′2〉 generated by 2-Enf .
If M1 =2 M ′1, then C2 = C ′2, M2 =2 M ′2, and τ |0` = τ ′|0` , for all `.
Proof. By structural induction on C.
216
B.6 Other Enforcers
Strong Threat Model
Theorem 8. For a lattice L, for an enforcer E that satisfies (k − 1)-BNI(L), with
k ≥ 2, and produces some k-precise k-varying label chains with elements in L, and for
an enforcer E ′ that produces (k − 1)-dependent label chains,
if E ≤k−1,Lc E ′, then E ′ does not satisfy (k − 1)-BNI(L).
Enforcer E and lattice L exist.
Proof. First we prove that E and L exist. Lemma 29 gives that k-Eopt is an
enforcer, satisfies (k − 1)-BNI(Lk), and produces some k-precise k-varying label
chains with elements in Lk, which is defined in (B.14). So, L exists and it can be
Lk, and E exists and it can be k-Eopt .
Assume a lattice L and an enforcer E that satisfies (k − 1)-BNI(L) and pro-
duces some k-precise k-varying label chains with elements in L:
Ω = 〈`1, `2, . . . , `k〉 and Ω′ = 〈`1, `2, . . . , `′k〉
with `k 6= `′k. Assume an enforcer E ′ that produces (k − 1)-dependent label
chains and E ≤k−1,Lc E ′.
We prove that E ′ does not satisfy (k − 1)-BNI(L). Assume for contradiction
thatE ′ satisfies (k−1)-BNI(L). We have that there are j,C, andM |= H0(E,L, C)
such that Ω is k-precise at the jth state of τ = traceE(C,M). There exists a
memoryM1 such thatM1 is conventionally initialized,M1 |= H0(E ′,L, C) holds,
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and ρ1(M,M1). Let τ1 = traceE′(C,M1). By definition of k-precise and because
E ≤k−1,Lc E ′ and E ′ satisfies (k − 1)-BNI(L), we then get that τ1 produces Ω at
the jth state. So, by definition, 1 ≤ j ≤ |τ1| and there exists w such that:
τ1[j − 1] = 〈w := e;Cr,Mw〉, τ1[j] = 〈Cr,Mr〉,
∀i: 1 ≤ i ≤ k: Mr(T i(w)) = `i.
Working similarly for Ω′, we get:
τ2[s− 1] = 〈w′ := e′;C ′r,M ′w〉, τ2[s] = 〈C ′r,M ′r〉,
∀i: 1 ≤ i < k: M ′r(T i(w′)) = `i, M ′r(T k(w′)) = `′k
for τ2 = traceE′(C ′,M2), conventionally initialized memory M2 with M2 |=
H0(E ′,L, C ′), and 1 ≤ s ≤ |τ2|. Because E ′ uses (k − 1)-dependent label chains,
there exists a function f such that:
Mr(T
k(w)) = f(Mr(T (w)), . . . ,Mr(T
k−1(w)))
M ′r(T
k(w′)) = f(M ′r(T (w
′)), . . . ,M ′r(T
k−1(w′))).
Because ∀i: 1 ≤ i < k: Mr(T i(w)) = M ′r(T i(w′)) = `i, we then have Mr(T k(w)) =
M ′r(T
k(w′)). But Mr(T k(w)) = `k, M ′r(T k(w′)) = `′k, and `k 6= `′k give
Mr(T
k(w)) 6= M ′r(T k(w′)), which is a contradiction.
Lemma 29. For k ≥ 2, k-Eopt is an enforcer, satisfies (k − 1)-BNI(Lk), and produces
k-precise k-varying label chains with elements in Lk, which is defined in (B.14).
Proof. Lemma 24 gives that k-Eopt is an enforcer on R for k-BNI. Thus, k-Eopt
satisfies (k − 1)-BNI(Lk).
Lemma 30 gives the possible label chains that k-Eopt produces for each zj
in pgmk, which is defined below. Lemma 31 gives that these label chains are k-
precise. The last label chain in (Zk−1) is 〈`k−1, `k−1, . . . , `k−1,⊥〉 and has length k.
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The penultimate label chain in (Zk) is 〈`k−1, `k−1, . . . , `k−1, `k〉 and has length k.
The above two label chains take elements from Lk and they are k-varying.
Definition of pgmk for k ≥ 2
Let pgmk be the following program:
if a1 > 0 then w1 := 0 else w1 := 1 end;
z1 := w1;
if a2 > 0 then w2 := z1 else w2 := 2 end;
z2 := w2;
. . .
if ak−1 > 0 then wk−1 := zk−2 else wk−1 := k − 1 end;
zk−1 := wk−1;
if ak > 0 then wk := zk−1 else wk := k end;
zk := wk;
where all wk and zk are flexible variables. Assume lattice Lk of labels such that
`0 A `1 A `2 A . . . A `k A ⊥ (B.14)
Assume Lk consists only of ⊥, `j , for 0 ≤ j ≤ k. Assume pgmk is executed with
conventionally initialized memory M under k-Eopt, where M(T (aj)) = `j , for
0 ≤ j ≤ k and k ≥ 2.
(Z1) After the execution of z1 := w1, this is the possible chain for z1:
T (z1) T
2(z1) . . . T
k(z1)
〈 `1 ⊥ . . . ⊥ 〉
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(Z2) After the execution of z2 := w2, these are the possible 2 chains for z2:
T (z2) T
2(z2) T
3(z2) . . .
〈 `1 `2 ⊥ . . . 〉 a2 > 0
〈 `2 `2 ⊥ . . . 〉 a2 6> 0
(Z3) After the execution of z3 := w3, these are the possible 3 chains for z3:
T (z3) T
2(z3) T
3(z3) T
4(z3) . . .
〈 `1 `2 `3 ⊥ . . . 〉 a2 > 0 ∧ a3 > 0
〈 `2 `2 `3 ⊥ . . . 〉 a2 6> 0 ∧ a3 > 0
〈 `3 `3 `3 ⊥ . . . 〉 a3 6> 0
. . .
(Zj) After the execution of zj := wj , these are the possible j chains for zj :
T T 2 T 3 . . . T j−1 T j T j+1 . . .
〈 `1 `2 `3 . . . `j−1 `j ⊥ . . . 〉 a2, a3, . . . , aj > 0
〈 `2 `2 `3 . . . `j−1 `j ⊥ . . . 〉 a2 6> 0 ∧ a3, . . . , aj > 0
〈 `3 `3 `3 . . . `j−1 `j ⊥ . . . 〉 a3 6> 0 ∧ a4, . . . , aj > 0
. . .
〈 `j−1 `j−1 `j−1 . . . `j−1 `j ⊥ . . . 〉 aj−1 6> 0 ∧ aj > 0
〈 `j `j `j . . . `j `j ⊥ . . . 〉 aj 6> 0
(Zk) After the execution of zk := wk, these are the possible k chains for zi:
T T 2 T 3 . . . T k−1 T k
〈 `1 `2 `3 . . . `k−1 `k 〉 a2 > 0 ∧ a3 > 0 ∧ . . . ∧ aj > 0
〈 `2 `2 `3 . . . `k−1 `k 〉 a2 6> 0 ∧ a3 > 0 ∧ . . . ∧ ak > 0
〈 `3 `3 `3 . . . `k−1 `k 〉 a3 6> 0 ∧ . . . ∧ ak > 0
. . .
〈 `k−1 `k−1 `k−1 . . . `k−1 `k 〉 ak−1 6> 0 ∧ ak > 0
〈 `k `k `k . . . `k `k 〉 ak 6> 0
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Lemma 30. The label chains presented after pgmk are the only possible chains that
k-Eopt produces for variables zj , where k ≥ 2 and 1 ≤ j ≤ k.
Proof. Induction on j.
Base case: j = 1.
When execution reaches C1:
if a1 > 0 then w1 := 0 else w1 := 1 end
with a memory M ′, then isSimple(C1,M ′, 1) is always satisfied. Using IFS, EXIT IFS,
and ASGNF rules, we get that z1 is always associated with: 〈`1,⊥, . . . ,⊥〉.
Induction case:
IH: chains presented after pgmk for zj−1, with j > 1, are the only possible chains
that k-Eopt produces for zj−1.
We prove that chains presented after pgmk are the only possible chains that
k-Eopt produces for zj . When execution reaches Cj :
if aj > 0 then wj := zj−1 else wj := j end
with some memory M ′, then using IH on zj−1 we get that isSimple(Cj,M ′, j) is
always satisfied. So, rules IFS and EXIT IFS are used while executing Cj .
1. aj > 0
Assignment wj := zj−1 is executed. From IH, IFS and ASGNF, we have that wj is
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associated after wj := zj−1 with one of the following j − 1 label chains:
T T 2 T 3 . . . T j−1 T j T j+1 . . .
〈 `1 `2 `3 . . . `j−1 `j `j . . . 〉 a2, a3, . . . , aj−1 > 0
〈 `2 `2 `3 . . . `j−1 `j `j . . . 〉 a2 6> 0 ∧ a3, . . . , aj−1 > 0
〈 `3 `3 `3 . . . `j−1 `j `j . . . 〉 a3 6> 0 ∧ a4, . . . , aj−1 > 0
. . .
〈 `j−1 `j−1 `j−1 . . . `j−1 `j `j . . . 〉 aj−1 6> 0
From EXIT IFS, we have that wj is associated at the end of Cj with one of the
following j − 1 label chains:
T T 2 T 3 . . . T j−1 T j T j+1 . . .
〈 `1 `2 `3 . . . `j−1 `j ⊥ . . . 〉 a2, a3, . . . , aj−1 > 0
〈 `2 `2 `3 . . . `j−1 `j ⊥ . . . 〉 a2 6> 0 ∧ a3, . . . , aj−1 > 0
〈 `3 `3 `3 . . . `j−1 `j ⊥ . . . 〉 a3 6> 0 ∧ a4, . . . , aj−1 > 0
. . .
〈 `j−1 `j−1 `j−1 . . . `j−1 `j ⊥ . . . 〉 aj−1 6> 0
2. aj 6> 0
Assignment wj := j is executed. From IFS and ASGNF, we have that wj is asso-
ciated after wj := j with the following label chain:
T T 2 T 3 . . . T j−1 T j T j+1 . . .
〈 `j `j `j . . . `j `j `j . . . 〉
From EXIT IFS, we have that wj is associated at the end of Cj with the following
label chain:
T T 2 T 3 . . . T j−1 T j T j+1 . . .
〈 `j `j `j . . . `j `j ⊥ . . . 〉
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So, using ASGNF and the j above possible label chains produced for wj at the end
of Cj , we get that label chains presented after pgmk for zj are the only possible
label chains that k-Eopt produces for zj .
Lemma 31. The label chains produced by k-Eopt for each zj in pgmk are k-precise,
where k ≥ 2 and 1 ≤ j ≤ k.
Proof. Consider j such that 1 ≤ j ≤ k and k ≥ 2. We prove that the label chains
for zj produced by k-Eopt are k-precise. We use induction on the number n of
elements in these label chains, where 1 ≤ n ≤ k.
Base case: n = 1
We prove that the label chains produced by k-Eopt for zj are 1-precise.
Consider τ = tracek-Eopt(pgmk,M), where M is conventionally initialized
and M |= H0(k-Eopt ,Lk, pgmk). Then τ [s − 1] = 〈zj := wj;C,M0〉 and
τ [s] = 〈C,M1〉 for some 1 < s ≤ |τ |. Trace τ produces label chain Ω =
〈M1(T (zj)),M1(T 2(zj)), . . . ,M1(T k(zj))〉 at the sth state.
We prove that Ω is 1-precise. Ω may be one of the j possible label chains in
(Zj). So, the only possible labels for M1(T (zj)) are `1, `2, . . . , `j . Let M1(T (zj)) =
`i for 1 ≤ i ≤ j. Only the ith label chain in (Zj) has T (zj) = `i. So, it should be
the case that
M(ai) 6> 0,M(ai+1) > 0, . . .M(aj) > 0 if i 6= j
M(aj) 6> 0 if i = j
(B.15)
Consider an enforcer D that satisfies 0-BNI(Lk) and k-Eopt ≤0,Lkc D. Consider
memory M ′ with M ′ |= H0(D,Lk, pgmk), ρ1(M,M ′) and τ ′ = traceD(pgmk,M ′).
It should be the case that τ ′[s] = 〈C,M ′1〉, because otherwise ∀` ∈ Lk: τ |0` E τ ′|0`
(and k-Eopt ≤0,Lkc D) would not hold.
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We prove M ′1(T (zj)) = M1(T (zj)) = `i. Assume for contradiction that
M ′1(T (zj)) 6= M1(T (zj)). Either M ′1(T (zj)) 6@ M1(T (zj)) or M ′1(T (zj)) @
M1(T (zj)) holds. From M ′1(T (zj)) 6@ M1(T (zj)) and M ′1(T (zj)) 6= M1(T (zj)), we
get τ |0`i 6E τ ′|0`i , which implies that k-Eopt 6≤0,Lkc D, which is a contradiction. As-
sume M ′1(T (zj)) @M1(T (zj)). From M ′1(T (zj)) @M1(T (zj)) and M1(T (zj)) = `i,
we then have M ′1(T (zj)) @ `i. Let ` = M ′1(T (zj)). There exists M ′′′ such that
M ′′′ |= H0(k-Eopt ,Lk, pgmk) and
M and M ′′′ agree on everything except for ai > 0 (B.16)
So M ′′′ is conventionally initialized.
Let τ ′′′ = tracek-Eopt(pgmk,M ′′′). We have τ ′′′[s − 1] = 〈zj := wj;C,M ′′′0 〉
and τ ′′′[s] = 〈C,M ′′′1 〉. There exists M ′′ such that M ′′ |= H0(D,Lk, pgmk) and
ρ1(M
′′′,M ′′) hold.
Let τ ′′ = traceD(pgmk,M ′′). We should have τ ′′[s−1] = 〈zj := wj;C,M ′′0 〉 and
τ ′′[s] = 〈C,M ′′1 〉, because otherwise ∀` ∈ Lk: τ ′′′|0` E τ ′′|0` (and k-Eopt ≤0,Lkc D)
would not hold.
Because M is conventionally initialized, and because we have ρ1(M,M ′),
ρ1(M
′′′,M ′′), and (B.16), we get that M ′ and M ′′ agree on everything except for
ai > 0. In particular, from ρ1(M,M ′) and (B.15) we get M ′(T (ai)) = M(T (ai)) =
`i and
M ′(ai) 6> 0,M ′(ai+1) > 0, . . .M ′(aj) > 0 if i 6= j
M ′(aj) 6> 0 if i = j
(B.17)
From (B.15), (B.16), and ρ1(M ′′′,M ′′), we get
M ′′(ai) > 0,M ′′(ai+1) > 0, . . .M ′′(aj) > 0 if i 6= j
M ′′(aj) > 0 if i = j
(B.18)
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Because M ′ and M ′′ agree on everything except for ai and because M ′(T (ai)) =
`i 6v `, we get M ′|` = M ′′|`. So, based on pgmk, we get M ′′1 (zj) < i and M ′1(zj) = i
for 1 ≤ i ≤ j. Thus, M ′1(zj) 6= M ′′1 (zj).
Because M ′1(T (zj)) = `, observation 〈zj,M ′1(zj)〉 appears in τ ′|0` . If M ′′1 (zj) 6v
`, then observation 〈zj,M ′′1 (zj)〉 does not appear in τ ′′|0` , and thus D does not
satisfy 0-BNI(Lk). If M ′′1 (zj) v `, then observation 〈zj,M ′′1 (zj)〉 appears in τ ′′|0` .
But because M ′1(zj) 6= M ′′1 (zj), D does not satisfy 0-BNI(Lk). So, in any case D
does not satisfy 0-BNI(Lk), which is a contradiction. So, M ′1(T (zj)) = M1(T (zj)).
Thus, the label chain produced by k-Eopt for zj is 1-precise.
Induction case:
IH: The label chains for zj are n-precise, for 1 ≤ n < k.
We prove that the label chains for zj are (n+ 1)-precise.
If n + 1 ≥ j + 1, then T n+1(zj) = ⊥, and thus using IH we get that the label
chains for zj are (n+ 1)-precise.
Assume 1 ≤ n < j. Consider τ = tracek-Eopt(pgmk,M) for a conventionally
initialized memory M with M |= H0(k-Eopt ,Lk, pgmk). Then τ [s − 1] = 〈zj :=
wj;C,M0〉 and τ [s] = 〈C,M1〉 for some 1 < s ≤ |τ |. Trace τ produces label chain
Ω = 〈M1(T (zj)),M1(T 2(zj)), . . . ,M1(T k(zj))〉 at the sth state.
We prove that Ω is (n+1)-precise. Ω may be one of the j possible label chains
in (Zj). So, we get M1(T n+1(zj)) = `m, for 1 ≤ m ≤ j. Consider an enforcer D
that satisfies n-BNI(Lk) and k-Eopt ≤n,Lkc D. Assume τ ′ = traceD(pgmk,M ′),
for memory M ′ with M ′ |= H0(D,Lk, pgmk) and ρ1(M,M ′). It should be the
case that τ ′[s − 1] = 〈zj := wj;C,M ′0〉 and τ ′[s] = 〈C,M ′1〉, because otherwise
k-Eopt ≤n,Lkc D would not hold. From IH, n-BNI(Lk, D), and k-Eopt ≤n,Lkc D we
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get that
∀t: 1 ≤ t ≤ n: M ′1(T t(zj)) = M1(T t(zj)). (B.19)
We prove M ′1(T n+1(zj)) = M1(T n+1(zj)). Assume for contradiction that
M ′1(T
n+1(zj)) 6= M1(T n+1(zj)). Either M ′1(T n+1(zj)) 6@ M1(T n+1(zj)) or
M ′1(T
n+1(zj)) @ M1(T n+1(zj)) holds. From M ′1(T n+1(zj)) 6@ M1(T n+1(zj)) and
M ′1(T
n+1(zj)) 6= M1(T n+1(zj)), we get k-Eopt 6≤n,Lkc D, which is a contradiction.
Assume M ′1(T n+1(zj)) @ M1(T n+1(zj)). So M ′1(T n+1(zj)) @ `m. Let ` =
M ′1(T
n+1(zj)). There exists memory Mm such that Mm |= H0(k-Eopt ,Lk, pgmk)
and Mm = M [¬(M(am) > 0)], which denotes that Mm and M agree on every-
thing expect for am > 0: (Mm(am) > 0) = ¬(M(am) > 0). So, Mm is convention-
ally initialized.
Let τm = tracek-Eopt(pgmk,Mm). So, τm[s−1] = 〈zj := wj;C,Mm0〉 and τm[s] =
〈C,Mm1〉. From Lemma 32, we get
Mm1(T
n(zj)) 6= M1(T n(zj)). (B.20)
There exists M ′′ with M ′′ |= H0(D,Lk, pgmk), ρ1(Mm,M ′′), and τ ′′ =
traceD(pgmk,M
′′). We should have τ ′′[s − 1] = 〈zj := wj;C,M ′′0 〉 and τ ′′[s] =
〈C,M ′′1 〉, because otherwise ∀` ∈ Lk: τm|n` E τ ′′|n` (and k-Eopt ≤n,Lkc D) would
not hold. From ρ1(Mm,M ′′), ρ1(M,M ′), and Mm = M [¬(M(am) > 0)], and be-
cause M,Mm are conventionally initialized, we get that M ′ and M ′′ agree on
everything except for am: M ′(am > 0) = ¬M ′′(am > 0). From ρ1(M,M ′) and
M(T (am)) = `m, we get M ′(T (am)) = `m and then M ′′(T (am)) = `m. From
`m 6v `, we then get M ′|` = M ′′|`. By IH, n-BNI(Lk, D), and k-Eopt ≤n,Lkc D we
getM ′′1 (T n(zj)) = Mm1(T n(zj)). From (B.19) and (B.20) we then getM ′1(T n(zj)) 6=
M ′′1 (T
n(zj)).
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Because M ′1(T n+1(zj)) = `, observation 〈T n(zj),M ′1(T n(zj))〉 appears in τ ′|n` .
If M ′′1 (T n+1(zj)) 6v `, then observation 〈T n(zj),M ′′1 (T n(zj))〉 does not appear in
τ ′′|n` , and thus n-BNI(Lk, D) does not hold. IfM ′′1 (T n+1(zj)) v `, then observation
〈T n(zj),M ′′1 (T n(zj))〉 appears in τ ′′|n` . But because M ′1(T n(zj)) 6= M ′′1 (T n(zj)), n-
BNI(Lk, D) does not hold. So, in any case n-BNI(Lk, D) does not hold, which
is a contradiction. So, M ′1(T n+1(zj)) = M1(T n+1(zj)). Thus, the label chains
produced by k-Eopt for zj are (n+ 1)-precise.
Lemma 32. Consider τ = tracek-Eopt(pgmk,M), where M is conventionally initial-
ized, τ [s − 1] = 〈zj := wj;C,M0〉 and τ [s] = 〈C,M1〉. Assume M1(T n+1(zj)) = `m,
with 1 ≤ n < j, 1 ≤ j ≤ k, and 1 ≤ m ≤ j. Then for τ ′ = tracek-Eopt(pgmk,M ′) with
M ′ = M [¬(M(am > 0))], τ ′[s− 1] = 〈zj := wj;C,M ′0〉, and τ ′[s] = 〈C,M ′1〉,
we get M1(T n(zj)) 6= M ′1(T n(zj)).
Proof. 1. M1(T (zj)) = `m
From (Zj) and M1(T n+1(zj)) = `m, we then get that 2 ≤ n + 1 ≤ m. So,
1 ≤ n ≤ m − 1. Also, M1(T n(zj)) = `m. Such a label chain M1(Ωzj) for zj
is generated when M(am) 6> 0 ∧ M(am+1) > 0 ∧ . . . ∧ M(aj) > 0. So, for
M ′ we should have M ′(am) > 0 ∧M ′(am+1) > 0 ∧ . . . ∧M ′(aj) > 0, because
M ′ = M [¬(M(am > 0))]. Thus, M ′1(Ωzj) should be one of the label chains
that appear above M1(Ωzj) in (Zj). From 1 ≤ n ≤ m − 1, we then have
M ′1(T
n(zj)) 6= `m. So, M1(T n(zj)) 6= M ′1(T n(zj)).
2. M1(T (zj)) 6= `m
From (Zj) and M1(T n+1(zj)) = `m, we then have M1(T n(zj)) = `m−1 and
n = m−1 (som 6= 1). Also, M should haveM ′(am) > 0∧M ′(aM+1) > 0∧ . . .∧
M ′(aj) > 0. So,M ′ should haveM ′(am) 6> 0∧M ′(aM+1) > 0∧ . . .∧M ′(aj) > 0,
because M ′ = M [¬(M(am > 0))]. Thus, M ′1(Ωzj) is the mth label chain in (Zj).
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So, M ′1(T n(zj)) = M ′1(Tm−1(zj)) = `m. Thus, M1(T n(zj)) 6= M ′1(T n(zj)).
Weakened Threat Model
Theorem 9. For an enforcer E and lattice L3, if GEa:=e is 1-dependent and 2-Enf ≤0,L3c
E, then E does not satisfy 0-BNI(L3).
Proof. We have L = 〈{L,M,H},v〉where L @ M @ H and ⊥ = L.
Consider program pgm:
wa := ma;
if mb > 0 then wb := mb else wb := h end;
if l > 1 then wc := wa else wc := wb end;
w := wc;
m := w;
l := 1
where l,ma,mb,m, h are anchor variables with T (l) = L, T (ma) = T (mb) =
T (m) = M, and T (h) = H, and w,wa, wb, wc are flexible variables.
2-Enf produces the following labels when executes pgm with a convention-
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ally initialized memory:
mb > 0 mb 6> 0
l > 1
wa : 〈M, L〉
wb : 〈M,M〉
w : 〈M, L〉
wa : 〈M, L〉
wb : 〈H,M〉
w : 〈M, L〉
l 6> 1
wa : 〈M, L〉
wb : 〈M,M〉
w : 〈M,M〉
wa : 〈M, L〉
wb : 〈H,M〉
w : 〈H,M〉
We first prove that, for all executions, T (w) produced by 2-Enf is 1-precise.
Consider τ = trace2-Enf (pgm,M), where M is conventionally initialized and
M |= H0(2-Enf ,L, pgm). There exists s such that τ [s − 1] = 〈w := wc;Cr,Mw〉
and τ [s] = 〈Cr,Mr〉.
We prove that Mr(T (w)) is 1-precise. Consider E ′ an enforcer that satis-
fies 0-BNI(L) and 2-E ≤0,Lc E ′. Assume τ ′ = traceE′(pgm,M ′) where M ′ |=
H0(E ′,L, pgm) and
ρ1(M,M
′). (B.21)
From 2-Enf ≤0,Lc E ′, we get ∀` ∈ L: τ |0` E τ ′|0` . So, it should be the case that τ ′[s−
1] = 〈w := wc;Cr,M ′w〉 and τ ′[s] = 〈Cr,M ′r〉. We prove M ′r(T (w)) = Mr(T (w)).
1. M(l) 6> 1 and M(mb) > 0 (a1)
We have Mr(T (w)) = M. We prove M ′r(T (w)) = M. It should be the case
that M ′r(T (w)) v M, because otherwise τ |0M E τ ′|0M would not hold, since
observation 〈w,Mr(w)〉would belong to τ |0M, but no observation involving w
would belong to τ ′|0M.
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Assume for contradiction thatM ′r(T (w)) @ M. So, M ′r(T (w)) = L. From (B.21)
and (a1), we get
M ′(l) 6> 1 and M ′(mb) > 0 (B.22)
There exists a memory M ′′ such that M ′′ |= H0(E ′,L, pgm) and:
M ′|L = M ′′|L, (B.23)
M ′′(mb) 6> 0, (B.24)
M ′(mb) 6= M ′′(h) (B.25)
Let τ ′′ = traceE′(pgm,M ′′). From (B.23) and because T (l) = L, we get
M ′(l) = M ′′(l). (B.26)
From M ′(l) 6> 1, we then get
M ′′(l) 6> 1. (B.27)
If M ′′r (T (w)) 6= L, then E ′ does not satisfy 0-BNI(L), because (B.23) and
M ′r(T (w)) = L, and thus, observation 〈w,M ′r(w)〉 is included in τ ′|0L but no
observation involving w is included in τ ′′|0L. So, M ′′r (T (w)) = L. Because E ′ is
an enforcer and due to (B.27), (B.22), and (B.24), we have:
M ′r(w) = M
′
r(wc) = M
′
r(wb) = M
′(mb) and
M ′′r (w) = M
′′
r (wc) = M
′′
r (wb) = M
′′(h).
From (B.25), we then have M ′r(w) 6= M ′′r (w). So, E ′ does not satisfy 0-BNI
given (B.23), because τ ′|0L includes observation 〈w,M ′r(w)〉, τ ′′|0L includes ob-
servation 〈w,M ′′r (w)〉, and M ′r(w) 6= M ′′r (w). But this is a contradiction. Thus,
M ′r(T (w)) = M.
2. M(l) 6> 1 and M(mb) 6> 0 (a2)
We have Mr(T (w)) = H. We prove that M ′r(T (w)) = H. If M ′r(T (w)) = L, then
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we follow the arguments of the above case, where (B.22) would be M ′(mb) 6>
0 and (B.24) would be M ′′(mb) > 0, and we are lead to a contradiction.
Assume for contradiction that M ′r(T (w)) = M. There exists M ′′ such that
M ′′ |= H0(E ′,L, pgm) and
M ′|M = M ′′|M, (B.28)
M ′(h) 6= M ′′(h). (B.29)
Let τ ′′ = traceE′(pgm,M ′′). From (B.28), we get
M ′(l) = M ′′(l), (B.30)
M ′(mb) = M ′′(mb). (B.31)
From (B.21), (a2), (B.30), and (B.31), we get
M ′(l) 6> 1,M ′′(l) 6> 1,M ′(mb) 6> 0, and M ′′(mb) 6> 0. (B.32)
It should be the case that M ′′r (T (w)) = M, because otherwise E ′ would not
satisfy 0-BNI(L), which is a contradiction. Because E ′ is an enforcer and due
to (B.32), we have:
M ′r(w) = M
′
r(wc) = M
′
r(wb) = M
′(h) and
M ′′r (w) = M
′′
r (wc) = M
′′
r (wb) = M
′′(h).
From (B.29), we then have M ′r(w) 6= M ′′r (w). So, given (B.28), E ′ does not
satisfy 0-BNI(L), which is a contradiction. Thus, M ′r(T (w)) = H.
3. M(l) > 1 (a3)
We have Mr(T (w)) = M. We prove that M ′r(T (w)) = M. It should be the case
that M ′r(T (w)) v M, because otherwise τ |0M E τ ′|0M would not hold.
Assume for contradiction thatM ′r(T (w)) @ M. So,M ′r(T (w)) = L. There exists
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M ′′ such that
M ′|L = M ′′|L, (B.33)
M ′(ma) 6= M ′′(ma) (B.34)
Let τ ′′ = traceE′(C,M ′′). From (B.33), we get
M ′(l) = M ′′(l). (B.35)
From (B.21) and (a3), we then have
M ′(l) > 1 and M ′′(l) > 1. (B.36)
If M ′′(T (w)) 6= L, then E ′ does not satisfy 0-BNI(L), which is a contradiction.
Assume M ′′(T (w)) = L. Because E ′ is an enforcer and due to (B.36), we have
M ′r(w) = M
′
r(wc) = M
′
r(wa) = M
′(ma) and
M ′′r (w) = M
′′
r (wc) = M
′′
r (wa) = M
′′(ma).
From (B.34), we have M ′r(w) 6= M ′′r (w). So, given (B.33), E ′ does not satisfy
0-BNI(L), which is a contradiction. Thus, M ′r(T (w)) = M.
So, for all executions, T (w) produced by 2-Enf is 1-precise.
Consider an enforcer E that uses 1-dependent GEa:=e and 2-Enf ≤0,Lc E. We
prove thatE does not satisfy 0-BNI(L). Assume for contradiction thatE satisfies
0-BNI(L). We examine whether E decides to block the execution of pgm for the
following exhaustive list of cases: l > 1, l 6> 1∧mb > 0, and l 6> 1∧mb 6> 0. From
that, we will show that E does not satisfy 0-BNI(L), which is a contradiction.
1. l > 1:
There exists a conventionally initialized memory M with M |=
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H0(2-Enf ,L, pgm) and M(l) > 1.
Let τ ′ = trace2-Enf (pgm,M). There exists memory M1 such that M1 |=
H0(E,L, pgm), ρ1(M,M1), and τ1 = traceE(pgm,M1). Because 2-Enf ≤0,Lc E,
we have ∀` ∈ L: τ ′|0` E τ1|0` . From ρ1(M,M1), we have
M1(l) > 1. (B.37)
Because M(l) > 1, enforcer 2-Enf executes l := 1, and thus, 〈l, 1〉 ∈ τ ′|0L. From
∀`: τ ′|0` E τ1|0` , we then get 〈l, 1〉 ∈ τ1|0L. Thus, 〈l := 1,Mr〉 → 〈stop,Ms〉
should be a subtrace of τ1. Thus, we have
Mr(G
E
l:=1) = true. (B.38)
Because pgm is an anchor-tailed command, we can have Vl:=1 = {l,m,w}.
Because E uses 1-dependent GEl:=1, we get that
Mr(G
E
l:=1) = f(Mr(T (l)),Mr(T (m)),Mr(T (w))). (B.39)
Because, for all executions, T (w) produced by 2-Enf is 1-precise, and because
2-Enf ≤0,Lc E, E satisfies 0-BNI(L), and ρ1(M,M1), we get
Mr(T (l)) = L,Mr(T (m)) = M,Mr(T (w)) = M. (B.40)
From (B.38) and (B.39), we then get
f(L,M,M) = true. (B.41)
2. l 6> 1 and mb > 0:
There exists a conventionally initialized memory M ′ with M ′ |=
H0(2-Enf ,L, pgm) M ′(l) 6> 1 and M ′(mb) > 0.
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Let τ ′ = trace2-Enf (pgm,M ′). There exists M2 such that M2 |= H0(E,L, pgm),
ρ1(M
′,M2), and τ2 = traceE(pgm,M2). Because 2-Enf ≤0,Lc E, we have that
∀` ∈ L: τ ′|0` E τ2|0` . From ρ1(M ′,M2), we have
M2(l) 6> 1 ∧ M2(mb) > 0. (B.42)
Because M ′(l) 6> 1, and M ′(mb) > 0, enforcer 2-Enf executes m := w, and
thus, 〈m, ν〉 ∈ τ ′|0M. From ∀`: τ ′|0` E τ2|0` , we then get 〈m, ν〉 ∈ τ2|0M. Thus,
〈m := w; l := 1,Mm〉 → 〈l := 1,Mr〉 should be a subtrace of τ2. Because pgm
is an anchor-tailed command, we can have Vl:=1 = {l,m,w}. Because E uses
1-dependent GEl:=1, we get that
Mr(G
E
l:=1) = f(Mr(T (l)),Mr(T (m)),Mr(T (w))). (B.43)
Because, for all executions, T (w) produced by 2-Enf is 1-precise, and because
2-Enf ≤0,Lc E, E satisfies 0-BNI(L), and ρ1(M ′,M2), we get
Mr(T (l)) = L,Mr(T (m)) = M,Mr(T (w)) = M. (B.44)
So, Mr(GEl:=1) = f(L,M,M) = true, due to (B.41). So, E executes l := 1, and
thus, 〈l, 1〉 ∈ τ2|0L. (c1)
3. l 6> 1 and mb 6> 0:
There exists a conventionally initialized memory M ′′ with M ′′ |=
H0(2-Enf ,L, pgm), dom(M ′′) = dom(M ′), M ′|L = M ′′|L, M ′′(l) 6> 1, and
M ′′(mb) 6> 0.
Let τ ′′ = trace2-Enf (pgm,M ′′). There exists M3 such that M3 |= H0(E,L, pgm),
ρ1(M
′′,M3), and τ3 = traceE(pgm,M3). Because 2-Enf ≤0,Lc E, we have that
∀` ∈ L: τ ′′|0` E τ3|0` . From ρ1(M ′′,M3), we have
M3(l) 6> 1 ∧ M3(mb) 6> 0. (B.45)
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From dom(M ′′) = dom(M ′), M ′|L = M ′′|L, ρ1(M ′′,M3), c(M ′′), ρ1(M ′,M2),
c(M ′), we then get M2|L = M3|L. Enforcer 2-Enf executes w := wc, and thus,
〈w, ν〉 ∈ τ ′′|0H. From ∀`: τ ′′|0` E τ3|0` , we then get 〈w, ν〉 ∈ τ3|0H. Thus, 〈w :=
wc;m := w; l := 1,Mw〉 → 〈m := w; l := 1,Mm〉 should be a subtrace of τ3. We
examine two cases: τ3 either executes m := w or not.
3.1. τ3 does not execute m := w.
So, l := 1 is not executed either. (c2)
Thus, τ2|0L 6= τ3|0L, due to (c1) and (c2).
From M2|L = M3|L, we then get that E does not satisfy 0-BNI(L).
3.2. τ3 executes m := w.
Then h is leaked to m. There exists M4 such that M4 |= H0(E,L, pgm)
and
M3|M = M4|M, (B.46)
M3(h) 6= M4(h). (B.47)
From (B.46) and (B.45), we get
M3(l) = M4(l) 6> 1, (B.48)
M3(mb) = M4(mb) 6> 0. (B.49)
Let τ4 = traceE(pgm,M4). If τ4 does not executem := w, then τ3|M 6= τ4|M.
If τ4 executes m := w, then (B.47) implies τ3|M 6= τ4|M, because in both
traces τ3 and τ4 the value of m equals the value of h. So, in both cases, E
does not satisfy 0-BNI(L).
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(ASGNA)
v = M(e) Ga:=e ` = M(bccc) unionsqM(bc)
〈a := e,M〉 → 〈stop,M [a 7→ v, bc 7→ `]〉
(ASGNAFAIL)
v = M(e) ¬Ga:=e ` = M(bccc) unionsqM(bc)
〈a := e,M〉 → 〈block,M [bc 7→ `]〉
(ASGNF)
ν0 = M(e) ν1 = M(T (e)) unionsqM(bccc) unionsqM(bc)
〈w := e,M〉 → 〈stop,M [w 7→ ν0, T (w) 7→ ν1]〉
U(M,W ) ,M [ ∀w∈W : T (w) 7→ T (w) unionsqM(bccc) unionsqM(bc)]
Figure B.2: Modified rules for EH,L
Familiar Two-level Lattice
Theorem 10. Enforcer EH,L uses 1-dependent Ga:=e, satisfies 0-BNI(L2), and satisfies
2-Enf <0,L2c EH,L.
Proof. Lemma 36 gives that EH,L is an enforcer and uses 1-dependent Ga:=e.
Lemma 33 gives that EH,L satisfies 0-BNI(L2). Lemma 34 gives that 2-Enf <0,L2c
EH,L holds.
Lemma 33. EH,L satisfies 0-BNI(L2).
Proof. We retrieve EH,L from ∞-Enf by replacing rules for assignments and
function U used in exit with the corresponding definitions in Figure B.2. Be-
cause BNI+(∞-Enf ,L2,C) holds, then BNI+(EH,L,L2,C) holds where C is any
command different from assignment and exit, provided all Lemmata used to
prove Lemma 13 hold for rules in Figure B.2. In particular, Lemmata 14, 15, 16,
19, 20, 17, and 18 still hold. Now, it suffices to prove BNI+(EH,L,L2,C) where C
is an assignment or exit.
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For EH,L, the domain of memories contain only variables and tags of these
variables. So, in the definition of BNI+, projections M |` and τ |k` equal projec-
tion M |0` and τ |0` , correspondingly. Also, mon(M) is trivially true for any such
memory So, the definition on BNI+ becomes: For all ` ∈ L2,M,M ′ if
M |0` = M ′|0` ,
M(cc) = M ′(cc)
τ = traceEH,L(C,M) = 〈C,M〉 ∗→ 〈Ct,Mt〉,
τ ′ = traceEH,L(C,M
′) = 〈C,M ′〉 ∗→ 〈C ′t,M ′t〉
where Ct and C ′t are terminations (i.e., stop or block), then:
c1 If Ct and C ′t are both stop, then τ |0` =obs τ ′|0` , Mt|0` = M ′t|0` , and Mt(cc) =
M ′t(cc).
c2 If Ct or C ′t is block, then τ |0` =obs τ ′|0` .
c3 If Ct is stop, C ′t is block, and M ′t(bc) 6v `, then Mt(bc) 6v `.
c4 If Ct is stop, C ′t is block, 〈C ′tp,M ′tp〉 → 〈C ′t,M ′t〉 are the last two states of
τ ′, and M ′tp(bccc) v `, then there exists 〈C ′′,M ′′〉 ∈ τ , with C ′′ = C ′tp and
M ′′|` = M ′tp|`.
Because ` ∈ L2,we have that ` is either L or H. If ` = H, then BNI+ is trivially
satisfied, because hypothesis M |0` = M ′|0` implies M = M ′. Thus, we prove
BNI+ for
` = L. (B.50)
1. C is a := e:
We prove that M(T (a)) = M ′(T (a)). If M(T (a)) = L, then M |` = M ′|` gives
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M ′(T (a)) = L. If M(T (a)) = H, then M |` = M ′|` gives M ′(T (a)) = H. So,
M(T (a)) = M ′(T (a)).
1.1. M(T (a)) v `
We first prove that the command is executed normally in both memories
or blocked in both memories. W.l.o.g, assume that the command is ex-
ecuted normally in M . That is, M(T (e)) unionsqM(bccc) unionsqM(bc) v M(T (a))
holds. This implies that M(T (e)) v `, M(bccc) v `, and M(bc) v `. Be-
cause M |` = M ′|`, we get M(cc) = M ′(cc) and M(bc) = M ′(bc). From
M(T (e)) v ` and M |` = M ′|`, we then get M ′(T (e)) v `. From (B.50), we
then have M(T (e)) = M ′(T (e)) = L.
Thus, M ′(T (e)) unionsqM ′(bccc) unionsqM ′(bc) v M ′(T (a)) holds. So, in both cases
the command is executed normally. Thus, the command is executed nor-
mally in both memories or blocked in both memories. So, c3 and c4 are
trivially true.
1.1.1. The command is executed normally in both memories.
c2 is trivially true.
We prove c1. We have:
τ = 〈a := e,M〉 → 〈stop,M [a 7→M(e), bc 7→ `g]〉
τ ′ = 〈a := e,M′〉 → 〈stop,M ′[a 7→M ′(e), bc 7→ `′g]〉,
where `g = M(bccc) unionsqM(bc) and `′g = M ′(bccc) unionsqM ′(bc). We have
τ |` = τ ′|` = 〈a,M(e)〉, because M(e) = M ′(e). Also, `g = `′g. So,
Mt(bc) = M
′
t(bc). Because Mt(cc) = M(cc) = M ′(cc) = M ′t(cc),
Mt(cc) = M
′
t(cc) holds. Because Mt(a) = M ′t(a), Mt(bc) = M ′t(bc),
and Mt(cc) = M ′t(cc), we get Mt|` = M ′t|`. Thus c1 holds.
1.1.2. The command is blocked in both memories.
τ = 〈a := e,M〉 → 〈block,M [bc 7→ `g]〉
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τ ′ = 〈a := e,M′〉 → 〈block,M ′[bc 7→ `′g]〉.
So, τ |` =obs  and τ ′|` =obs . Thus c2 holds. c1 is trivially true.
1.2. M(T (a)) 6v `
We have τ |` =obs  and τ ′|` =obs . Thus c2 holds.
We prove c1. Assume Ct = C ′t = stop. Because M(T (a)),M ′(T (a)) 6v `,
Mt andM ′t do not need to agree on a. AssumeMt(bc) v `. So,M(T 2(e))unionsq
M(bccc) unionsqM(bc) v `. Thus, M(T 2(e)) v `, M(bccc) v `, and M(bc) v `.
From mon(M ) and M(T 2(e)) v `, we get M(T 3(e)) v `. From M |` =
M ′|`, M(T 3(e)) v `, M(bccc) v `, M(bc) v `, and Lemma 17, we get:
M(T 2(e)) = M ′(T 2(e)), M(bccc) = M ′(bccc), and M(bc) = M ′(bc). So,
Mt(bc) = M
′
t(bc). From M(cc) = M ′(cc), we get M(cc) = M ′(cc). From
Mt(cc) = M(cc) and M ′t(cc) = M ′(cc), we then get Mt(cc) = M ′t(cc).
Thus, Mt|` = M ′t|` and Mt(cc) = M ′t(cc). Thus c1 holds.
We prove c3. Assume Ct is stop, C ′t is block, and M ′t(bc) 6v `. We prove
Mt(bc) 6v `. We prove the contrapositive. Assume Mt(bc) v `, then fol-
lowing the same arguments as above, we get Mt(bc) = M ′t(bc), and thus,
M ′t(bc) v `, as wanted.
We prove c4. AssumeCt is stop,C ′t is block, 〈C ′tp,M ′tp〉 → 〈C ′t,M ′t〉 are the
last two states of τ ′, and M ′tp(bccc) v `. So, M ′tp = M ′ and C ′tp = a := e.
We have that 〈C ′′,M ′′〉 = 〈a := e,M〉, which satisfies C ′′ = C ′tp and
M ′′|` = M ′tp|`. Thus c4 holds.
2. C is w := e
τ = 〈w := e,M〉 → 〈stop,Mt〉
τ ′ = 〈w := e,M ′〉 → 〈stop,M ′t〉
c2, c3, and c4 are trivially true.
We prove c1. Mt(cc) = M ′t(cc) holds due to M(cc) = M ′(cc), Mt(cc) = M(cc),
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and M ′t(cc) = M ′(cc).
2.1. Mt(T (w)) v `
Then M(T (e)) v `, M(bccc) v `, and M(bc) v `. From, M |` = M ′|` and
(B.50), we then get M(e) = M ′(e), M(T (e)) = M ′(T (e)), M(cc) = M ′(cc),
and M(bc) = M ′(bc). So, Mt(w) = M ′t(w) and Mt(T (w)) = M ′t(T (w)).
Thus, Mt|` = M ′t|` and τ |` = τ ′|`. Thus c1 holds.
2.2. Mt(T (w)) 6v `
By symmetry of preceding case, M ′t(T (w)) 6v `. So, τ |` =obs  and τ ′|` =obs
. Also Mt|` = M ′t|`. Thus c1 holds.
3. exit
τ = 〈exit,M〉 → 〈stop,Mt〉
τ ′ = 〈exit,M ′〉 → 〈stop,M ′t〉.
c2, c3, c4 are trivially true.
We prove c1. We have τ |` =obs  and τ ′|` =obs . So, we need to prove Mt|` =
Mt|` and Mt(cc) = M ′t(cc). From M(cc) = M ′(cc), we get M(cc) = M ′(cc).
Because Mt(cc) = M(cc).pop and M ′t(cc) = M ′(cc).pop, we then get Mt(cc) =
M ′t(cc). We now prove Mt|` = Mt|`.
3.1. Mt(bccc) unionsqMt(bc) 6v ` and M(cc).top.A 6= ∅.
Because M(cc).top.A 6= ∅, we have Mt(bc) = M(bc) unionsqM(bccc). We have
Mt(bccc) v M(bccc). We get Mt(bccc) unionsqM(bc) v M(bccc) unionsqM(bc), which
becomes Mt(bccc) unionsqM(bc) unionsqM(bccc) vM(bccc) unionsqM(bc) unionsqM(bccc), which
becomes Mt(bccc) unionsqMt(bc) v M(bccc) unionsqM(bc). So, M(bccc) unionsqM(bc) 6v `.
So, Mt(bc) 6v `. Because M |` = M ′|`, we also get M ′(bccc) unionsqM ′(bc) 6v `.
Because M(cc).top.A 6= ∅ and M(cc) = M ′(cc), we have M ′(cc).top.A 6=
∅, too. So, M ′t(bc) = M ′(bc) unionsqM ′(bccc). Thus, M ′t(bc) 6v `.
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From Mt(bc) 6v ` and M ′t(bc) 6v `, we get Mt(bccc) unionsq Mt(bc) 6v ` and
M ′t(bccc) unionsqM ′t(bc) 6v `.
Only variables in W change their labels. Let x ∈ M(cc).top.W . Because
M(bccc) unionsqM(bc) 6v `, we have Mt(T (x)) 6v `. Because M(cc) = M ′(cc),
we get x ∈ M ′(cc).top.W , too. Because M ′(bccc) unionsqM ′(bc) 6v `, we have
M ′t(T (x)) 6v `. So, Mt|` = M ′t|`. Thus c1 holds.
3.2. Mt(bccc) unionsqMt(bc) 6v ` and M(cc).top.A = ∅.
Because M(cc).top.A = ∅, we have Mt(bc) = M(bc). We have Mt(bccc) v
M(bccc). We get Mt(bccc) unionsq M(bc) v M(bccc) unionsq M(bc), which becomes
Mt(bccc) unionsqMt(bc) v M(bccc) unionsqM(bc). So, M(bccc) unionsqM(bc) 6v `. Because
M |` = M ′|`, we also get M ′(bccc) unionsqM ′(bc) 6v `.
Because M(cc).top.A = ∅ and M(cc) = M ′(cc), we have that
M ′(cc).top.A = ∅. So, M ′t(bc) = M ′(bc).
Assume Mt(bc) v `. Then M(bc) v `. From M |` = M ′|`, we then get
M(bc) = M ′(bc). Thus, Mt(bc) = M ′t(bc).
We proveM ′t(bccc)unionsqM ′t(bc) 6v `. Assume for contradiction thatM ′t(bccc)unionsq
M ′t(bc) v `. Then M ′t(bc) v `. Following the same arguments as
above, we get Mt(bc) = M ′t(bc). Because Mt(cc) = M ′t(cc), we then
get Mt(bc) unionsq Mt(cc) = M ′t(bc) unionsq M ′t(cc), which is a contradiction. So,
M ′t(bccc) unionsqM ′t(bc) 6v `.
Only variables in V change their labels. Let x ∈ M(cc).top.W . Because
M(bccc) unionsqM(bc) 6v `, we have Mt(T (x)) 6v `. Because M(cc) = M ′(cc),
we get x ∈ M ′(cc).top.W , too. Because M ′(bccc) unionsqM ′(bc) 6v `, we have
M ′t(T (x)) 6v `. So, Mt|` = M ′t|`. Thus c1 holds.
3.3. Mt(bccc) unionsqMt(bc) v `
So, Mt(bc) v `. From Lemma 19, we get M(bc) v `. From M |` = M ′|`
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and M(bc) v `, we also get M(bc) = M ′(bc). From M(cc) = M ′(cc), we
then get Mt(bc) = M ′t(bc).
• Let M(bccc) unionsqM(bc) v `.
Let x ∈M(cc).top.W . Because M(cc) = M ′(cc), we get
x ∈M ′(cc).top.W . We have:
Mt(T (x)) v `⇒M(T (x)) v `⇒M(x) = M ′(x) and M ′(T (x)) v `.
BecauseM(cc) = M ′(cc) andM(bc) = M ′(bc), we then haveMt(x) =
M ′t(x) and M ′t(T (x)) v `. Thus, Mt|` = M ′t|`. Thus c1 holds.
• Let M(bccc) unionsqM(bc) 6v `.
So, M ′(bccc) unionsq M ′(bc) 6v `. Let x ∈ M(cc).top.W . So, Mt(T (x)) 6v
`. Because M(cc) = M ′(cc), we get x ∈ M ′(cc).top.V , and thus
M ′t(T (x)) 6v `. Thus, Mt|` = M ′t|`. Thus c1 holds.
Case 4.3.2. in the proof of Lemma 13 mentions ASGNA.
We reexamine this case when rule ASGNA in Figure B.2 is instead used:
– Mtp(bc) v ` and Mtp(cc) v `
From IH[c4] on C1, there exists 〈C1tp,M ′1〉 ∈ τ ′1 such that Mtp|` = M ′1|`. So,
Mtp(bc) = M
′
1(bc) and Mtp(cc) = M ′1(cc). Because τ1 is blocked, we have
Mtp(T (e))unionsqMtp(bccc)unionsqMtp(bc) 6vMtp(T (a)). Since the inequality is satisfied
in τ ′1, it means that the value of T (e) is different in M ′1 and Mtp. But this
contradicts Mtp|` = M ′1|`. Indeed, Mtp|` = M ′1|` implies that M ′1(T (e)) and
Mtp(T (e)) should either be both L or both H. Thus, this case is no longer
possible once a two-level lattice is considered.
Thus, BNI+(EH,L,L2,C) holds. BNI+ implies 0-BNI. So, EH,L satisfies 0-BNI.
Lemma 34. 2-Enf <0,L2c EH,L
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Proof. We first prove 2-Enf ≤0,L2c EH,L. Consider conventionally initial-
ized memory M with M |= H0(2-Enf ,L2, C). Consider memory M ′ with
M ′ |= H0(EH,L,L2, C) and ρ1(M,M ′). Assume τ ′ = traceEH,L(C,M ′) and τ =
trace2-Enf (C,M). By definition, we have M ′(cc) = M(cc) =  and M ′(bc) =
M(bc) = ⊥.
We write M ′ ve M iff
1. ∀x: M ′(x) = M(x),
2. ∀a: M ′(T (a)) = M(T (a)),
3. ∀w: M ′(T (w)) vM(T (w)),
4. M ′(bc) vM(bc),
5. ∀i ≥ 0: M ′(bcc.popic) vM(bcc.popic) ∧
M ′(cc.popi.top.A) = M(cc.popi.top.A) ∧
M ′(cc.popi.top.W ) = M(cc.popi.top.W )
where cc.popi pops the top i elements from cc and cc.pop0 = cc.
So, M ′ ve M holds. By induction on the number of steps in τ and Lemma
35, we get that ∀` ∈ L2: τ |0` E τ ′|0` . So, 2-Enf ≤0,L2c EH,L.
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Now, we prove EH,L 6≤0,L2c 2-Enf . Consider program pgm:
if h > 0
w := h
else
w := l
end;
h := w;
l := 1
For every execution under 2-Enf we have:
• w is associated with 〈H,H〉,
• bc is H when reaching l := 1,
• so l := 1 is blocked.
For every execution under EH,L we have:
• w is associated with H,
• bc is L when reaching l := 1,
• so l := 1 is allowed.
Thus, EH,L produces observation 〈l, 1〉, but 2-Enf does not. So, EH,L 6≤0,L2c 2-Enf .
From 2-Enf ≤0,L2c EH,L, we then have 2-Enf <0,L2c EH,L. Notice that the same
program pgm works for 2-Eopt, too. And thus we get 2-Eopt <0,L2c EH,L.
Lemma 35. If 〈C1,M1〉 → 〈C2,M2〉 under 2-Enf , and 〈C1,M ′1〉 → 〈C ′2,M ′2〉 under
EH,L, and M ′1 ve M1, then C2 = C ′2 and M ′2 ve M2 hold or C2 = block holds.
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Proof. We use induction on C1. Assume C2 6= block. We prove C2 = C ′2 and
M ′2 ve M2.
1. C1 is a := e.
We have C2 = stop. Then M1(T (e)) unionsqM1(bccc) unionsqM1(bc) v M1(T (a)) holds.
Due to M ′1 ve M1, we then get M ′1(T (e)) unionsq M ′1(bccc) unionsq M ′1(bc) v M ′1(T (a)).
So, C ′2 = stop. Also, M2(a) = M1(e) = M ′1(e) = M ′2(a). Because M ′2(bc) =
M ′1(bccc) unionsq M ′1(bc) and M2(bc) = M1(T (e)) unionsq M1(bccc) unionsq M1(bc), hypothesis
M ′1 ve M1 gives M ′2(bc) vM2(bc). So, M ′2 ve M2.
2. C1 is w := e.
We have C2 = C ′2 = stop. Hypothesis M ′1 ve M1 implies M1(e) = M ′1(e), and
thus, M2(w) = M ′2(w). Because M ′2(T (w)) = M ′1(T (e)) unionsq M ′1(bccc) unionsq M ′1(bc)
and M2(T (w)) = M1(T (e)) unionsqM1(bccc) unionsqM1(bc), hypothesis M ′1 ve M1 gives
M ′2(T (w)) vM2(T (w)). So, M ′2 ve M2.
3. C1 is exit
We have C2 = C ′2 = stop. Because M2(cc) = M1(cc).pop and M ′2(cc) =
M ′1(cc).pop, hypothesis M ′1 ve M1 gives ∀i: M ′2(bcc.popic) vM2(bcc.popic). Hy-
pothesis M ′1 ve M1 also gives M ′1(cc) vM1(cc), M ′1(cc.top.A) = M1(cc.top.A),
and M ′1(bc) v M1(bc), and thus, we get M ′2(bc) v M2(bc). From M ′1 ve M1,
we also get M ′1(cc.top.W ) = M1(cc.top.W ). Because, for all w ∈ W , we have
M ′2(T (w)) = M
′
1(T (w)) unionsq M ′1(bccc) unionsq M ′1(bc) and M2(T (w)) = M1(T (w)) unionsq
M1(bccc) unionsq M1(bc), hypothesis M ′1 ve M1 gives M ′2(T (w)) v M2(T (w)). So,
M ′2 ve M2.
2-Enf and EH,L use the same rules for other commands, so M ′2 ve M2 follows
easily.
Lemma 36. EH,L is an enforcer and uses 1-dependent Ga:=e.
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Proof. It is easy to prove that EH,L is an enforcer on R and satisfies restrictions
(E1), (E2), and (E3) by induction on the operational semantics rules. We omit
the details.
We now prove that EH,L uses 1-dependent Ga:=e. Consider an assignment
a := e in an anchor-tailed command C;C ′, where C does not involve any as-
signment to anchor variable and C ′ is a sequence of assignments to anchor vari-
ables. From rule (ASGNA) of EH,L we get that Ga:=e is M(T (e))unionsqM(bccc)unionsqM(bc) v
M(T (a)). Because a := e is in an anchor-tailed command, we get that a := e is
not encapsulated in any conditional command. So, M(cc) = . Because C does
not involve any assignment to anchor variable, bc is ⊥ when execution reaches
C ′. While executing C ′, cc remains , and thus, from rule (ASGNA) of EH,L, we get
that bc remains ⊥. So, M(bc) = ⊥. Thus, Ga:=e is M(T (e)) v M(T (a)). So, EH,L
uses 1-dependent Ga:=e.
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